ASSESSING CHANGES IN US COUNTERMEASURE STRATEGIC OPTIONS WITHIN MOUNTING IRANIAN NUCLEAR ASPIRATIONS SINCE YEAR 2000

By
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**Supervisor**
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**Examination Committee**   **Signature**

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List of Abbreviations

AD   Assured Destruction

AP   Additional Protocol

CENTO   Central Treaty Organization

CIA   Central Intelligence Agency

ED   Extended Deterrence

EU   European Union

EU 3   Germany, France, UK

EU/E3   France, the UK and Germany

GCC   Gulf Cooperation Council

HEU   Highly Enriched Uranium

IAEA   International Atomic Energy Agency

ILSA   The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act

ISA   Iran Sanctions Act

LEU   Low Enriched Uranium

MAD   Mutual Assured Destruction

NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NIE   National Intelligence Estimate

NPT   Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

PGCC   Persian Gulf Cooperation Council

P5+1   "Permanent Five Plus 1" (United States, Russia, China, France, Britain, and
Germany)

PMOI   People's Mujahidin Organization of Iran

SCO   Shanghai Cooperation Organization

SEATO   South East Asia Treaty Organization

TCA   Trade and Cooperation Accord

UN   United Nations

US   United States

USSR   Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WMD   Weapons of Mass Destruction

WTO   World Trade Organization

ASSESSING CHANGES IN US COUNTERMEASURE STRATEGIC OPTIONS WITHIN MOUNTING IRANIAN NUCLEAR ASPIRATIONS (2000-2006)

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ABSTRACT

For the past few years, Iranian nuclear issue has vividly demonstrated itself on the surface of the political, security, as well as strategic analyst circles and policy makings alike. Today, the American Iranian relations have entered into what appears a limbo though irreversible blur path especially since the arrival of two opposed political leaders to presidency office: George Bush and Ahmadinejad in 2000 and 2005 respectively. Indeed, Iran's persistence to carry out its nuclear 'ambitions' has triggered further complications to the relations. Accordingly, the United States has been working rigorously in preventing Iran from accomplishing such end. So far, the US has adopted a number of strategic options available in an attempt to compel Iran to relinquish it current nuclear program 'aspirations'.

To this end, this paper aims at evaluating and assessing the effectiveness of these strategic countermeasures options applied so far by the US towards Iran. Within the course of analytical discussions demonstrated in the following chapters, the thesis concludes that the United States has considerably failed to limit or mitigate Iran's nuclear 'ambitions', so far. The policy of containment has not yet deemed efficient to swerve Iran from its nuclear 'path'. In parallel, the paper foresees that US military options are irrelevant rational instruments at least in the time being in that it may backfire on its own various vital interests in the region.

I.I. Introduction

During the course of modern history, it is well recognized that the US-Iranian relations have witnessed major turning points and transformations within which numerous studies and research were conducted to understand as well as to speculate those trends that affect the shaping of their relationship. After decades of cordial relationship during the secular reign of the Shah of Iran, Mohamed Reza Pahlavi, Iran has become increasingly one of US's main adversaries over the twenty nine years. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 is viewed as the most distinct juncture in the history of their relationship when considering the predominant aggressive and belligerent norm of behaviors that dictated their foreign policies for a long period of time.

As for the US, the growing animosity of US foreign policy towards Iran, since late 1970s can be summarized in terms of viewing Iran as a pariah, terrorist, a rogue, and an "evil" state respectively. The US explicit stance towards Iran was clearly stated after President Bush added Iran in the "Axis of Evil" along with Iraq and North Korea. Ever since these developments, Iran is seen by the United States as the world's foremost state-sponsor of terrorism. According to Americans, the pursuit of Iranian nuclear programs has been a major challenge to the United States especially after Iran's refusal to cooperate fully with the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency). Certain suspicions about the developments and more advanced stages of nuclear weapon enrichment programs in Iran have raised American's concerns dramatically. An ongoing turmoil of accusations and arguments never reached to any kind of settlement or agreement between the two states. Iran continued to hold to its right to a nuclear program that it claims as peaceful, while the

United States continued to suspect the intentions and motives behind Iran's insistence to acquire a nuclear program.

As for Israel, it regularly made it clear that it would have preferred tougher penalties for Tehran, not simply what Western diplomats say is a moderate tightening of the screws. Israel's U.N. ambassador Dan Gillerman told reporters "We're not so naive as to think this resolution will put a stop to Iran's nuclear program" (Charbonneau, 2008:3). Israel is getting increasingly restless about the failure of sanctions to effect a change of direction by Iran and is expected to press Washington for action at some stage.

On the other hand, the arrival of Ahmadinejad to presidency in 2005 exacerbated the US – Iranian conflictual relations especially with Iran's continued insistence to further developing its nuclear programs on the one hand, and Ahmadinejad's regular aggressive tones and statements towards Israel -US major ally- on the other. Indeed, nuclear proliferation is a contemporary phenomenon that is being massively discussed in the past decade, and what adds more importance to it is the fact that a country like Iran is being accused of pursuing its nuclear right for -as it claims- peaceful purposes. The Islamic Republic claims that its program is meant for civil and peaceful ends coinciding with international laws adhered mainly by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and thus US – and it allies – pretexts have no legitimate basis. The latter defiant stance nonetheless spins off the argument that Iranian nuclear 'ambitions' or intentions go beyond the alleged peaceful purposes as it desires to seek military nuclear capabilities in future.

The Iranian nuclear program has been an intriguing matter that caused many political and security circles and decision-making cycles to raise questions, mainly in terms of whether the issue of Iran envisaged attempts to acquire nuclear weapons, is seen, as a matter of nuclear proliferation to challenge US or even Israel's regional balance of power. The challenging matter regarding Iran's nuclear program resides mainly in its limited range of viable options that the United States can adopt in dealing with its nuclear issue. Regardless the type of strategy the US is using or intends to use to counter Iran's "nuclear ambitions", it never ignored the significance of Iranian dominance and influence particularly in a region known for its security sensitivity especially when considering the serious dilemma it is currently facing in the aftermath of 2003 war on Iraq.

However, realizing these challenges, it appears that the US is striving to force Iran to give up its nuclear 'aspirations' whilst avoiding to confront Iran militarily at least in the time being. Thus, as shown below, for the past few years, the US has undertaken staunch efforts to countermeasure Iran nuclear prospects along with its continued efforts in gathering international community to isolate the Persian state. For instance, while the U.N. sanctions are targeted specifically at Iran's nuclear program, the unilateral US sanctions are intended to squeeze Iran's economy. The efforts of the US Treasury Department have resulted in the withdrawal of as many as 40 international financial institutions from the Iranian market (Walker, 2007:2). In addition, the United States, Britain and France are pushing for a United Nations Security Council vote on a third round of sanctions because they fear Iran seeks an atomic bomb at a meeting of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council - China, Russia, the United States, France and Britain - and Germany, that was held in Washington in February 2007.

In parallel, the draft resolution calls for asset freezes and mandatory travel bans for specific Iranian officials and vigilance on all banks in Iran. It also expands the list of Iranian officials and companies targeted by the sanctions and repeats the council's demand that Iran halt nuclear enrichment activity, which the West fears is aimed at producing uranium fuel for atomic weapons. It adds language to ensure that the council is authorized to create a committee to gather information, report every three months to the council and decide on some requests to add individuals and entities or to issue exemptions. Under the proposed new sanctions, all countries would have to ban the entry or transit of individuals involved in Iran's nuclear program, including procurement activities. For the first time, trade in equipment and technology that can be used in both civilian and nuclear programs would also be banned. Furthermore, the draft resolution calls for a report from IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei in 90 days on Iran's compliance with the council's demands and says the council will suspend sanctions for as long as Tehran suspends enrichment and reprocessing activities. But the draft also says it will consider added measures if Tehran fails to comply (Charbonneau, 2008:3).

I.II. Hypothesis of the Research

In an anarchic international system, based mainly on the realist school of thought, actions and countermeasures undertaken by the United States have, so far, failed in preventing Iran from maintaining its nuclear program and in neutralizing its nuclear aspirations.

The United States have adopted various countermeasure options in dealing with nuclear Iran. The lack of an effective containment policy, the improbability of a military option,

and the failure of United Nations sanctions, altogether somehow failed to deter Iran from altering its position towards advancing its nuclear program.

I.III. Purpose of the Research

To this end, the question worth asking here is whether such actions or countermeasures undertaken by the US succeeded in preventing Iran from maintaining its nuclear program? The answer of this question raises the main objective as well as the key question of the research in that – as shown below – this paper aims at assessing the various US strategic options in dealing with 'nuclear' Iran during the period of (2000-2006) [1] It will examine the recent escalations in the US-Iranian relations culminated particularly with President Bush's arrival to presidency seat in 2000 followed by with Ahmadinejad's arrival to power in Iran five years later (2005). Ostensibly, the paper is expected to unveil the implications of those major turning points which exacerbated the already fertile grounds to further escalate the tension between the concerned parties on the one hand and unleash the limitations of US strategic options and assess how successful each of the policies adopted by the US has been so far on the other.

I.IV. Significance of the Research

Ostensibly, these types of researches are deemed significant to the contemporary political and strategic literatures in particular and to the International Relations discipline as a whole. With no doubt, the nature of one given countermeasure option undertaken by the US

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[1] Due to the complexity nature of the research, the researcher admits that there are few cases where the paper depended on information which went beyond the specified time framework- considering the centrality of such enlightening and supportive events and data to the quality excellence of the research.

in any particular period of time may swiftly alter the geopolitical as well as economic maps and relations in the already volatile region considering that over than 65% of world oil reserved are contained in the Gulf [2] region. Let alone the fact that most regions surrounding Iran are under US occupation or dominance (e.g. Iraq and Afghanistan). Understanding the strategic countermeasure options available and not least speculating their repercussions and consequences can benefit those as policy maker articulates as well as concerned scholars of the IR field. On the other hand, this contemporary nature of research shall also enrich the theoretical discipline of IR in that it tries to envisage the extent to which various classical schools of though manage to explain current affairs - US-Iranian political and strategic interplay.

I.V. Literature Review

As mentioned above, the current situation in the Gulf region has triggered widespread debates and controversial discourse amongst political and strategic circles. Numerous studies and research were published to reflect serious divergence of opinions and conflict of views amongst scholars concerned which may to some extent refer to their indifferences in ethnic or religious backgrounds coupled with inconsistencies in their comparative level of depth of historical understandings. The following are some of many literatures that tackled the existing US-Iranian affairs:

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[2] Gulf region in this paper refers to the Arabian/Persian Gulf

I. History of American Iranian Relations

It can easily be argued that before 1941 Iran and the United States had almost no relations whatsoever. In his book "The Origins of the Iranian-American Alliance, 1941-1953", Mark Hamilton Lytle say that almost all the ties that bound Iran and the United States from 1954 to 1979 were established during World War II and the early years of the cold war. That meant that the objectives of American policy for Iran were generally defined by global policy concerns (Lytle, 1987:8).

Mark Gasiorowski in "US Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran" examines the cliency relationship that existed between the United States and Iran during the reign of the late shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and assesses the effects of this relationship on Iran's domestic politics. Gasiorowski argues that by bolstering the shah's repressive regime in the 1950s and early 1960s, the US-Iran cliency relationship indirectly helped bring about the Iranian revolution (Gasiorowski, 1991:10).

Ever since the hostage crisis incident, Iran and United States have had a fluctuating relationship that has finally reached to animosity and publicly known hatred, Iran had been transformed from a supporter to a threat to the United States. Stephen Kinzer argues in "All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror" that Operation Ajax, as the CIA coup against Mossadegh was codenamed, was a great trauma for Iran, the Middle East, and the colonial world. It was the first time the United States overthrew a foreign government. It set a pattern for years to come and shaped the way millions of people view the United States. The violent anti-Americanism that emerged from Iran after 1979 shocked most people in the United States (Kinzer, 2003:5).

II. Turning Point of the American Iranian Relations

In the middle of attempts to improve its relations with America, Bush included Iran in his Axis of Evil and characterized it as a rogue state. Whereas according to many western analysts this has been the result of Iran's ambitious dangerous behavior, its nuclear program enrichment, and funding of terrorist groups, according to Brendan O'Neill who wrote in "An irrational war of words" that the denunciation of Iran in 2002 was instead due to absence of clear sense of America's interests and missions, that only irrationalism of the US foreign policy rather than cunning or ambition heightened tensions with Iran (O'Neill, 2006:10).

In "Checking Iran's Nuclear Ambitions", Henry Sokolski characterized Iran as the world's foremost state-sponsor of terrorism, as well as one of the countries most actively pursuing nuclear weapons. He states that Washington is vigilant about Iran's support for a network of Islamist terrorist organizations and persistent in pressing Iran to end its financial, political, material, and operational support to them. At the same time, he adds that the United States has to come up with effective strategies to ensure that Iran does not acquire nuclear weapons (Sokolski, 2004:18).

III. Nuclear Proliferation

"In Deterrence and Nuclear Proliferation in the Twenty-First Century" Stephen J. Cimbala offers a prognosis about the role of nuclear weapons and nuclear arms control in future US defense and other international security policy. The proliferation of nuclear weapons is closely related to other security issues, including the spread of chemical and biological weapons and the availability of ballistic missiles to dissatisfied state actors. Formerly the

weapons of choice that defined great power status, nuclear forces, after the end of the Cold War, may be the preferred weapons by which the weak checkmate the strong (Cimbala, 2001:70).

IV. Iran's Nuclear Program

American and European writers focus mainly on the fact that the major threat to the United States is the nuclear enrichment program that Iran insists on developing as many authors, analysts and academics have written. For instance, Henry Sokolski in "Checking Iran's ambitions" insists that were Iran to acquire nuclear weapons, there is a grave risk it would be tempted to provide them to terrorists. He believes, as many other analysts do that, the fear about what Iran might do with nuclear weapons is fed by the concern that Tehran has no clear reason to be pursuing nuclear weapons. The strategic rationale for Iran's nuclear program is by no means obvious. He compares Iran to Israel, saying unlike Israel, Iran faces no historic enemy who would welcome an opportunity to wipe the state off the face of the earth (Sokolski, 2004:20).

R. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary for Political Affairs wrote in "United States Policy toward Iran" that the United States faces interconnected crisis in the Middle East, one of which is to block the nuclear and regional ambitions of Iran (Burns, 2007:15). He also added that "nothing is more vital to the future of America's role in the Middle East than addressing the challenges posed by the radical regime in Iran, whose public face is the vitriolic President Mahmoud AhmadiNejad"(ibid.) As said by Baker Spring and James Phillips in "Iran's Nuclear Ambitions Go Beyond the Purview of International Institutions"

that Iran is a threat to US vital interests where US and Israel are its main targets (Spring and Phillips, 2006:2).

In recurrence to what had occurred with North Korea in blackmailing US by using its nuclear weapons as a tool, several researchers have highlighted the possibility of a similar behavior by Iran. In "Assessing Iran's nuclear program" by Mark Fitzpatrick who says that "a nuclear weapons capability would give Iran the means to threaten and blackmail its neighbors," "Nuclear weapons increase the possessor's sense of status and might" (Fitzpatrick, 2006:1). Mike Whitney has affirmed and made it clear in "Blackmailing Bush; How The "Dear Leader" Conned "The Decider" , that Iran would naturally develop nuclear weapons after the Korean experience and the process of blackmailing, which was found to be an efficient way to fend off the United States (Whitney, 2007:2).

The motives behind Iran's insistence on acquiring nuclear weapons have been questioned by biased authors who refuse to evaluate the Iranian position in the context of the international arena. To prove the dangerous intentions of Iran, In "Think Again" Christopher de Bellaigue says that If Iran did want nuclear technology for peaceful uses why did it hide its program unless it wants to gather all the elements necessary for bomb making so that it can go nuclear the moment an attack is imminent. He also says that the nuclear fuel cycle is a card Iran plays only to make US abandon its policy of undermining the Islamic republic and lift economic sanctions (Bellaigue, 2005:2). Of the same point of view is Mark Fitzpatrick who stated in "Assessing Iran's nuclear program" that signs of military related nuclear weapons in Iran are multiplying (Fitzpatrick, 2006:3). In his book "Checking Iran's ambitions" Henry Sokolski argues that there is no clear reason to pursuing

nuclear weapons in Iran, and that it is worse off with nuclear weapons complicating its relations with the neighboring states and with US (Sokolski, 2004:20).

In the article "Forced to Fuel: Iran's Nuclear Energy Program" published in the Journal Harvard International Review by Muhammad Sahimi who wrote that the US argument against Iran's nuclear program is that, given its vast oil Iran is not in need of a nuclear program as it claims (Sahimi,2005:1). In the same journal, Tim Bakken in his article "Secretly violating treaty: Averting Catastrophe: Combating Iran's Nuclear Threat" accuses Iran of violating its treaty obligations by concealing its nuclear program for 20 years and adds that the rhetoric of Iran's leaders has been no less worrisome(Bakken,2007:1).

While on the other hand some writers, who are mainly more objective, defended the enrichment of the Iranian nuclear program in the middle of a critical region with a nuclear armed enemy, as such Noam Chomsky said "Had the Iranians not tried to build nuclear weapons, they would be crazy" (Chomsky, 2007:1). As well as Joseph Nye in "Iran approach requires carrot and stick" who said that the world might have to accept a nuclear Iran. Having seen that American enemies that have nuclear weapons survive while Iraq, who didn't have them, no longer exist, Iran is presumed to have a security motivation to arm itself, Other than national prestige and regional leadership motives (Nye, 2006:1).

In the same vein, there exist several writers, who are well experienced with Middle Eastern issues, who believe that the Iranian issue is not a nuclear one, as Chomsky said when Michael Shank interviewed him on the latest developments in US policy toward Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and Venezuela. He had declared that one of Iran's issues is that its

independence is intolerable; its defiance was unacceptable when the revolution threw the Shah's regime that was installed by the United States. He adds that some programs that are now considered as threat were sponsored by the States who installed the Shah. This argument is defended by George Perkovich in "Democratic Bomb: Failed Strategy" who says that bad guys and not bombs are the problem that US actually wished to deter (Perkovich, 2006:5). Bending non-proliferation rules for friendly democracies and refusing to negotiate directly with "evil" non democratic regimes such as North Korea and Iran.

V. Non-Proliferation Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency

The enforcement of the Non Proliferation Treaty rules have been questioned in several articles, and the extent of the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in controlling nuclear activities, as well. Baker Spring and James Phillips have agreed in "Iran's Nuclear Ambitions Go beyond the Purview of International Institutions" that neither IAEA nor Security Council is responsible of safeguarding America's security; these institutions are not reliable and usually have leaders with political ambitions. In "Problems of Enforcement: Iran, North Korea, and the NPT", Julia Choe discusses the weaknesses that lie in the enforcement of NPT policies, which were highlighted by the defiance of North Korea.

VI. US Strategic Options in Dealing with Iran

Analysts and politicians continue to discuss the options and strategies the US has been adopting ever since Bush's state of Union speech when Iran was characterized a rogue state next to North Korea and Iraq. It is being widely agreed that what the US requires in dealing with Iran's ambitions, is a policy of engagement rather than any other strategy the US has

been adoptiong. "US needs a new policy of engagement, normalization as a starting point of talks which would then facilitate discussions on issues of nuclear weapons", Ray Takeyh says in "Time for Détente" (Takeyh, 2007:1). According to Nicholas Burns, who spoke in the John F. Kennedy Jr. Forum of the benefits that both countries would gain if they increase cultural exchanges and adopt creative diplomacy as an option (Burns, 2008:1).

A possible way out, suggests Joseph Nye , is a more attractive package if US adds more positive incentives , increasing economic and cultural ties which contribute to more gradual regime transformation. As he affirmed that in "Iran approach requires carrot and stick", a combination of hard power and soft power making up what is called smart power (Nye, 2006:1). Of the same point of view is Henry Sokolski who explained the "carrot and stick" approach in his book "Checking Iran's ambitions"(Sokolski, 2004:25). Agreeing with that, the former US ambassador in Tehran, Babak Rahimi said that Washington's stance so far has failed to change Iranians behavior but instead fuelled anti-American ideology. He explains further that the US main objective must be to create a policy balanced by rewards and penalties (Rahimi, 2006:3).

-Economic Sanctions

Economic sanctions option is also disfavored by Fareed Zakaria in "Revisiting Iran", for sanctions had effect neither on India nor on Pakistan. No international enthusiasm for each of the world's community's states has its interests to care about and thus is forced somehow to maintain their relations as peaceful as possible with Iran. Hence an isolation option is viewed as way too hard to be achieved (Zakariya, 2007:2).

In an article written for the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Matheww Levit studies how effective unilateral economic sanctions imposed by the United States on Iran can be. He says that although targeted economic sanctions represent the strongest nonmilitary means of changing Tehran's behavior, policymakers do not have to choose between sanctions, diplomacy, and military action. Levitt believes that no one tool can by itself fix the problem. A mix of financial sanctions and international diplomatic censure, backed by various military options (e.g., a strong naval presence in the Persian Gulf), offer the most effective option for dealing with the threat posed by the Iranian nuclear program, according to Levitt (Levitt, 2006:4).

-Containment

In "Iran current development and US policy" Kenneth Katzman states that the Bush Administration has continued most aspects of the containment policies toward Iran that characterized preceding administrations (Katzman, 2003:2).

In "The Absence of a US Policy towards Iran and its Consequences" Ellen Laipson refers to containment as the least bad option, but that has serious limitations. She further explains that it is considered as a holding position, waiting for a policy that can achieve more direct results. Over time, it allows the United States to postpone thinking rigorously about the steps needed to achieve a clear goal. It allows policymakers to delay a more serious consideration of the stakes. Ellen believes that Containment is also likely to fail if it is unilateral; she says "European allies have joined, sometimes reluctantly, in parts of the containment policy over the past decade, but China and Russia have opted for more engagement, thus weakening the potential impact of containment" (Laipson, 2004:2).

-Military Option

Although the military option has been on the table of negotiations, most analysts and politicians find it impossible, for technical reasons such as Uranium enrichment facilities being hidden underground and thus difficult to hit as explained by Scott D. Sagan in "How to keep the bomb from Iran"(Sagan, 2006:1), or that the United States cannot afford another failure in the time being, or worse reputation as Joseph Nye says in "Should Iran be attacked?"(Nye, 2006:15). Iran's population, its strong ideology, its religious government, and deterring nuclear weapons are factors that hinder any success to a military option, but as Micheal Niman in "Getting a grip why we won't invade Iran" said "that doesn't stop the irrational insane policy of Bush". He says, "Obviously there's nothing that could stop US from getting into military war with Iran if necessary" (Niman, 2007:1). While Chomsky in "Preventing War with Iran"(Chomsky, 2007:1) and Francis Harrison in "Tehran alarm over US tough talk" agree that only an accidental war on Iran is possible , through naval deployments , support for secessionist movements , and acts of terror within Iran (Harrison, 2007:2).

There has been a lot of warning from a possible WWIII in the case of military confrontation between Iran and the United States of America as Noam Chomsky had said in "Preventing War with Iran" (Chomsky, 2007:3). Joseph Nye in "Should Iran be attacked" questioned the preventive military options explored by the Bush administration and had stated that military options are less attractive when analyzed but on the same time a diplomatic solution does not seem promising either (Nye,2006:16). On the other hand, in "The Absence of a US Policy towards Iran and its Consequences" Ellen Laipson comes with a

conclusion that the United States lacks a policy toward Iran. The abundant rhetoric of the current administration does not constitute a policy in itself. He added that,

> "What we have is a general sense that Iran remains a threat to US interests through its opposition to the peace process, its nascent nuclear program, and its links to terrorist groups. What we haven't seen so far is a systematic review of policy assumptions that looks at all aspects of current Iranian behavior, including the nature, scope, and specificity of Iranian threats to US interests" (Laipson, 2004:2).

I.VI. Methodology

This research relies heavily on qualitative methods based on textual analysis. The author depended on the primary and secondary literature, and on online availability of official treaties, speeches, working papers, official and unofficial statements. In parallel, through out the courses of the following chapters, the paper pursues two methodological approaches which help in better understanding the complexities surrounding the US-Iranian contemporary affair:

A) Descriptive methodology: a description of the power positions of each of the two actors, and of all the factors in the political environment largely affecting the positions of both.

B) Historical methodology: a brief glimpse of the American – Iranian negotiations will be tackled, and how active Iran has been diplomatically in order to achieve its objectives.

Within this context, the paper will also adopt, indirectly, the level of analysis approach through which the chapters will take individual, national state and international level systems.

I.VII. Results of the Research

Indeed, the insistence and persuasion of Iran to persist its nuclear program, and its clenching to its nuclear right, indicated that the United States and the International community as a whole, have somehow, failed, so far, to affect the Iranian nuclear route. The effect that the United States and Israel, mainly, expected to induce on Iran was not tangible. Thus, it is concluded that Iran was not deterred from altering its position towards advancing its nuclear program, and that whatever countermeasure strategic options adopted by United States have, so far, failed to achieve their ends.

I.VIII. Structure of the Research

The paper will present the structure of the research in coherent order as an attempt to illustrate its argument and exemplify its findings harmoniously. In total, the paper is composed of two main parts both of which contain a total of four main chapters[3]. The first chapter presents the theoretical foundations of the paper. In it, it will cast some light on the relationship between the theories and policy making in international relations, specifically those related to the Iranian American relations. The second chapter however commences with a descriptive analysis of the history of the American Iranian relations by focusing on those major turning points that shaped their relations. Chapter three describes the recent development of Iran's nuclear issue to include all major events, negotiations, resolutions, and key parties involved.

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[3] The first part (chapters one and two) is dedicated to the theoretical premises of the research whilst the second part (chapters three and four) is devoted to the empirical analysis examinations.

Finally, chapter four will mainly focus on two key areas: first, to verify the extent to which theories explained in chapter II coincide with the contemporary contested developments of the US Iranian relations described in chapter III.

Second, to try to answer the main question of the research by assessing US countermeasure strategies adopted so far towards Iran.

What could distinguish this work resides with its initiative to conduct a comparative analysis between the theoretical and the empirical parts of the research. It focuses on examining the implications of strategic options within theoretical-empirical analytical synthesis to envisage the extent to which theoretical themes reflect on empirical realities.

Part I

Chapter I

Understanding International Relations within Theoretical Perspective

This chapter will shed the light on the key theoretical foundations of the relations between states in the international system. For decades, it has been well recognized amongst political science and international relations scholars that there are two main traditional schools of thoughts which remain to be prominent nowadays in dealing with relations between states under anarchy: the realism and the liberalism school of thoughts. In the same vein, the chapter will introduce at later stages, those main strategic instruments (e.g. containment) and components (e.g. technology) which are deemed relevant key factors in determining the power relations between states with special reference to military power per se. This very much coincides with main guideline assumptions adopted by realist school of discipline which appears the most relevant theory explaining the existing relationship between the US and Iran (as explained in chapter IV).

The objective of this theoretical chapter is to generally lay the foundations to conduct a comparison analysis between the main theoretical themes and principles analyzed in this chapter with the main empirical findings deduced from chapter three. In other words, the aim revolves around the idea of the extent to which theoretical assumptions and principles (chapter I) explain empirical analysis reflecting the current status of the US-Iranian relations (Chapter III).

I.I. Relationship between Theory and Policy Making in International Relations

There exists a continual interplay between the "real world" and the world of knowledge, where that world of knowledge is shaped by the real world. Theory is actually nothing but systematic reflection of phenomena, designed to explain them and show how they are related to each other, in a meaningful intelligent pattern, instead of being merely random items in an incoherent universe. As Stephen Walt says in a *Foreign Policy* article

> "There is an inescapable link between the abstract world of theory and the real world of policy. Theories are needed to make sense of the blizzard of information that bombards us daily… It is hard to make good policy if one's basic organizing principles are flawed, just as it is hard to construct good theories without knowing a lot about the real world. Everyone uses theories—whether he or she knows it or not—and disagreements about policy usually rest on more fundamental disagreements about the basic forces that shape international outcomes" (Walt, 1998: 16).

Theory is an essential tool of statecraft. It is necessary for diagnosing events, explaining their causes, prescribing responses, and evaluating the impact of different policies. An understanding of how theories may work together allows for crafting more effective policy strategies.

Thinking deeply and abstractly about something, without being able to answer questions that matter, usually is what leads to getting engaged in theorizing. Theories can be explanatory which tend to explain why or give reasons, or normative and prescriptive which inform what should be the attitude towards war. Other theories interpret events, attempting to give meanings to them (Brown, 1997:5).

As in all scientific fields, in international relations there are comprehensive or grand theories on the one hand, and partial or middle range theories on the other. There is no

theory that is fully satisfactory, nor is there a theory that can be discarded, because there is no clear cut on which theory is right or wrong. Competition between theories reveals their weaknesses and strengths, and even the effort to classify theories is debatable since there are not completely disjunctive categories.

The gap between theory and policy can be narrowed only if the academic community begins to place greater value on policy-relevant theoretical work. Still, no single approach can actually capture the complexity of contemporary world politics (ibid: 11).

I.II. Realism vs. Liberalism

The theory of Classical Realism (sometimes called the Power- Politics School) has intellectual roots that can be traced to the ancient world. It is derived form the works of Thucydides in his "History of the Peloponnesian War (431 B.C.)". His statement "the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept" (Thucydides, 1980:402) typifies much of twentieth century realist thought. Observing relations between Athens and Sparta, Thucydides had developed an understanding of state behavior in the ancient world. As such, Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1557) was clearly linked to the realist school of thought through all his writings, and particularly "The Prince", where his famous phrase "better feared than loved" (Machiavelli, 1961:370). Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) had stated in Leviathan (1651) that man has a "perpetual and restless desire for power after power that ceased only in death" (Hobbes, 19846:64). He believed that "covenants, without the sword, are but words and of no strength to secure man at all." Followed by others starting from Rousseau (The State of War 1755); to Clausewitz

(On War 1827); E.H. Carr (The Twenty Years Crisis 1939); and Hans Morgenthau (Politics Among Nations 1948) whose book is regarded as "The Bible of International Relations". All of which were contributors to the realist school of thought (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1997: 63).

Whereas Realism remains to this day the dominant theory of international relations, it has always been in controversy with the "Liberal – Utopian" school of thought (see figure one). Utopianism believed that if people were given as much liberty and freedom as possible, authoritarian political patterns would disappear, democracies would flourish, wars would never be fought, and world peace and prosperity would surely follow. It stressed on international legal rights, obligations, and a natural harmony of interest in peace. It is derived from the 18th century Enlightenment, that environing circumstances shape human conduct, that the humankind is flawless and capable of significant improvement. At the international level, the political environment can be transformed by the development of new institutions such as the League of Nations and the United Nations. The highest interest of the individual is that of the larger community, and had states not embraced peace, it is because the leadership has not been responsive to the will of people. The debate continues between the two schools, where idealists see the world as they wish it to be, realists see it as it is and learn from lessons in history (Doyle, 1997: 45).

Figure1. One Goal, Different Approaches.

What is generally agreed upon by all of the founders of the realism school is that sovereign states are the key actors in international relations. International institutions, non-governmental organizations, multinational corporations and other sub-state or trans-state actors exercise and act –though less influential- independently of states (Brown, 1997: 33).

"International relations" is about states pursuing interests defined in terms of power. The overriding national interest of each state is its national security and survival. It is these interests that dominate state behavior. In pursuit of national security, states strive to amass resources, never sacrificing themselves, and acting essentially egoistic. The international system is deemed to be anarchic, in the absence of a legal authority regulating interactions between states. States are not equal in capabilities and have to rely on their own means to ensure their survival, which gets them engaged in what is called the "self-help" system. Thus, relations between states are determined by their comparative level of power derived

primarily from their military and economic capabilities. Military capabilities must be at least sufficient to deter attack, and strategic planning should be along lines of the worst-case scenario. The ultimate means by which states achieve security, based on self-help is found in armaments. If each state arms against one or more other states, the result is what has been called a "security dilemma." Because all states exist in a self-help system, levels of trust are low. One state cannot be sure if another state is arming for defensive or offensive purposes. This suspicion is what is known to lead to an "Arms Race". And the obligatory movements made by states to preserve themselves lead to the emergence of a "Balance of Power" (Baldwin, 1993: 29). Indeed, the notion of balance of power - in line with other 'apparatus' of realist themes and principles - are progressively becoming more relevant in explaining contemporary international politics and security structures and builds up – chiefly because the increasingly boosting sophistication on technology developments especially in weaponry arsenals.

I.III. Spread of Military Technology

As mentioned earlier, in order to achieve their objectives and interests which are mainly their security, states tend to be obligated to accumulate military power. Accumulating power is the means by which states achieve the ends. There exist two fundamental variables that affect the international system: its political structure, which was described earlier in the realist school of thought, and the nature of prevailing technologies available to the political actors within it, which is to be discussed in the following section.

A. Military Technology Revolution

As explained in the previous section, the anarchical nature of the international system creates the need for strategy and sets the conditions that determine the ends for which force is used. Technology has been a significant factor in military strategy throughout history. It is a major factor in determining the scope of military options, the character of military threats, and the consequences of resorting to the use of force. Political actors worry, not only, about the quantity and quality of military technology possessed by other actors, but also about the pace and direction of change of these variables (Pearton, 1982:28).

The importance of technology to military strategy is clearly demonstrated in the historical record among nations. Throughout history, victory at wars was seen for nations with more sophisticated, developed military equipments. But it was not until the mid 19th century that a fundamental transformation in military technology took place. The industrial revolution, with the expansion of the use of energy and machinery, developed major changes in technology (ibid: 35).

The revolution in technology was quantitative in two senses: first, the number and frequency of change was large, and secondly, the ability to mass-produce huge numbers of new items increased. It was qualitative in the sense that each new innovation either improved an old capability or opened up a capability never used before. The principal military effects of this technological revolution can be indicated in terms of five capabilities: firepower, protection, mobility, communications, and intelligence (Buzan, 1987: 19-24).

For instance, firepower has been the major effect of the revolution up to the present day where nuclear weapons dominate the strategy of the great powers. Firepower has been enhanced in terms of accuracy and range of delivery systems.

The military consequences of this revolution are enormous. The generation of new technological capabilities became irrelevant of their demand. Technological options emerge from the general advance of human knowledge, and because they are in many ways independent of specific military demand, they put constant pressure on the formulation of military strategy. The most obvious general consequence of the technological revolution for strategy has been the increase in the difficulty of assessing military strength.

Advanced military technology spread throughout the international system in various ways: either though physical and political expansion of those acquiring it; or by the transfer of weapons from those capable of manufacturing them to those who cant; and by the spread of manufacturing capability to more centers of control. The level of technology between states becomes crucial when rivalries exist between them. Thus, rivals have to guard against their opponents, keeping themselves always under pressure to maintain high levels of innovation (Buzan, 1987: 19).

A contemporary form of military capability diffusion is nuclear proliferation which will be discussed in the next section.

B. Nuclear Proliferation

Nuclear Proliferation is a vivacious example of military diffusion that resulted from the technological revolution. But it is kind of a special case because of the massive destructive power nuclear weapons acquire. In general, there are two types of proliferation; horizontal and vertical. It is of more importance focusing on the horizontal aspect of proliferation which is related to the spread of nuclear weapons from states that possess them to those that do not. Unlike horizontal[4], vertical proliferation is defined as the increase in stockpiles of nuclear weapons by states already possessing them, or the positioning of nuclear weapons in locations outside the territory of nuclear power itself (Meyer, 1984: 20).

There has always been a tendency to control the spread of nuclear weapons more than any other military technology. Against such backgrounds, the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty) was founded. It obligates the five acknowledged nuclear-weapons states (the United States, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, France, and China) not to transfer nuclear weapons, explosive devices or their technologies to any non-nuclear-weapon state. Non-nuclear-weapon states undertake not to acquire or produce nuclear weapons. They are also expected to accept safeguards to detect diversions of nuclear materials from civilian peaceful purposes such as power generation. This must be done in agreement between each state and the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency). All peaceful activities must be declared to the agency whose inspectors have routine access to the facilities for periodic monitoring (Mozley, 1998: 251).

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[4] It relates to the spread of nuclear weapons to those states who never acquire them ever.

The link between civil and military nuclear programs is the heart of the nuclear proliferation problem. Attention now is focused on shrinking the "Lead time", that is the time between the decision to acquire nuclear weapons, and the ability to actually test them. States are more concerned with achieving the "threshold" nuclear power, which is acquiring elements of civil nuclear technology that could provide fissile material for military purposes. This seemed attractive to some states, enabling them to get the benefits of a nuclear weapon status without violating non-proliferation norms (Betts, 1987: 144).

The fact that acquiring civil nuclear weapons is legitimate according to IAEA complicates the issue of nuclear proliferation. The role of the agency is to provide an accounting check on fissile materials for civil use. But the system carries no sanctions, and offers no restraint to a state that is turning its civil nuclear capabilities into military assets. The only fear that these states face could be the stance of the international system and its reaction. This reaction actually varies from containment, to pre-emptive attacks, to threats of withdrawal of aids, or sanctions. It all depends on different factors that will be discussed later in this paper.

The spread of nuclear programs hasn't been as rapid as expected. Some issues hamper the process of proliferation. The cost of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems threatens the balance of other items in the military budget. Going nuclear raises the risks, in the case of war, and might provoke preventive attacks as well. But it has been seen that the nuclear weapons potential has vastly increased, which worsens the so called "nth country problem", which is the fear that some country will acquire nuclear weapons triggering a cascade of acquisition by previously non-nuclear weapon states (Schneider, 2007: 5).

The impact of vertical proliferation on horizontal is mixed. On one hand, vertical proliferation legitimizes nuclear weapons, and increases the incentives for rising powers to seek nuclear status. The effect of nuclear deterrence can't but encourage nuclear ambitions among lesser powers. But on the other hand, vertical proliferation adds more constraints and hesitation for many states to join the ranks of nuclear powers. It raises costs of becoming a first-class nuclear power. Reducing their arsenals, superpowers would make entry to the nuclear club cheaper and easier (Bull, 1980: 19-21).

C. Arms Racing and the Arms Dynamic

One of the effects of the spreads of military technology on international relations is a phenomenon usually referred to as "Arms Racing". Given the political anarchical nature of the international system, states are vulnerable to a type of competition with each other in which military technology is a major variable.

There have been several attempts to define arms racing. Huntington, for example, defines it as "a progressive, competitive peacetime increase in armaments by two states or coalitions of states resulting from conflicting purpose or mutual fears" (Huntington, 1958: 41). Steiner defines it as "repeated, competitive, and reciprocal adjustments of the war-making capacities" between "two nations or two sets of nations" (Steiner, 1973: 5). Whereas Bull defines it as "intense competition between opposed powers or groups of powers, each trying to achieve an advantage in military power by increasing the quantity or improving the quality of its armaments or armed forces" (Bull, 1961:5). With another attempt, Gray

defines it as "two or more parties perceiving themselves to be in an adversary relationship, who are increasing or improving their armaments at a rapid rate and structuring their respective military postures with a general attention to the past, current, and anticipated military and political behavior of the other parties" (Gray, 1971: 40).

The problem with the concept of arms racing is how to differentiate between this abnormal condition and that of normal self-defense behavior adopted by states in such conditions of anarchy. Therefore, the concept of arms racing remains ambiguous that some scholars avoid using it (Bellany, 1983: 129).

Because arms racing preceded the two World Wars, it is seen as a dangerous phenomenon. It is of great importance analyzing the reasons states seek a race in armaments. Motives of states can range from deterrence, to defense, to diplomatic weight, the convenience of defense administration and modernization, the satisfaction of vested interests, or for the sake of reputation, or because technology provides no alternative (Gray, 1974: 220).

To clarify the difference between the normal military relations among states and arms racing, a broader definition was needed. For the utilization of the world arms racing connotes two or more states strenuously engaged in a competition to accumulate military strength against each other, and it suggests that winning is the object of the exercise in terms of one party achieving a decisive change in the balance of military power.

Thus, the term maintenance of the military status quo is used to express the normal condition of military relations in an anarchic system, whereas the term arms dynamic is

used to describe the whole phenomenon, including both normal behavior and arms racing. It refers to the whole set of   pressures that make states both acquire armed forces and change the quantity and quality of the armed forces they already possess (Thee, 1986: 110).

In order to understand the idea of arms racing two models have been suggested. The first, domestic structure model which seeks to locate the driving force of the arms dynamic in the internal, economic, organizational and political workings of states. The second, action reaction model, which looks for the driving force of the arms dynamic in the competitive relations between states. Its basic proposition being that states strengthen their armaments because of threats they perceive from other states. An action by any state to increase its military strength will raise the level of threat seen by other states and cause them to react by increasing their own strength (Rathjens, 1973: 23).

The classical maxim of the ancient Roman writer Vegetius "If you want peace, prepare for war", has always been a favorite of realists. Whether arms racing is more likely to escalate war or be conducive to peace through deterrence, remains an experimental question. Conflicting attitudes towards arms dynamics continue to exist, either criticizing its extreme form of arms racing, held to be dangerous, or its regular form of maintenance of military status quo which some see as necessary while others see as wasteful and undesirable (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1996: 320) .

Arms dynamic influences the whole range of military relations among states, especially deterrence that cannot be detached from understanding the arms dynamic to which it is

intimately linked. The following section tackles deterrence as a theory that has been applied in several cases throughout the history of international relations.

I.IV. Deterrence

A. Definition of Deterrence

The term deterrence did not appear in the literature of international relations or strategic theory prior to World War II. It is actually a product of the nuclear age. Since the development of nuclear weapons, wrote Bernard Brodie, "the term has acquired not only special emphasis but also a distinctive connotation" (Brodie, 1974: 174). Robert Jervis called deterrence theory "probably the most influential school of thought in the American study of international relations," (Jervis, 1979: 289).

It is notable that deterrence is not solely limited to the use of nuclear weapons. Alexander L.George and Richard Smoke wrote, "In its most general form, deterrence is simply the persuasion of one's opponent that the costs and/or risks of a given course of action he might take outweigh its benefits" (George and Smoke, 1974: 11). Glenn Snyder defined it as a combination of stick and carrot: "One deters another party from doing something by the implicit or explicit threat of applying some sanction if the forbidden act is performed, or by the promise of a reward if the act is not performed" (Synder, 1961: 9).

The idea of deterrence is very old, although it may not be found in exact terms, but it is found in the writings of Thucydides and Machiavelli as an idea. Following the Napoleonic Wars a balance of power system prevailed in Europe; it was actually a management of

power technique in which state leaders sought to make war unprofitable. It took more implicit forms, whereas in the nuclear age, it was characterized by explicit threat (George and Smoke, 1974: 15).

It is necessary to be more precise in the definition of deterrence in order to better understand it. Deterrence diverges into two concepts, retaliation and denial. Retaliation involves the infliction of punishment on an opponent in response to an attack. The punishment does not have to be within the same area as the attack that provoked it. Its aim is to inflict reciprocal cost. Whereas, denial involves building up defense and intelligence systems aiming at neutralizing attacks. Aggressors are deterred if they choose not to act, perceiving the cost of their action to be too high in relation to its chances of success (Jervis, 1991: 6).

Deterring is about stopping unwanted actions before they occur; it is the making of military threats in order to prevent an actor from taking aggressive actions. Logically, the concept of deterrence encompasses both denial and retaliation. Opposite to deterrence is compellence, which is the active use of force either to make the opponent do something, or stop him from continuing some action already being committed (Schelling, 1966: 69).

Thus, deterrence is seen as a strategic end, where retaliation and denial/defense are means of pursuing that end. The debate remains on to whether retaliation and denial are complementary or contradictory. To some the term deterrence refers exclusively to threats of punishment by retaliation, so in this view defense is seen as a different strategy, incompatible with deterrence.

B. The Logic of Deterrence

The definition of deterrence implies the involvement of two actors, the deterrer and the deterree. Its objective is to stop the deterree from taking actions against the interests of the deterrer. Its mechanisms are threats (the posing of adverse consequences for the deterree that will outweigh the gains of the contested action), and calculation (the ability of both deterrer and deterree to weigh costs and benefits in a similar fashion).

Assessing the chances of success of the deterrence theory is hard, because its objective is inaction. It cannot be clearly told whether the deterree acquiesced because of the deterrer's policy or because of self serving motivations. Thus, the effectiveness of deterrence depends on two sets of factors: first, the strength of basic motivation in the deterree towards the action, and the probability that he would undertake it in the absence of deterrence measures; and secondly, the logic of costs and benefits which results from taking the action in the presence of deterrence measures against it. The deterree has to calculate the balance between the possible gains and possible costs which result from taking, or not taking, given actions, as well as the probability of them occurring (McKinlay and Little, 1986: chs 8, 10).

A further variable is the sensitivity of the deterree towards costs, if the deterree is soft he will be easier to deter even if his incentive to attack is high, and vice versa.
If these political considerations are ignored, the assumption that inaction is always a result of deterrence would over militarize relations between states.

C. Nuclear Deterrence

A major question in contemporary strategic thinking is whether the application of deterrence is easy or difficult. It actually depends on how major a transformation one believes nuclear weapons have made in the logic of costs and gains.

Before the nuclear age, deterrence was difficult because prevailing military technologies made it hard to raise the possible costs above the possible gains. Since the 1950s, the deployment of large arsenals of nuclear weapons has made such military gambles more hazardous. Under nuclear deterrence, the possible costs are raised to the obliteration of the state as a whole. Under such conditions, possible costs are much higher than possible gains, since no gain could offset the complete destruction of the state and nation making it.

There are two schools of thought that exist regarding the difficulty of nuclear deterrence, the "easy" and the "difficult" school. If deterrence is easy, then the essential policy requirement is the possession of sufficient nuclear capability to threaten the opponent with some form of "infinite" costs. If a state can keep such a force secure against disarming first strikes, then it possesses assured destruction (AD), and therefore effective deterrence against its opponent. The whole position of the easy school rests on the assumption of uncertainty in the minds of the deterree's leaders which will stop them from acting if possible costs are high. Through nuclear weapons, uncertainty is easily created. In the pre-nuclear age deterrence was usually difficult because potential cots seldom convincingly outweighed potential gains.

Those who think deterrence is difficult assume that it becomes effective only when the potential aggressor is confronted with the certainty, or near certainty of unacceptable damage. The difficult school worries more about the responsibility of the deterrer in keeping the level of risk as high as possible to the deterree (Kaldor, 1982: 89).

D. Variables Affecting the Deterrence Logic

It is of vital importance realizing that deterrence is not applied in a world of vacuum. There are many conditions that enhance the ease or difficulty of deterrence policy. The availability of nuclear as opposed to conventional military threats is crucial to the "easy" case. But it is not always as clear, the impact of other factors can rather be ambiguous. The following are the main intervening variables influencing deterrence:

1. Polarity: it refers to the number of nuclear powers involved in the deterrence operation. With one nuclear power, deterrence is very easy so long as the danger of aggression is not from the nuclear power itself.

With two nuclear powers, deterrence logic becomes more complicated. Each power is both deterrer and deterree. In order to maintain threats of assured destruction (AD), each side must deploy secure second strike retaliatory forces that are invulnerable to destruction by a first strike from the other side, which is technologically demanding. Both sides must ensure not only the security of their retaliatory forces, but also their ability to penetrate the defenses the other might have. If this is done, a situation of mutually assured destruction (MAD) is created between them and the basic logic of deterrence is sustained. Bipolarity

can make deterrence easy because it creates a general fear of mutual destruction which restrains both sides from resorting to major aggression. But it also makes it more difficult if each side challenges the other's ability to maintain AD, then the technological requirements for MAD can be massively demanding.

As for multipolarity, it is traditionally thought that it makes deterrence more difficult, it makes MAD hard to calculate because each deterrer must account for more than one deterree. Multipolarity creates the possibility of aggressive alliances in which two or more powers unite to threaten a disarming strike against one another. It also makes arms control and disarmament agreement more complicated, and puts forward the mere fact that more states acquiring nuclear capabilities raises the probability of war whether intended or accidental. But multipolarity also makes it more difficult to calculate the outcome in any attack on another, and reduces the intensity of hostility in deterrence relations, which lowers incentives to resort to aggression. Another issue that multipolarity raises is the small powers that possess nuclear capabilities. It is argued that since the deterrence logic is supposedly universal; it would work between such minor powers. But on the other hand, it is also argued that nuclear proliferation would contribute to world order by spreading the war prevention imperative.

It is important to mention that the existence of minor powers could encourage major powers to increase their nuclear arsenals in order to differentiate themselves from lower ranks. As well as encouraging those to adopt strategic defense policies. That would increase the gap between major and minor powers, and would protect the major powers against threats from minor ones. But resorting to policies of strategic defense would complicate deterrence

relations between the super powers. This would also affect the medium nuclear powers, either by pushing them out of the game, or by pressuring them to develop larger nuclear forces (Treverton, 1980: 42).

2. Technology: Technological factors are central to deterrence. It affects the difficulty and ease of deterrence. The huge capacity for destruction provided by nuclear weapons is the basic requirement for "Easy" deterrence. But this also creates difficulty, because the weapons that threaten obliteration by retaliation are often similar to those needed to threaten a first strike against the retaliatory forces of the other side. The pressure of technological innovation is a general difficulty for deterrence since it requires continuous assessment of forces (Bracken, 1983: 57).

3. Geography: Whether the states in deterrence are remote or adjacent to one another is a factor that affects the deterrence relationship of the states. While remoteness makes deterrence easier, adjacency makes it more difficult. When states in a deterrence relationship are adjacent, both sides are strongly motivated to avoid nuclear war, because neither has any hope of winning without risking its own destruction (Howard, 1973, 263).

4.The Deterrer's Political Objectives: Once a condition of MAD is reached, if one or both countries seek to extend the cover of deterrence to third countries, then deterrence becomes more difficult to achieve, unlike, as in most situations described before, countries simply sought to prevent attacks on themselves, that is, core deterrence. The problem for extended deterrence (ED) is similar to that for geographical problem of deterrence between adjacent states (Waltz, 1981: 18).

5. Political Relations: It concerns the level of tension between the states in a deterrence relationship. Tension can be fed by hostility and fear, which is normal in an anarchic international system. High levels of tension tend to make deterrence more difficult, because each party will tend to assume that the basic motivation of the other is strong.

Different combinations of these variables can occur. Pressures towards making deterrence easier could be ruled out by others making it more difficult, thus making the net effect small. In other cases, the effects line up, in a mutually reinforcing pattern, producing strong pressures towards making deterrence either easier or more difficult.

E. Debates about Deterrence

Deterrence is an immensely controversial subject. Debates on the issue of deterrence are not just whether it is useful or dangerous, but also amongst its supporters on how to bring the theory and practice in harmony.

One of the principle sources of confusion and dispute in the debates about deterrence arises from the relationship between defense and deterrence. Some authors treat the two as distinct, alternative, and in some ways incompatible, approaches to policy. While others argue or assume that there is a broad overlap between them. In military terms, denial and defense have identical meanings. Those who treat deterrence and defense as alternatives are assuming that deterrence is likewise synonymous with retaliation. In this view, the terms

defense and deterrence thus reflect the unambiguous distinction between denial and retaliation. This narrow view is questionable (Halle, 1984: 33).

A debate about deterrence and ethics is an ongoing one. It stems from long-standing debates about the ethics of the use of force and the ethics of states as a form of political organization. The ethics of use of force hinge on the means of deterrence rather than on its ends. As an end, deterrence is not controversial since it is a war preventive strategy, whereas as means, deterrence raises difficult questions. Are the means immoral, are they compatible with the ends, are they appropriate, etc (Bracken, 1983: 120).

Criticism has focused on the assumption of rationality, which is rooted in all strategic thinking, but which achieved particular notice as a result of application of game theory about nuclear deterrence. It is strange that analysts ignored decision maker's emotions, perceptions and calculations and have instead relied on the logic based on the premise that people are rational, when actually a psychological relationship is involved in deterrence (Schelling, 1960: 162).

Finally is the debate about whether the pursuit of deterrence leads to arms race or not. Observation of history suggests that there are many ways in which pursuit of deterrence can stimulate the arms dynamic. Mainly, and as discussed earlier, deterrence is sensitive to technological developments. Without nuclear weapons, deterrence theory would not have become nearly as prominent as it has. Thus a commitment by states is needed to stay close to the relevant limits of technological advance. In bipolar deterrence, both sides need high level of force to ensure that each can preserve a secure second strike force against the

possibility of a counterforce first strike by the other. This can easily lead to military competition and so to unlimited arms racing. On the other hand, the idea of sufficiency tends to defend for deterrence in relation to arms racing. This rests on acceptance of the view that fear of nuclear war is a strong general deterrent, and that minimum deterrence postures are therefore sufficient.

It can be argued that deterrence is less bad in terms of arms racing than the most likely alternative. The international anarchy continues to define political conditions of international relations, and the ability to deliver powerful destructive weapons easily to any part of the planet continues to set the military baseline of relationships amongst powers (Freedman, 1981: 70).

I.V. Containment

The policy of Containment was adopted by the United States against the Soviet Union for fighting the cold war (1947-1989). After World War II, the soviets had control over Eastern Europe; containment was designed in order to prevent the control from expanding beyond those boundaries. The main aim of the policy was to limit the spread of communism, and encourage states to adopt European American based capitalism, by political, diplomatic, and economic means. The objective was to build "situations of strength" around the world in order to contain the Soviet Union.

George F. Kennan, a top official at the US embassy in Moscow, was the one who formulated the policy of "containment". His ideas first came to public attention in 1947 in

the form of an anonymous contribution to the *Foreign Affairs* journal, the so called "X-Article." "The main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union," Kennan wrote, "must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies." To that end, he called for countering "Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the Western world" through the "adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy." Such a policy, Kennan predicted, would "promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power" (Kennan, 1984: 25). Kennan believed that the soviet ideology was self-destructive and would eventually collapse. He had said "it is difficult to see how these deficiencies can be corrected at an early date by a tired and dispirited population working largely under the shadow of fear and compulsion". He said the Soviets have within it the "seeds of their own decay" and that the world would see the economic success of capitalist countries and the failure of the communists causing a decline in the influence of communism.

The containment policy had been the basis of the Truman doctrine. The doctrine was a proclamation by US president Harry S. Truman on March 12, 1947. It stated that the US would support Greece and Turkey with economic and military aid to prevent their falling into the Soviet sphere. The Doctrine shifted American foreign policy as regards the Soviet Union from détente to, as George F. Kennan phrased it, a policy of containment of Soviet expansion. Historians often use it to mark the starting date of the Cold War.

Kennan, advocated above all economic assistance (e.g., the Marshall Plan) and "psychological warfare" (overt propaganda and covert operations) to counter the spread of Soviet influence. In 1947, US Secretary of State George C. Marshall proposed a program to funnel American economic aid to Europe. The Marshall Plan committed more than 10 percent of the federal budget and almost 3 percent of the United States' gross national product to rebuilding Western Europe. Over the next 40 months, Congress authorized $12.5 billion in aid to restore Western Europe's economic health and to halt the spread of communism (Gaddis, 1982: 54).

On the other hand, the United States had justified its intervention in Vietnam using the "domino effect" as a pretext. That is if one state falls under communism, other surrounding ones will too, triggering changes in others in a linear way, resulting in the expansion of communism. Referring to communism in Indochina, Eisenhower explained the theory during an April 7, 1954 news conference:

> "Finally, you have broader considerations that might follow what you would call the "falling domino" principle. You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly. So you could have a beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound influences" (President Eisenhower's Press Conference, April 7, 1954).

Supporters of domino effect cite examples of southeastern Asian countries that fell under communism in 1975. But this has been argued, that other Asian countries like Indonesia and Thailand did not. It is most likely that the countries that fell for communism, at that time, were suffering internal instability, corruption and chaos in their domestic governments (Boot, 2007: 2). Michael O'Malley, a history instructor at George Mason University, says about the Containment/Domino theory:

"By [1964], proponents of 'containment' were also talking about 'the Domino Theory.' Hardly a theory at all, since it had little or no intellectual content, the 'domino theory' argued that if one nation (Vietnam) fell to the communists, neighboring nations would fall as well--like dominos. This absurd argument perpetuated the tendency, deeply rooted in the doctrine of containment, to see other nations as having no history, no past, no culture that mattered. They were simply dominos in a row, to be knocked down or picked up by the world's two largest powers "(Stix, 2003: 2).

It has been argued that the Domino effect was also applied against Iran, in the Iran-Iraq war, where the United States was worried about the expansion of Iran's radical theocracy in the region. Thus, the US backed Iraq in this war. In the aftermath of the allied victory in the Gulf war, the policy of "Dual Containment" was first introduced, in 1993. A strategy adopted by the Clinton administration, pursuing a policy of containing both regional powers, Iran and Iraq, without having to build up one against the other in order to balance the two. It stemmed from a judgment by the administration that both Iran and Iraq, in light of their recent actions and stances pursue policies that are in direct conflict with US interests. This strategy is based on three principles: enhanced security, global economic vitality, and promotion of democracy throughout the world. The US administration felt responsible to promote the core values on which the overall strategy of engagement and enlargement are based. The policy seeks to isolate both powers regionally, cut them off from the world trading and economic system, and encourage a regime change in Iraq. Due to sanctions imposed on both states, their economies were exhausted, and American military bases multiplied in the Gulf region (Myers, 1997: 11).

A more recent version of Domino theory was the "Reverse Domino Theory" used by the United States against Iraq in the 2003 war on Iraq, where democratizing and liberalizing Iraq could likely be contagious to the region as a whole. A rather good example of the

application of containment policy would be the economic sanctions and nuclear inspections held in Iraq since 1991 up to 2003, by the US and the diffusion of US military troops in the Gulf, specifically in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain (Wright, 2003: 2).

Although Kennan envisaged an essentially political and economic approach to containment, the conflict became progressively militarized. In an attempt to imitate the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State made efforts to build a ring of military alliances. These included the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). An era of "proxy wars" ensued in which the United States and the Soviet Union provided aid to opposing political forces, especially in nations of the developing world.

During the 1960s and 1970s, doubts about the wisdom of containment became more intense, especially after the military withdrawal of United States from Vietnam in 1973. In the 1970s the doctrine of détente and coexistence between the two superpowers became more influential, until the elections that ended up with the winning of Ronald Reagan in 1980, which resulted in a shift of American foreign policy towards massive military buildup. By building expensive new weapons and defense systems that the Soviets could not match, Reagan aspired to defend American interests and to defeat Soviet aggression and expansion. Reagan's initiation of a new arms race with the Soviets proved highly controversial both domestically and abroad. However, in the late 1980s Russian communism collapsed and the Soviet Union dissolved, bringing an end to the long Cold War (Gause, 1994: 56).

One would likely conclude that containment can be a very efficient policy today in that it placed the world on the edge of a nuclear holocaust over non-essential interests. It also produced an unrealistic American policy to the rest of the world, making it support brutal dictatorships simply because they were anti-communist. The risks and costs of the implemented policy of containment were far too high compared to the relative gains.

I.VI. Balance of Power

Containment policy adopted by the United States against the Soviet Union during the Cold War was an attempt to achieve a balance of power in the world. Balance of power can be implemented in two ways, either by containment, which was explained earlier, known as the policy of forming a geographically based coalition of states to surround and block an expansionist power, or by expanding military capability of states. The United States had built military bases in Europe, the Middle East and Asia in order to counterbalance the Soviet Union.

As a matter of fact, it is often hard measuring the extent of power a state has. Power is not just the quantity of military weapons and coercive capabilities that a state has. It is rather derived from other factors as well, such as land mass, population, level of technology. Other than the leadership (leaders' misperceptions can distort calculation of power), morale, geography, and luck factors that influence the potential power, which can often be translated into military capability. When put in a context, power can be evaluated differently. Thus, it is difficult measuring and evaluating power (Brown, 1997: 104).

Nowadays, balance of power has taken different forms in the contemporary unipolar world, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the emergence of United States as the superpower, the world's dominant power. The significant military gap between the United States and the rest of the world, concerned weaker smaller states, and made them fear not being able to join a counterbalancing coalition to protect their security. As a result, many are developing nuclear weapons in an attempt to dramatically expand their military capability. For example, North Korea claimed in 2003 that it was developing nuclear weapons to balance against US power.

The changing nature of power in the contemporary international system further complicates the operation of the global balance of power. Globalization, the Internet, weapons of mass destruction, and other technological developments have made it possible for small states and even non-state groups to acquire significant power. These factors also dilute the relative importance of military power (Fingar, 2005:2).

The major change in the nature of threat, and difficulty in knowing the identity of enemies has also vastly affected the balance of power, which is no longer restricted to obvious state enemies. As an example, is the September 11, 2001 unexpected, unforeseeable attacks on the United States, the world's superpower, by comparatively insignificant non-state groups. In the light of September 11 attacks, the US began to transform its security strategy, reforming its doctrine and operations. Notably, the use of the terms "prevention" and "preemption" interchangeably, describes the new strategy adopted by US The president's new defense strategy was conveyed in the speech he had made in January 29 in 2002, "We must prevent the terrorists and regimes who seek chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons

from threatening the United States and the world… I will not wait on events while dangers gather" (President George W. Bush's State of Union Address in January 29, 2002). Later in June 2002, president Bush compared today's security situation to that of the Cold War

> "For much of the last century America's defense relied on the cold war doctrines of deterrence and containment. In some cases these strategies still apply…. We must take the battle to the enemy and confront the worst threats before they emerge" (Lennon and Eiss, 2004: 6).

Even more explicit language was used in Deputy secretary of defense Paul Wolfowitz's speech at the International Institute for Strategic Studies on December, 2, 2002

> "The notion that we can wait to prepare assumes that we know the threat is imminent…. When were the attacks of September 11 imminent, certainly they were imminent on September 10, although we didn't know it…. Anyone who believes that we can wait until we have certain knowledge that attacks are imminent has failed to connect the dots that led to September 11" (Wolfowitz, 2002: 2).

Ever since the events of September 11, the US felt a new shape of threat, and a different nature of enemy. This transformation has affected the policies adopted by the United States.

In short, the above-mentioned analysis demonstrated an amalgam though coherent set of principles and themes revolved mainly around the realist school – with little liberal bent- of thought in conjunction with the vital role of technology. Such synthesis is deemed significant for the purpose of research and particularly in the following empirical chapters in that the envisaged fear of the mounting threats emanating from Iran on the one hand and US potential countermeasures are based on security principles derived from realism and the ongoing complexities triggered by technological developments (e.g. nuclear proliferation). Chapter IV will further explain how such findings took place but after reviewing and investigating the empirical analysis embedded in chapters III and IV.

Chapter II

History of the US-Iranian Relations

The purpose of this chapter is to shed some light on the historical developments of the US-Iranian relations in order to understand – at later stages of this research – what are those roots of conflicts as well as the driving forces behind the forging relationship between the two states. Accordingly, this shall assist the research to understand how and why the existing heated crises are taken place today and why the US is determined to halt Iranian nuclear 'ambitions'.

Generally speaking, the American Iranian relations have taken different forms and had gone through major transformations throughout history. Each phase is characterized by crucial events that pushed the relations to take a specific shape. The binding history of these two states can be divided into two main phases each of which is characterized by different nature of relations. The initial phase which lasted over 25 years witnessed the reign of the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. The next phase however, evolved with the emergence of the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979. Since then, relations escalated dramatically particularly in the past few years and received more tenuous amid Iranian declared nuclear ambitions – not least to mention the incessant public hatred towards US major ally in the region, Israel.

II. I. Introduction

By late 19th century, major powers realized the necessity to dominate other regions in order to strengthen their economic capabilities as a major step towards maintaining their national interests. This explains the rush of a number of European powers to find their ways into significant, yet developing regions in the world, to exploit their natural resources. Indeed,

the Middle East region (e.g. Iran) reflected a genuine historical example considering the tempting rich oil resources inhabited in the region.

In 1889 Lord Curzon, the British Viceroy of India, wrote that Iran and its neighbors were "the pieces on a chessboard upon which is being played out a game for the domination of the world" (Saikal: 1980, 13). For over 150 years, with the global spread of capitalism and the rise of colonialism, the Middle East generally and Iran particularly have been the target of a handful of Western powers who have wanted to gain control of the region and its resources, while preventing their rivals from doing likewise.

The importance of oil was not restricted solely to its military significance, but also became an essential economic input, demonstrated by its price impact on production costs and profits. It became a tool of rivalry and dominance of those who had the management of the oil under their control over the dependent states, and the world economy as a whole creating a source of enormous profits in the Middle East.

It happened to be that Iran was the first country in the world to be able to exploit oil on an industrial scale after William D'Arcy, an English man, inaugurated in 1901 the first Petroleum company (Everest: 2004 , 30). In the mid 19th century, Iran became the region of power struggle between Great Britain and Russia over the economic and political control of Iranian territory. Each of the two competitors had its interests lying in the Iranian region. To the British, Iran deemed a strategic venue to the Indian subcontinent and a way to prevent Russian expansionism whereby the Russians considered it as a potential strategic blockade against British interests and aspirations regionally. To both powers it was of their

interest to keep Iran weak and unstable. As the rise of the importance of oil came about, interests in the region became drastically intensified, leading to further dominance.

II. II. Phase 1: US Iranian Relations up to the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979

During World War I, Iran was the battleground of rival imperialist powers claiming that they were fighting to free the Middle East from the authoritarian Ottoman rule. But, they were actually fighting over dividing the Middle East under European power for its strategic location and vast oil potential. Behind the façade of the non–imperialist agenda the United States had, under covered by Woodrow Wilson's "14 points", there was an ongoing fierce rivalry for oil and power. In 1920 the US protested against the monopolization of Middle East by Britain and France (Kinzer, 2003:15).

During World War II, the US decision policy makers began to pay special attention towards the Middle East because of its strategic location being at the intersection of Africa, Asia and Europe, let alone the fact that the region enjoys the world's highest oil reserves. US strategists realized that controlling this region was crucial not only to win the war, but also to deter the soviet expansion southwards.

Hence, seizing Middle East dominance meant edging out the British and French as the region's dominant power. Also, containing or suppressing the post-war nationalist and anti-imperialist movements rising across the region -most importantly, preventing the then-socialist Soviet Union from gaining influence or power.

After World War II the United States emerged as the world's super power, ripping colonies from rivals and creating oppressive relations with much of Asia, Africa and Latin America (Everest: 2007,1). The US Central Intelligence Agency was convinced by the British to organize a coup against the nationalist secular government of Mohammed Mosaddeq, who was behind the nationalization of the Anglo Iranian Oil Company because he believed that only the nationalization of the oil could provide prosperity and sovereignty for Iranian people. As the profits were going more to the state government rather than the foreign oil companies, Britain feared that it would lose leverage over Iran's oil to Russia, who was assumed to be behind the nationalization of that company. Doubts that Russia was behind the nationalization of Iranian oil lead Britain to convince General Dwight Eisenhower, who became the President of the United States in 1953, to join them in overthrowing the democratically elected government and re-establishing British control of Iranian oil. (Kinzer: 2003, 6)

According to US, only regime change would prevent Iran from falling under Soviet control, thus the coup was held against Mohammed Mosaddeq. The first trial of overthrowing Mosaddeq called "Operation Ajax" failed. But it was followed by a second successful operation that resulted into the installment of Iran's monarch, Shah, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, to power. Together Britain and the United States reinstalled the Shah who reigned for the next 25 years being a loyal instrument of American domination in Iran and the region (ibid,24).

The close relationship that tied the United States and Iran during the reign of the Shah is a typical example of cliency relationship. This kind of international relationship is common in the contemporary world. In the period after World War II, many third world countries were involved in this kind of relationships. Most observers agree that this cliency relationship tends to affect the domestic politics of the client state.

An international cliency relationship is meant to be mutually beneficial for both the patron and client states' governments, where the two states differ largely in size, wealth and power. All cliency relationships involve the reciprocal exchange of goods and services between the two states. The patron provides the client with grants, loans, economic and military aid, whereas in return it is expected to be granted its security, which may take different forms of support provided by the client state (Gasiorowski: 1991, 2).

It is obviously seen that the patron state would choose a client state that would serve its purposes. Usually the client state would be a strategically important country according to the patron state, either located near its borders, or near the borders of its adversaries and allies, or a country that is a source of vital raw materials.

Other than financial aid, and military support, a client state government may seek commercial ties associated with the cordial relations with the patron country. On the other hand, the patron state is expected to spread its ideological views and to boost its various national interests accordingly.

Through such relationship, ways to other subsidiary interactions are usually opened, more investments in the client state by the patron's local businessmen, resulting in more personal contacts that may lead to commercial, educational and cultural ties between the two states. Such interactions may foster other relationships such as economic dependence or cultural penetration (Gasioworoski, 1991:5).

These relationships parallel to the cliency relationship may trigger the awareness of the public society resulting in harmful consequences of confusion or rejection sometimes - especially if the cliency relationship is benefiting the patron state more than the client state. So in order to maintain stability in the client state, which is necessary for the patron state, the latter would make sure to provide more aids and means to achieve stability where it is required. This may even include influencing the government of client state to prevent oppositions, or maybe forcing it to arresting the opposition leaders as well (ibid, 10).

The period of time during which the Shah ruled Iran was characterized by US-Iranian cliency relationship. Iran started to serve as western anchor in the Middle East. This relationship had great impact on Iranian politics. After permitting the Shah to establish a rigid authoritarian regime, the United States provided massive economic aid and defense assistance and cooperated closely in many different ways, modernizing and expanding Iran's economy and strengthening its security forces. The US poured military advisors and aid ($504 million between 1952 and 1961) into Iran, reorganizing, training, and expanding the Monarchy's police, military and, in 1957, its dreaded secret police, the (Shah's security apparatus) SAVAK (Nobari, ed.1978, 143).

Opposition groups which had backed the overthrown Prime Minister Mossadeq, were immediately outlawed. All forms of political organization and activity were banned. Massive arrests, unjustified detentions, institutionalized torture, summary tribunals, prison-murders, and executions were very common. Newspapers, magazines, books were outlawed if they criticized the government or the US Iran's educational system was reorganized to institutionalize pro-Shah loyalty and propaganda.

The US also moved to prop up the Shah by reviving Iran's economy by integrating it more deeply into the US-dominated world market as a producer of cheap oil, as well as a market for Western goods and investment. Between 1952 and 1961, the US funneled $631 million in economic aid into Iran--the largest amount to any non-NATO country (Ansari: 2007, 41).

On the same time Iran suffered losses of profits from oil due to the control run by the US and other oil giants who controlled the market. Historian Amin Saikal writes,

> "The international oil companies were placed in such a powerful position that they could run the Iranian oil industry as their interests dictated. They increased and decreased production and prices, and finally controlled supply and demand in markets, to whatever degree and in whatever way suited them best." Saikal calls this "ownership without control," which "enabled the consortium to make the real decisions on Iran's economic growth" (Saikal: 1980, 20).

Later on, the situation in Iran grew out of control which worried the US. The people were still living in poor conditions and rumblings of discontent were increasing. In 1963, the Shah, under the direction of the US, got engaged in a program of economic, political and social reform. Planned by US policymakers and Harvard professors, the so-called "White

Revolution" was a comprehensive effort to strengthen the Shah's regime, and turn Iran into a modern, more industrial society with a growing middle class and wider opportunities for foreign capital, but which eventually lead to the overthrowing of the Shah.

During the 70s Iran became one of US main pillars in the region, and in order to fulfill this role, Iran embarked on a massive military buildup and spending spree. It is also tremendously important mentioning that Iran's nuclear program was launched during the Shah's reign. The Shah was influenced by the United States proposals of building up to 23 nuclear reactors. Other countries such as France also assisted Iran; deals were signed by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, which lead to the expansion of Iran's nuclear research capabilities and facilities, only under US close scrutiny (Ansari, 2007:55).

This development fueled by US domination and oil revenues lead to unstable political, economic, social and cultural changes. These changes alarmed Iranian society and Iranian students studying abroad causing an international stance against the American imperialism in Iran. The role the Shah was playing, his close ties to Washington and the Westernization of Iran began to infuriate segments of the Iranian population specially the hard line Islamic conservatives. A wave of protests of dissatisfaction with the repression and brutal rule of the tyranny swept Iran.

II. II. Phase 2: US Iranian Relations after the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979

The shah was forced to flee, while Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and his followers took power. United States was viewed by Iran as the "Great Satan". At the time, the Carter administration decided to try to deal with the new Islamic Republic. The US maintained diplomatic relations with Iran, and attempted to build ties with forces in the new government.

On November 4, 1979, the US received another awakening. Islamic students seized the US embassy in Tehran with Khomeini's support, took its personnel hostage, and demanded the exiled Shah be returned to face trial (Sick, 1985:20).

The US opted to work through Saddam Hussein's Iraq, whose secular nationalist regime was ideologically and politically threatened by Iran's Islamic revolution (including because 60 percent of Iraq's population were Shiites who were oppressed under Saddam's rule). In the spring and summer of 1980, the US encouraged an Iraqi attack on Iran. But when Iraqi forces drove deep into southern Iran it became apparent that Saddam Hussein had greater ambitions. So the US promised to airlift $300-$500 million worth of arms to Iran if the hostages were released. Nothing came of this offer because of a secret behind-the-scenes conspiracy between Iran's clerics and powerful right-wing forces in the US (ibid, 134).

Ronald Reagan's backers were deeply frustrated by the constraints on US power generally and felt a Reagan victory in the 1980 presidential election was crucial to strengthening US global dominance and aggressively taking on their Soviet rivals (Sick: 1985, 337).

These Reagan backers feared that if Carter won the hostages' release he would win re-election. So they worked to make sure this didn't happen. Over the summer of 1980, Reagan's top advisors made a secret agreement with the Islamic Republic: if Iran continued to hold the hostages through November's election and Reagan won, he would lift the economic sanctions imposed by Carter and allow Israel to ship arms to Iran.

Iran's Ayatollahs agreed because they wished to prolong the Embassy crisis and the Iran-Iraq war in order to pose as anti-imperialist fighters, outflank and crush their opponents, and firmly consolidate their theocracy. Reagan did win, and on January 21, 1981, the day he was inaugurated, Iran sent the US embassy personnel home. In the short run, this US offensive worked. The Iran-Iraq war dragged on for 8 years with neither side winning a clear victory. The Islamic Republic's energies were absorbed in the war and domestic political struggles, and the US's regional clients survived. In Afghanistan, the Soviets were forced to withdraw their forces in 1989, suffering a major defeat which contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the US victory in the "Cold War" (Parry: 1993, 63).

The US started to fear facing enormous difficulties in the Middle East Central Asian region. For one, the US-backed proxy wars in the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan exacted an enormous toll, In the Iran-Iraq war and the Afghanistan war. This contributed greatly to the

overall suffering and dislocation in the region, which became a primary source of anti-US Islamism.

The Iran-Iraq war helped the Khomeini regime firmly consolidate power, and it would use that power to promote Islamist movements across the region. Arming and training of the Afghan and Islamic Mujahadeen created a fighting force that would soon turn on its US and Saudi sponsors and become a huge problem for them.

The collapse of the Soviet Union also strengthened Islamic fundamentalism ideologically (secularism and Marxism had supposedly failed) and politically (a major backer of secular and nationalist forces had fallen). Over the course of the 1990s and into the new millennium, the Islamist trend became a bigger and bigger problem for the US Empire.

After the Soviet Union collapse the US found it unnecessary balancing Iraq and Iran, instead it turned on against both of them. The Clinton administration adopted a policy of "Dual Containment," with punitive economic sanctions against Iran and Iraq, aimed at weakening and isolating both. Clinton feared that Iran's regional needs and ambitions and the growth of Islamic fundamentalist movements could jeopardize the US-dominated Middle East order (Dreyfuss: 2005, 217).

As the region's main Islamist state, Iran represented an ideological challenge to US-led imperialist globalization and "modernization." The Islamic Republic represented a pole of opposition to some of the US's political objectives in the region, as well as a source of inspiration (and sometimes direct support) for various Islamic trends. The US also worried

about Iran's potential to become a major force in the region due to its size, location, vast oil resources, and its efforts to reach out to global powers. Considering fact that the US 1991 war on Iraq had weakened it as a regional competitor against Iran, added to these worries.

II.III. The Arrival of Presidents Bush and Ahmadinejad to Presidency Office in 2000 and 2005 Respectively

Unilateral global hegemony was to be established by the US, even if military weapons and use of force had to be adopted as methods of achieving their goal of domination, while on the same time acting in alliance with other imperialist powers. The Middle East needed to be radically reshaped or else it would keep generating anti-US forces, particularly Islamic fundamentalist forces, which would get in the way of US domination in the whole region.

The 2001 September 11 attacks were viewed as an opportunity, by both Iran and the United States, to restore their relations, since the Taliban in Afghanistan was viewed as a common enemy for both. Although tentative steps were taken, lack of trust and worries maimed the moves, and were actually put to an end when George Bush added Iran next to North Korea and Iraq in the "Axis of Evil". A "War on Terror" was launched and Iran was included in it. Iran was labeled since then as a rogue state (a term used almost exclusively by the United States government describing a state that allegedly seeks weapons of mass destruction despite international pressure, a state that often engages in widespread suppression of human rights, sponsors or encourages terrorist activities, and challenges the primacy of the US) and as the world's foremost state-sponsor of terrorism, as well as one of the countries most actively pursuing nuclear weapons.

Despite the public accusations of US against Iran, the relations between the two states continued, especially later on in 2003 when Iranian cooperation was needed in the war on Iraq because of the strong historical ties between Shiites in both Iraq and Iran, whereas again, publicly, only animosity could describe American – Iranian relations at the time (Hamada:: 2007, 3).

In parallel, what made the relations between the US and Iran more awkward culminated with the advent of a new conservative leader to presidency seat in 205. It was not until Ahmadinejad arrived to the Iranian presidency seat that the relations between the two states reached their climax. Ahmadinejad's public hatred towards Israel, the insistence of Iran to developing its nuclear program, and accusations that Iran is trying to destabilize the American military presence in Iraq, made of Iran a targeted US enemy. Iran dared to become a challenge to the US and happened to emerge as Israel's main rival. These escalations complicated the already tensed relations, and lead to further economic sanctions being imposed on Iran's trade, more pressures put on nuclear inspections, and a tougher international stance towards the situation of Iran. The development of events, the way tensed relations had escalated to reach the peak, and the implications that surfaced accordingly, will be examined thoroughly in the following chapters, where the situation of both the US and Iran shall be assessed (ibid,10).

In short, as shown above, the emergence and divergence of US- Iranian relations is determined by the gap of interests that tied their relationship based on ideological grounds. Whereas secularism united the mutual interests between the concerned states during the

Shah reign, Islamism nonetheless diverged such trend into conflict of interests' paradigm since late 1970s. The following chapter will analyze the recent developments of US-Iranian relations to better understand the implications of conflict of interests on US strategic options to neutralize Iran – as examined in chapter IV.

Part II

Chapter III

Current Developments on Iran's Nuclear Affair: The Road towards Escalations

III.I. Background

Interestingly, unlike yesterday, the United States is desperately trying nowadays to stop of what appears 'similar' nuclear program that it supported under the Shah reign. In the 1950s, the Shah of Iran began initial research into nuclear power. In the 1960s, the United States supplied Iran with its first nuclear research reactor, a small five-megawatt thermal reactor that is still in operation at the Tehran Nuclear Research Center. After ratifying the NPT in 1970, Iran sought greater international assistance, signing contracts for reactor construction and supply of nuclear fuel with the United States, Germany, and France. A 1975 US National Security Decision Memorandum signed by Henry Kissinger details the US willingness to cooperate with Iran. The document specifies that the United States would

> "Permit US material to be fabricated into fuel in Iran for use in its own reactors and for pass-through to third countries with whom we have Agreements .... We could inform the Government of Iran that we shall be prepared to provide our approval for reprocessing of US material in a multinational plant in Iran if the country supplying the reprocessing technology is a full and active participant in the plant, and holding open the possibility of US participation." (Cirincione, 2005:2).

The Shah's plan to build 23 power reactors was regarded as grandiose but never was it suspected as a "back door" to nuclear weapons especially that Iran, possibly didn't seek the technologies to enrich or reprocess its own fuel (Spector, 1990:204). There were some suspicions but were not intense during the period of the Islamic Iranian Revolution in 1979 till the end of the Iran-Iraq war, a period through which nuclear activities were suspended.

Iran did just like many industrialized nations did in the follow up of the United States initiated Atoms for Peace program. Iran was actually one of the first nations to sign the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty) in 1968 and had ratified it in 1970. The Safeguards

Agreement was signed in May 1974 and the Additional Protocol, according greater access and the possibility of intrusive inspections to Iran's nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) only on December 18, 2003 (Schneider, 2007:28).

Iran's nuclear aspirations came to the world's attention particularly in 2002 as the National Council of Resistance revealed some clandestine nuclear activities, which coincided with PMOI (People's Mujahidin Organization of Iran) allegations over Iranian activities. Iran confirmed the news but rejected their accusations that its intensions go beyond civil purposes. The Islamic State was said to be building two facilities that could be used to produce fissile material useful for a nuclear weapon: a uranium enrichment facility at Natanz and a heavy water production plant at Arak, considered ideal for plutonium production. It was also revealed in 2003 that the founder of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, Abdul Qadeer (A.Q.) Khan, sold Iran nuclear technology and designs (Lancaster et al, 2004:2).

Ever since these events, Iran's nuclear issue has grasped the international concern, inspections by the IAEA were intensified and all developments were thoroughly followed. While Iran has been criticized for the past 6 years, it argues as it did in the 70s that the nuclear power energy is important for rising domestic energy consumption, while oil and gas are needed to generate foreign currency. Iran has repeatedly asserted that the nuclear program is peaceful. A statement by G.Ali Khoshroo, Iran Deputy Foreign Minister for legal and international affairs, in April, 29 2003, stating that, "we consider the acquiring, development and use of nuclear weapons inhuman, immoral, illegal, and against our basic principles. They have no place in Iran's defense doctrine" (Khoshroo, 2003).

Furthermore, Iranian believe that Iran's nuclear program is a peaceful one, and that it has the right to enrich uranium, since it's a party of the NPT in which uranium enrichment is allowed. It is true that the Iranian regime has the legal right to develop these facilities under nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) safeguards as long as it remains in good standing with the IAEA and abides by its safeguards agreement, as specified under Article III of the NPT.

However, many members of the international community are deeply concerned that Iran is using this civil nuclear power program to conceal the development of nuclear weapons, and the Board of the IAEA has used Iran's previous failure to abide by its responsibilities (by developing clandestine facilities) to make demands that it abandon its enrichment and reprocessing activities. States with nuclear weapons have developed them in conjunction with their civil nuclear energy programs. It is the view of many international actors, including the US administration, the EU and others, that Iran not only must be held to its legal obligations under the NPT but also must not be allowed to develop a nuclear weapon capability under the guise of its power program. Iran's 'dual-use' centrifuge enrichment capabilities can supply fuel for nuclear energy and could also produce highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons (Fitzpatrick, 2006:2). Moreover, US officials say that Iran's vast gas resources make a nuclear energy program unnecessary. An analysis published by the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America challenges the US view that Iran is petroleum rich and is in no need for a nuclear power program. According to the analysis, the relative lack of investment is causing a rapid decline in Iranian oil exports to the point where Iran might have negligible exports of oil by 2015 (Stern, 2006:2).

Against the wishes of the Iranians, following the 2002 discovery, the IAEA inspectors reported additional secret nuclear activities, a number of which were in contravention of Iran's NPT safeguards agreement. According to them, the Islamic state failed to disclose certain activities – including plutonium production and uranium importation, conversion and enrichment. They added that Iran has also misled IAEA inspectors about other activities, through which it increases doubts over whether Iran's nuclear program is being developed for nuclear energy alone. They also argued that in addition to its uranium enrichment activities, it is possible that Iran could develop a nuclear weapon using reprocessing technology and plutonium. The activation chances are high especially when extracting fuel rods from the planned heavy-water research reactor – which assumes to produce plutonium more efficiently - at Arak or the light-water reactor at Bushehr, once it becomes operational (Arms Control Association Fact Sheet, 2006:3). As a result of the said inspections' claims, international efforts to put limits to Iran's nuclear ambitions escalated dramatically.

III.II. Recent Developments

Since Western powers were alerted to Iran's secret nuclear activities in 2002, the EU/E3 – France, the UK and Germany – have been engaged in diplomatic attempts to prevent Iran from developing a full nuclear fuel cycle. The EU/E3-led talks gave rise to hopes of a successful resolution of the situation and were described by former UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw as 'constructive and critical engagement' (Straw, 2002:1).

On October 21, 2003, Iran pledged, in return for peaceful nuclear technology, to (1) fully disclose its past nuclear activities, (2) to sign and ratify the "Additional Protocol" to the NPT (allowing for enhanced inspections), and (3) to suspend uranium enrichment activities (IAEA, 2003:1). Some outside experts maintain that the joint statement did not ensure that Iran could not use an alternate route, such as plutonium production, to develop nuclear weapons (Milhollin, 2003:3). Khamene'i publicly backed the deal in early November 2003, amid demonstrations against the deal by Iranian hardliners.

Iran signed the Additional Protocol (AP) on December 18, 2003, which was considered a move towards giving IAEA inspectors greater investigatory freedom inside the country. While the Iranian government abided by the terms of the AP, the Iranian Parliament refused to ratify it and instead passed a bill in August 2005 instructing the Iranian government to comply only with its basic existing safeguards agreement if Iran was referred to the UN Security Council (Ingram, 2005:1).

However, since signing the AP, IAEA inspectors have carried out various inspections all throughout Iran that revealed a lot of new information about the scale and history of the Iranian nuclear program. While Iran has in general been forthcoming and helpful to the IAEA, some issues remained outstanding. Some IAEA board members, primarily the United States, have accused Iran of pursuing an underground nuclear weapons program. The United States argues that this constitutes a violation of the NPT and necessitates the referral of Iran's nuclear file to the United Nations Security Council (ibid.).

In its November 10, 2003 and February 24, 2004 reports, the IAEA said that Iran had committed violations of its agreements, including unreported uranium enrichment, over an 18-year period, and along with the fact that Iran did not declare designs, found in Iran by the IAEA in early 2004, of advanced uranium enrichment centrifuges, parts of which Iran made itself. The latter report added that traces of both highly enriched and low-enriched uranium had been found at two sites in Iran (Murphy, 2004:1). The latter report added that the Iranian military has been involved in manufacturing centrifuge equipment. IAEA board resolutions adopted after these reports condemned Iran's previous violations and said that Iran had not resolved outstanding issues, but welcomed what cooperation Iran has been providing (ibid,10).

After another visit by the IAEA to Iran in mid April 2004, a new report was issued on May 31, 2004, which alleged that Iran is continuing to make parts and materials that could be used in a nuclear weapons program. On June 18, 2004, amid reports Iran had bulldozed or altered suspected nuclear sites, the IAEA adopted another resolution reprimanding Iran for failing to clear up questions about highly enriched uranium found in Iran and Iran's efforts to build or acquire enrichment centrifuge equipment. The IAEA also called on Iran to "be proactive in taking all necessary steps on an urgent basis to resolve all outstanding issues" including issues related to low enriched uranium LEU and highly enriched uranium (HEU) contamination and the limited production of polonium-210 and plutonium (Katzman,2004:13). The United States said after the adoption of the resolution that Iran's lack of full compliance should be reported to the United Nations Security Council, which would have the power to impose economic sanctions. After the rebuke, Iran said it would

resume building centrifuges for uranium enrichment, although it said it remained committed to suspending actual enrichment activity (ibid, 22).

Iran abrogated the agreement after the IAEA reports of November 10, 2003, and February 24, 2004, stated that Iran had violated its NPT reporting obligations over an 18-year period. On the other hand, El-Baradei was weary of referring Iran to the Security Council, fearing that exerting too much pressure could push Iran out of the NPT (Charbonneau, 2004:2). Responding to the barrage of critics who insisted that Iran's illicit intentions are obvious, El-Baradei has pointed to the continued absence of a "smoking gun" and the fundamental shortcomings of attempts to concretely assess Iran's programmatic goals without such evidence. As he stated in July 2004, "We are not God. We cannot read intentions"(ibid). For its part, Iran continues to assert that it pursues a nuclear program with only peaceful applications, while El-Baradei is steadfast in his belief that the situation may be resolved diplomatically.

In the face of the US threat to push for Security Council action, the EU-3 and Iran reached a more specific November 14, 2004, "Paris Agreement", negotiating a voluntary and temporary suspension of uranium enrichment activities (the process by which both reactor fuel and weapons-grade fissile material can be produced) in return for unspecified economic rewards from the EU. The EU-3 - Iran negotiations on a permanent nuclear pact began on December 13, 2004, and related talks on a trade and cooperation accord (TCA) began in January 2005. On March 11, 2005, the Bush Administration announced it would support, but not join, the EU-3 talks by offering to drop US objections to Iran's application

to the World Trade Organization (which it did in May 2005) and to consider sales of US civilian aircraft parts to Iran (Squassoni, 2006:5).

IAEA inspections aiming to verify Iranian compliance with the NPT continued throughout 2005. Iranian leaders became frustrated by the lack of progress in negotiations, and the apparent EU strategy of waiting for the election of a reformist President backfired with the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as the sixth President of the Islamic Republic of Iran in June 2005.

III.III. Ahmadinejad's Presidency and Point of No Return

The Paris Agreement broke down just after Ahmadinejad's election, when Iran rejected it as it viewed an EU-3 "final settlement" plan that offered to assist Iran with peaceful uses of nuclear energy insufficient (medicine, agriculture, and other uses) and provide limited security guarantees in exchange for Iran's (1) permanently ending uranium enrichment; (2) dismantling the Arak reactor; (3) agreement to no-notice nuclear inspections; and (4) pledge not to leave the NPT (Katzman, 2007:35).

In June 2005, the US secretary of state Condoleezza Rice said International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) headed by Dr. Mohamed El-Baradei should either toughen his stance on Iran or fail to be chosen for a third term as IAEA head (BBC news, 2005:1).

Concurrent with Iran's ongoing EU trio nuclear negotiations, Iranian nuclear official Ali Akbar Salehi asserted on 22 April 2005 that Iran's plan to achieve full mastery of the

nuclear fuel cycle is "completely clear and irreversible." This ambition has elicited widespread international criticism. In a "message" to Iran, on 26 April the United States approved the sale to Israel of "bunker buster" bombs capable of penetrating Iran's underground nuclear facilities (Chossudovsky, 2006:4).

On August 8, 2005, Iran notified the IAEA of its decision to resume uranium conversion activities at its conversion facility at Esfahan. This decision to resume uranium conversion was seen as a breach of the November 2004 Paris Agreement that viewed Iran's suspension of all uranium-related activities as a prerequisite for dialogue. This notification by Iran was followed by the IAEA Director General's report to the Board of Governors in September 2005, confirming Iran's resumption of uranium activities (ibid.).

The Director General's report in September 2005 also used strong language, urging Iran to adopt greater transparency measures vis-à-vis their nuclear program. On 24 September 2005, the IAEA passed a resolution finding Iran in non-compliance as opposed to previous resolutions that merely affirmed a breach in obligations. The resolution passed with 21 votes of approval, 12 abstentions, and one opposing vote. Russia and China were among those that abstained from voting and Venezuela was the only country to vote against the resolution. The resolution stated that Iran's non-compliance due to "many failures and breaches" over nuclear safeguards of the NPT were grounds for referral to the UN Security Council (Yaphe and Lutes, 2005:14).

The resolution passed on 24 September 2005, leaving the door open for future referral of Iran to the Security Council and was finally adopted in February 2006. On 4 February

2006, the 35-nation board of the IAEA voted to "report" Iran to the Security Council over its decision announced in January, to restart nuclear research. The above resolution passed with 27 votes of approval, 5 abstentions, and 3 opposing votes. This was the first time that Russia and China agreed to go along with the position of the EU-3 and the United States over Iran. However, Russia and China insisted on using the word "report" instead of "refer" in the text of the last IAEA resolution. Iran has rejected the above resolution calling it, "illegal, illogical and politically motivated" (BBC news, 2006:1). As a response to the most recent resolution, Iran has decided to scrap the "containment and surveillance measures" as defined under the 1997 Additional Protocol, limiting the intrusive powers of the inspectors and putting a halt to snap inspections as well. Iran has also resumed small scale enrichment activities at its Natanz facility as of February 16. In a parallel diplomatic process vis-à-vis a deal backed by the United States and the European Union, Russia continues to pursue negotiations with Iran that would allow Russia to host Iran's uranium enrichment program leaving only the uranium conversion to be carried out on Iranian soil (www.nti.org).

On March 8, 2006, US and EU-3 representatives noted that Iran has enough unenriched uranium hexafluoride gas to make up to ten atomic bombs if it were to be highly enriched, and adding it was "time for the Security Council to act" (Traynor, 2006:1).

On March 29, 2006, the Council agreed on a Council presidency "statement" setting a 30-day time limit (April 28, 2006) for Iran to cease enrichment (Katzman, 2007:20). However, because of opposition by Russia and China to immediately punishing Iran, on May 8, 2006, the Administration said it would support another diplomatic overture. At the same time, the

Administration rebuffed a letter from Ahmadinejad to President Bush as offering no new nuclear proposals (Cronic news, 2006:13).

On 11 April 2006, President Ahmadinejad declared in a televised speech that Iran had mastered the uranium enrichment process: using 164 centrifuges at its Natanz facility, Iran succeeded in enriching uranium to 3.5%, within the 3–5% range required for a civilian nuclear project and far short of the 80–90% enrichment level required for nuclear weapons (AFP, 2006: 6). This rate has since been increased to 4.8% (Iran Focus, 2006:1).

The government also announced that Iran had already produced 110 tones of enrichment feedstock gas (uranium hexafluoride, or UF6) (AFP, 2006:1) and stated its ambition to begin installing 3,000 new centrifuges at Natanz by the end of 2006, as a precursor to industrial-scale enrichment (Heinrich, 2006:1).

On April 11, 2006, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced that Iran had enriched uranium successfully. President Ahmadinejad made the announcement in a televised address from the northeastern city of Mashhad, where he said "I am officially announcing that Iran joined the group of those countries which have nuclear technology." The uranium was enriched to 3.5% using over a hundred centrifuges. At this level, it could be used in a nuclear reactor if enough of it was made; uranium for a nuclear bomb would require around 90% enrichment and many thousands of centrifuges to be built and operated (Brannan, 2007:13).

On April 13, 2006, after US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said (on April 12, 2006) the Security Council must consider "strong steps" to induce Tehran to change course in its

nuclear ambition; President Ahmadinejad vowed that Iran won't back away from uranium enrichment and that the world must treat Iran as a nuclear power, saying "Our answer to those who are angry about Iran achieving the full nuclear fuel cycle is just one phrase. We say: Be angry at us and die of this anger," because "We won't hold talks with anyone about the right of the Iranian nation to enrich uranium"(Arabicnews:April 16,2006).

Followed by a statement made by El-Baradei on May 30, saying that "Iran does not represent immediate threat", the US Administration offered on May 31, 2006, to join the nuclear talks with Iran, if Iran first suspends its uranium enrichment, in an effort to strengthen the diplomacy, as well as to build support for possible international or multilateral sanctions. Such talks would center on a package of incentives and possible sanctions that were agreed to on June 1, 2006, by a newly-formed group of negotiating nations, the so-called "Permanent Five Plus 1" (P5+1: United States, Russia, China, France, Britain, and Germany). EU representative Javier Solana formally presented the offer to Iran on June 6th of that year. This was seen as significant, partly because it had the agreement of the P5 (Britain, France, China, Russia and US) and partly because in it the West had addressed Iranian concerns about security guarantees for the first time. Iran claimed the offer contained 'ambiguities' and, flouting the deadline to respond by the end of July, said it would respond by 22 August. This delay, combined with Iran's continued refusal to cease enrichment, provided grounds for the US and the EU/E3 to secure a UN Security Council resolution in mid-July (Arms Control Facts sheets, 2006:2).

On 31 July 2006, Security Council Resolution 1696 was adopted. It gave Iran a month in which to comply with IAEA demands to suspend enrichment, reconsider the construction

of the heavy-water nuclear reactor at Arak, ratify and implement a stricter inspection regime and cooperate fully with IAEA inspectors. Failure to do so would mean referral of the matter back to the UN Security Council, which could then impose diplomatic or economic sanctions under Article 41, Chapter VII of the UN Charter. On August 22, 2006, Iran submitted a 21-page formal response to the June 6 offer by the six powers. The text of Iran's response was not disclosed, but it reportedly offered negotiations on a broader roadmap of engagement with the West — and sought provision of guarantees that the United States would not seek to change Iran's regime — in exchange for acceptance of the international demands on the nuclear program. Iran did not offer to suspend uranium enrichment in advance of negotiations (UN Official Document, 2006: 8792).

Qolam Ali Hadad-adel, speaker of Iran's parliament, said on August 30, 2006, that Iran had the right to "peaceful application of nuclear technology and all other officials agree with this decision," according to the semi-official Iranian Students News Agency. "Iran opened the door to negotiations for Europe and hopes that the answer which was given to the nuclear package would bring them to the table (Neisloss and Chance, 2006:1).

"They should know that the Iranian nation will not yield to pressure and will not let its rights be trampled on," Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad told a crowd on August 31, 2006 in a televised speech in the northwestern Iranian city of Orumiyeh. In front of his strongest supporters in one of his provincial power bases, the Iranian leader attacked what he called "intimidation" by the United Nations, which he said was led by the United States. Ahmadinejad criticized a White House rebuff of his offer for a televised debate with President Bush. "They say they support dialog and the free flow of information," he said.

"But when debate was proposed, they avoided and opposed it." Ahmadinejad said that sanctions "cannot dissuade Iranians from their decision to make progress," according to Iran's state-run IRNA news agency. "On the contrary, many of our successes, including access to the nuclear fuel cycle and producing of heavy water, have been achieved under sanctions." Iran has been under IAEA investigation since 2003, with inspectors turning up evidence of clandestine plutonium experiments, black-market centrifuge purchases and military links to what Iran says is a civilian nuclear program (ibid.)

On 31 August 2006, the IAEA confirmed that Iran had not met its demand to cease enrichment. Despite US calls for the immediate imposition of sanctions, other members of the UN Security Council appeared reluctant to take further steps. As the EU set down a two-week deadline for Iran to clarify its position, two separate tracks emerged, with the US lobbying for sanctions whilst the EU, China and Russia advocated continued dialogue (Charbonneau, 2006:3).

On September 5, 2006, President Bush said explicitly "I am not going to allow [a nuclear-armed Iran]" (Schweid, 2006:2). In mid-September, US Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns said. "We're sure going to work toward that [sanctions] with a great deal of energy and determination because this cannot go unanswered," Burns said. "The Iranians are obviously proceeding with their nuclear research; they are doing things that the International Atomic Energy Agency does not want them to do, the Security Council doesn't want them to do. There has to be an international answer, and we believe there will be one" (CNN, 2006).

President George W. Bush insisted on August 31, 2006 that "there must be consequences" for Iran's defiance of demands that it stop enriching uranium. He said "the world now faces a grave threat from the radical regime in Iran. The Iranian regime arms, funds, and advises Hezbollah"(ibid.) The U.N.'s nuclear watchdog agency issued a report saying Iran has not suspended its uranium enrichment activities, a United Nations official said. The report by the International Atomic Energy Agency opens the way for U.N. Security Council sanctions against Tehran. Facing a Security Council deadline to stop its uranium enrichment activities, Iran has left little doubt it will defy the West and continue its nuclear program. A congressional report released on August 23, 2006 made many allegations that have been strongly disputed by the IAEA calling it "erroneous" and "misleading" (BBC, 2006).

With the backing of the P5+1, chief EU negotiator Javier Solana negotiated with Iran to try arranging a temporary enrichment suspension. A round of talks, in Berlin, concluded on September 28, 2006, without agreement. After almost four months of negotiations during which Russia and, to a lesser extent, China, argued that diplomacy with Iran would yield greater results than would sanctions, the Security Council agreed to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1737. It was passed unanimously on December 23, 2006, under Chapter 7, Article 41 of the U.N. Charter. It orders Iran to suspend work on uranium conversion and enrichment, work on heavy water reactors, and nuclear weapon delivery systems. Leaves 60 days for Iran either 2 comply or face further sanctions. It prohibits sale to Iran — or financing of such sale — of technology that could contribute to Iran's uranium enrichment or heavy-water reprocessing activities. It also required U.N. member states to freeze the financial assets of ten named Iranian nuclear and missile firms. The Resolution did not

mandate the banning of travel by these personalities, but called on member states not to admit them. It also provided an exemption for the Bushehr reactor, which Russia had sought. The EU Foreign Ministers agreed on February 12, 2007, to freeze the assets of the named entities and to impose broader restrictions on entities that might later be identified as assisting Iran's WMD program and to prevent the training of Iranians in Europe that might contribute to Iran's programs. In reaction, the Majles called for the government to adjust its cooperation with IAEA inspections (Dempsey, 2006:2).

Resolution 1737 demanded enrichment suspension by February 21, 2007. An IAEA report sent to Board member countries that day reportedly corroborated Iran's statements of defiance, saying it is continuing its enrichment activities. In London on March 8, 2007, the P5+1 began formal discussions on a new Chapter 7 Security Council resolution that would presumably impose additional sanctions on Iran, quickly reaching agreement. On March 24, 2007, Resolution 1747 was adopted unanimously: It bans arms transfers by Iran, a provision targeted at Iran's alleged arms supplies to Lebanese Hezbollah and to Shiite militias in Iraq. It requires all countries to report to the United Nations when the sanctioned Iranian persons travel to their territories. It calls for (but does not require) countries to refrain from selling arms or dual use items to Iran and to avoid any new lending or grants to Iran. Resolution 1747 demands Iran suspend enrichment by May 24, 2007. The IAEA report of May 23, 2007 indicated that Iran did not comply, and new negotiations have begun on another resolution. Observers say that a new resolution is likely to focus on making mandatory those provisions that are only voluntary in 1737 and 1747, including an arms sale ban and travel ban on named Iranian officials. Some reports say that a US and British draft might also require inspections of Iranian cargo flights and shipping.

Suggesting that the pressure might be starting to yield results on Iran's nuclear decision making, in July 2007 Iran offered to allow IAEA inspectors to inspect the Arak heavy water facility and to otherwise try to clear up longstanding questions about Iran's program. In addition, the IAEA said in July 2007 that Iran is slowing its installation of new centrifuges, possibly indicating that it seeks to undercut US arguments for immediate additional U.N. sanctions. At the same time, IAEA Director Baradei has incurred some criticism in May and June 2007 for reportedly telling the Security Council countries that it is no longer realistic to demand uranium enrichment suspension, but instead to focus on preventing industrial-scale production of enriched uranium and allowing robust inspections to ensure the uranium is not enriched to bomb-grade levels. Others have criticized him for reported policy comments taking issue with US officials who advocate military action or regime change as a means of curbing Iran's nuclear program (Katzman, 2007:38).

IAEA officials complain that most US intelligence shared with the U.N. nuclear watchdog agency about Iran's nuclear program proved to be inaccurate, and none has led to significant discoveries inside Iran (Drogin and Murphy, 2007:1).

On 10 May 2007, Agence France-Presse, quoting un-named diplomats, reported that Iran had blocked IAEA inspectors when they sought access to the Iran's enrichment facility. Both Iran and the IAEA vehemently denied the report. On 11 March, 2007, Reuters quoted International Atomic Energy Agency spokesman Marc Vidricaire, "We have not been denied access at any time, including in the past few weeks. Normally we do not comment on such reports but this time we felt we had to clarify the matter...If we had a problem like

that we would have to report to the [35-nation IAEA governing] board ... That has not happened because this alleged event did not take place" (Reuters, 2007:1).

On July 30 2007, inspectors from the IAEA spent five hours at the Arak complex, the first such visit since April. Visits to other plants in Iran were expected during the following days. It has been suggested that access may have been granted in an attempt to head off further sanctions (Dahl, 2007:1).

In late October 2007, according to the International Herald Tribune, the head of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, stated that he had seen "no evidence" of Iran developing nuclear weapons. The IHT quoted ElBaredei as stating that, "We have information that there have been maybe some studies about possible weaponization," said Mohamed ElBaradei, who leads the International Atomic Energy Agency. He continued, "That's why we have said that we cannot give Iran a pass right now, because there is still a lot of question marks…But have we seen Iran having the nuclear material that can readily be used into a weapon? No. Have we seen an active weaponization program? No." (IAEA Official publications, 2007:48). The IHT report went on to say that "ElBaradei said he was worried about the growing rhetoric from the US, which he noted, focused on Iran's alleged intentions to build a nuclear weapon rather than evidence the country was actively doing so. If there is actual evidence, ElBaradei said he would welcome seeing it" (ibid.).

Iran also minimizes the significance of the IAEA's inability to verify the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program, arguing the IAEA has only drawn such conclusions in thirty-two states that have implemented the Additional Protocol. The IAEA reported on August 30,

2006 that while it "is able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran", it "remains unable to verify certain aspects relevant to the scope and nature of Iran's nuclear program" and that Iran's adherence to the recently agreed "action plan" was "essential"(ibid.). Iran also argues that the UN Security Council resolutions demanding a suspension of enrichment constitute a violation of Article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty which recognizes the inalienable right of signatory nations to nuclear technology "for peaceful purposes," although the IAEA remains unable to resolve questions about whether Iran's enrichment program is peaceful.

Other than the IAEA and UN related resolutions and sanctions, the United States adopted unilateral strategies of imposing economic sanctions against Iran's banks and sectors. Through the sanctions the US aspires it could exert pressure on Iran's nuclear program. But what's clear is that American pressure on Iran is not confined to UN sanctions designed to dissuade it from the pursuit of nuclear weapons. Other US pressures include:

• The use of "soft power" (broadcasting, cultural exchange, the promotion of democracy and human rights) to try to influence Iranian public opinion
• Efforts to coax somewhat ambivalent Arab states to join an anti-Iranian regional alliance
•The Seizure of Iranian officials who are, in American eyes, stirring up trouble in Iraq

Three of Iran's largest banks — Bank Melli, Bank Mellat and Bank Saderat — also were targeted. The United States had already moved in 2006 to sever Bank Saderat from the US financial system. The order also designates companies, including Khatam al-Anbya Construction Co. and Oriental Oil Kish, believed to be owned or controlled by the

Revolutionary Guard Corps, as well as military officials and people involved in Iran's ballistic missile programs (Hardy, 2007:3).

The sanctions announced by the United States could have a major impact on the already shaky Iranian economy, but the political effect is likely to be more mixed. The Revolutionary Guard Corps is thought to control up to one-third of the economy through a series of subsidiaries and trusts. International companies are afraid of dealing with any of the sanctioned entities or anyone who might have had dealings with them, for fear of economic retaliation from the US (Leyne, 2007:1).

On June 3, 2007, Secretary of Defense Gates said it is the "general view" of the US intelligence community that Iran could develop a nuclear device "probably sometime in the period 2010-2011 or 2014-2015" (Burns, 2007:1). Other experts focus on a so-called "point of no return," a point at which Iran has the expertise and proficiency to enrich uranium to weapons grade levels. The IAEA report of May 23, 2007 said that Iran is running at least 1,300 centrifuges (8 lines of 164 centrifuges each), suggesting it has overcome some, but not all, of its technological roadblocks to high enrichment. However, other accounts say that Iran's program still faces significant bottlenecks — for example whether or not Iran is able to link separate cascades into one continuous enrichment process (Katzman, 2007:20).

III.IV. The Israeli Perspective

While the United States and Europe have focused on economic sanctions and referrals of Iran to the U.N. Security Council, Israel's stance has been more aggressive ever since Ahmadinejad's arrival to the presidency and the statements he had made concerning the existence of the state of Israel.

A Scottish newspaper claimed in November 2003 that Israel warned that it is prepared to take unilateral military action against Iran if the international community fails to stop any development of nuclear weapons at the country's atomic energy facilities. It cited Israeli defense minister Shaul Mofaz stating, "Under no circumstances would Israel be able to tolerate nuclear weapons in Iranian possession"(Dunn, 2003:2).

In December 2005, a British newspaper claimed that the Israeli military had been ordered by the then Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to plan for possible strikes on uranium enrichment sites in Iran in March 2006, based on Israeli intelligence estimates that Iran would be able to build nuclear weapons in two to four years. It was claimed that the Special Forces command was in the highest stage of readiness for an attack (state G) in December. Ariel Sharon reportedly said, "Israel - and not only Israel - cannot accept a nuclear Iran. We have the ability to deal with this and we're making all the necessary preparations to be ready for such a situation" (Mahnaimi, 2005:1). Israeli military Chief of Staff, Dan Halutz, was quoted as responding to the question of how far Israel was ready to go to stop Iran's nuclear energy program with the statement "Two thousand kilometers" (Petras, 2005:1).

Seymour Hersh has also claimed that US Department of Defense civilians led by Douglas Feith have been working with Israeli planners and consultants to develop and refine potential nuclear, chemical-weapons, and missile targets inside Iran (Hersh, 2005:2).

As of 2006 relations between the two states became very tense primarily due to the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. After his election, Ahmadinejad frequently began to call for a complete end to the State of Israel, and has made various anti-Semitic remarks.

On December 8, 2005, Ahmadinejad gave an interview with Iran's Arabic channel 'Al-Alam' during a summit of Muslim nations in Islam's holy city of Mecca. "Some European countries insist on saying that during World War II, Hitler burned millions of Jews and put them in concentration camps," Ahmadinejad said. "Any historian, commentator or scientist who doubts that is taken to prison or gets condemned. Although we don't accept this claim, if we suppose it is true, if the Europeans are honest they should give some of their provinces in Europe—like in Germany, Austria or other countries—to the Zionists and the Zionists can establish their state in Europe. You offer part of Europe and we will support it." This statement made by Ahmadinejad triggered a defensive, aggressive reaction by Israel and the United States. On 08 May 2006, Israeli vice Premier Shimon Peres said in an interview with Reuters that "the president of Iran should remember that Iran can also be wiped off the map," Army Radio reported (Dominican today, 2006:20).

Israel is estimated to have between 200-400 nuclear weapons and well-developed missile delivery systems, but there are neither confirmations nor denials nor did other information regarding the intent to use them in the operations allegedly being planned (Jahn, 2007:2).

A secret Israeli plan to strike Iranian nuclear enrichment facilities at Natanz with nuclear bunker busters was disclosed to The Times in January 2007. The report alleged that:

The Israeli weapons would each have a force equivalent to one-fifteenth of the Hiroshima bomb. Under the plans, conventional laser-guided bombs would open "tunnels" into the targets. "Mini-nukes" would then immediately be fired into a plant at Natanz, exploding deep underground to reduce the risk of radioactive fallout. "As soon as the green light is given, it will be one mission, one strike and the Iranian nuclear project will be demolished," said one of the sources. The tactical nuclear weapons would only be used if conventional weapons were "ruled out" and if the United States "declined to intervene", the article continues, based on "senior" military sources (Mahnaimi and Baxter, 2007:2).

Tehran has said that Israel would be the first retaliatory target for any attack on Iran. Plans has been drawn up to retaliate against Israel with conventional weapons if Israel should attack or the United States, the Iranian deputy air force commander said on September 19, 2007, adding to tensions already heated up by an Israeli airstrike on Syria and Western calls for more U.N. sanctions against Tehran. Other Iranian officials also underlined their country's readiness to fight if the US or Israel attacks, a reflection of concerns in Tehran that demands by the US and its allies for Iran to curtail its nuclear program could escalate into military action (Dareini, 2007:1).

"We have drawn up a plan to strike back at Israel with our bombers if this regime (Israel) makes a silly mistake," Iran's deputy air force commander, Gen. Mohammad Alavi, said in an interview with the semiofficial Fars news agency. Alavi warned that Israel is within range of Iran's medium-range missiles and fighter-bombers. The Iranian air force had no

immediate comment on the Fars report. But Defense Minister Mostafa Mohammed Najjar told the official IRNA news agency that "we keep various options open to respond to threats. ... We will make use of them if required." Iran's elite Revolutionary Guards also weighed in, saying Iran "has prepared its people for a possible confrontation against any aggression"(msnbc, 2007).

The view of many Israelis is that Iran is perceived as "an existential threat"(The Washington Post, 2006:1). Although Iran professes only peaceful ambitions for their nuclear program, their president has allegedly spoken of wiping Israel off the map (Dareini, 2007:1). This statement, though widely attributed to Ahmadinejad, is considered to be a mistranslation intended to portray Iran as a nuclear threat to Israel (Cole,2006:1), and Israeli officials privately concede that Iranian nuclear weapons would not actually pose much of a threat to Israel (Porter, 2007:3).

Some Israelis claim that the Iranians might consider a nuclear exchange, even one that greatly damages their own country. However, in October 2007, the Israel newspaper Haaretz reported that the Israeli Foreign Minister, Tzipi Livni, has admitted that "Iranian nuclear weapons do not pose an existential threat to Israel". The report went on to state that "Livni also criticized the exaggerated use that Prime Minister Ehud Olmert is making of the issue of the Iranian bomb, claiming that he is attempting to rally the public around him by playing on its most basic fears" (Weitz and Lanski, 2007:1). Livni's reported remarks echo those of Ephraim Halevy, the former head of the Israeli intelligence agency, Mossad, that Iran is not a threat to Israel. As Halevy says, "We cannot say that the Iranian threat is an

existential threat on the State of Israel; I believe that the State of Israel cannot be eliminated" (ibid: 2).

Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman Mark Regev said his government took Iran's "threat very seriously and so does the international community." "Unfortunately we are all too accustomed to this kind of bellicose, extremist and hateful language coming from Iran," he said (Dareini, 2007:1).

Israel also blames the IAEA for what it is calling cautious reports about Iran's nuclear program. It campaigns, together with the United States, for tougher sanctions on Iran. The director general of the IAEA, El Baradei has been accused of complacency with Iran's nuclear ambitions. Especially after his report stating that Iran will need another three to eight years to be able to make a nuclear bomb, and that there was plenty of time for diplomacy, sanctions, dialogue and incentives. On the 5th of October, 2007, the Director-General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, Aharon Abramovich, described the IAEA as a "hindrance" to "the international effort against Iran" (Sofer, 2007:1).

In brief, the above-mentioned chapter presented a lengthy narrative description of latest developments on Iran nuclear issue in a systemic and periodic manner. It included all major states and non state actors who are deemed to be directly involved and influential in determining outcomes. Though, such lengthy informative presentation is needed and remains significant in that it facilitates the grounds conducive to conduct analytical assessments in the following chapter especially when tacking the main question of the research. As mentioned above, with exception to Iran, all state and non state actors aim for

one objective – 'neutralizing' nuclear Iran whilst they considerably diverge on the means and the instruments to achieve such objective – with special reference to the US. To some extent, such divergence reflects the theoretical amalgamation between realism and liberalism. The following chapter will try analytically assessing to what extent these policies diverges based on theoretical analytical foundations the one hand and to attempt to evaluate the efficiency of US countermeasures towards Iran on the other.

Chapter IV

Iran and the US: Who gets What, When, and How

IV.I Introduction

The main aim of this chapter will be based on two main grounds: first, it will try to verify the extent to which theories explained in chapter I coincide with the contemporary contested developments of the US Iranian relations. In it, the chapter will delineate the extent to which the theoretical foundations explain empirical analysis. Second, the chapter will try - based on these findings and along with those themes derived from the above mentioned analysis – to formulate and deduce an answer to the main question of the research. Accordingly, it seeks to reach an assessment formula attempting to depict US countermeasure options towards Iran's nuclear expectations.

As for the former, the section is divided into two main themes as it differentiates between those 'instrumental policies' – reflecting different approaches of the above-mentioned school of thoughts and ideologies - adhered by states to countermeasure nuclear Iran on the one hand and the goals of such 'instrumental policies' on the other. As for 'instrumental policies' per se, the chapter concludes that – as shown below- that it would be difficult to adopt a single particular theory that explains or handles the overall complexities discussed in the previous chapter. Indeed, the paper understands the theoretical peculiarity of a given interrelation status between Iran and US on the one hand and Iran and other key state actors of the international community (e.g. the EU) on the other. In other words, whereas realism – to high extent – explains the US approach towards countering the Iranian nuclear issue, liberalism nonetheless, considerably portrays other states and non state actors (e.g. UN) involvement in such issue. On the other hand, as for the overall goals of 'instrumental policies', the section argues that despite the divergence in attitudes amongst states to halt

Iranian nuclear capabilities, they nonetheless, converge on both: fortify containment and mitigate Iranian deterrence sway.

As for the second objective of this chapter however (assessing US countermeasure options), the chapter will examine in the following sections the efficacies as well as those changes in the US strategic thinking and policy options adopted so far in order to try to figure out an overall assessment of such actions and activities. In it, the section will demonstrate how such assessment reveals dual, though extreme approaches, ranges from the threat to use force to the embracement of maintaining diplomacy as an instrumental mean to neutralize Iranian's 'threat'. Finally, the section concludes that the US overall countermeasures approach, so far, have failed considerably to mitigate and lessen Iranian nuclear progression. Ostensibly, this conclusion is based on such short-term (so far) view in that what may occur or take place in future may contradict with today's outcomes and developments (e.g. effective US strategic policy).

IV. II. Understanding Nuclear Iran within a Theoretical Perspective

IV.II. I. Containing and Deterring Iran

This section will try to demonstrate how the theoretical foundations of containment as such coincided with the actual interpretations of the latest US countermeasure policy towards Iran. Though, it is worth noting here that the applications of such theoretical foundations or themes do not necessarily reflect that they have been effective or successful so far to neutralize Iran's existing nuclear plans. On the contrary, the following sections will reveal

that containment may produce little influence (failed) but it nonetheless failed in total to generate or meet the intended objectives sought by the US.

As mentioned in chapter two, containment policy was meant in general terms to isolate – rather than to confront- the enemy in order to defeat or weaken him. In principle, the policy of containment has been also the dominating strategy in dealing with Iran's nuclear ambitions, adopted by both the US and the international community as a whole. In an attempt to contain Iran, the US has been mobilizing an international coalition to raise the diplomatic, economic, domestic political, and potential military costs to Tehran of continuing to flout its obligations under its nuclear safeguards agreements. This "coalition of the willing" seeks to isolate the Ahmadinejad regime, weaken it through targeted economic sanctions, explain to the Iranian people why their government's nuclear policies will impose economic costs and military risks on them, contain Iran's military power, and encourage democratic change.

However, it is worth noting that, the evolution of the US containment policy is nothing new. Many Iranians consider the US involvement in the 1953 coup that overthrew Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq as the beginning of Iran's distrust of American policy makers, as the Eisenhower Administration, through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) "did help overthrow Mosaddeq and it was culpable in the establishment of the despotism of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi" (Pollack, 2004:68) coming back into power. The clerics have continually used this event to fuel the Iranian attitude of mistrust toward the US From the Iranian revolution in 1979 through the mid 1990's the US diplomacy, and military force." (Brzezinski and Gates, 2004:40). From the mid 1990's through 2003 the US used

the Clinton administration's policy of dual containment for Iran and Iraq. In the late 1990's the Clinton administration attempted to engage Iran but never achieved any breakthroughs.

Immediately after the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001 the Bush administration did engage with the Iranian government. Tehran provided assistance to the US during Operation Enduring Freedom, primarily along the Afghanistan and Iranian borders. The opportunity for the US to expand on this engagement policy ended when President Bush announced during his first State of the Union address in January 2002, that Iran was a member of the axis of evil. This statement caused the Iran government to stop engaging with the US and the Bush administration returned to the dual containment policy. With the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, the Bush administration updated the dual containment policy for both Iraq and Iran by indicating that they wanted to engage with Iran again. This policy change occurred in October 2003 when "the Bush administration assured Iran that the US did not favor a regime change in Tehran and signaled a new willingness to engage in a dialogue with Iran over its nuclear weapons program, alleged support of terrorism, violent opposition to the Middle East peace process and the Iranian government's poor human rights record" (Weisman, 2003:7).

Ever since Iran's explicit nuclear ambitions, and the arrival of Ahmadinejad to the presidency, the United States stance towards Iran has taken a more firm shape based on realistic thoughts. Accordingly, for the last year, Iran has been successfully gaming the international diplomatic process, stalling while its nuclear program moves inexorably forward. The US has realized it should make time work for them, rather than against them. It has been recommended by US officials that the best way to do that is to take bold and

immediate steps to deter and contain Iran -- almost like a Cold War on a small scale. In order to show its hard-line leaders that their nuclear program hurts Iran's security rather than helps it, namely, that Iran is starting an arms race it will lose because the United States and Iran's neighbors will respond (Clawson, 2006:12-15).

In a return to its past, Washington took a page out of its early Cold War struggle with the Soviet Union, when Western powers successfully frustrated Moscow's expansionist designs. By directly projecting its own power and creating a broad-based Arab alliance, the Bush administration thought it could check - and if possible reduce - Iran's influence. Accordingly, the United States increased pressure on the Islamic Republic by building up its naval presence in the Gulf and engineering a series of United Nations sanctions against Iran for its nuclear violations. The administration also rallied Arab support against Iranian policies in Lebanon, the Palestinian territories and Iraq. Through a series of regional meetings and conferences, beginning with the meeting at Annapolis, the administration is also seeking to rejuvenate the Israeli-Palestinian peace process as a means of refocusing regional energies on Iran.

It is well argued that although the United States, the EU, Russia and China are in broad agreement that an advancement of a claimed military nuclear program in Iran is unacceptable, they have not yet reached a consensus on how to stop Iran. While the US, the UK, and lately France tend to use more "sticks", Russia, China and the EU use more "carrots". Although the US has been involved in some negotiations, following the European liberal path, intensifying its engagement with the Iranian people, trying to increase contacts between the two peoples, it has also been showing mild military threats, especially with the

defense missile programs the US is planning in Europe, showing that a military option is serious.

Also, a French Foreign Ministry spokeswoman stressed that the international community "must maintain pressure on Iran." Paris believes that a new "constraining (UN) resolution" is necessary, she added (AFP, 4 December). In parallel, a spokesman for UK Prime Minister Brown said that Iran's nuclear program poses a "serious" security threat and that, "in overall terms," the government believes London was "right" to be "worried" about it. Another report quoted the spokesman as saying that "the sanctions program and international pressure has had some effect" (AFP, AP, 4 December).

However, Russia and China - whose acquiescence would be required for any new UN sanctions - have said the NIE report raises questions about the need for new measures. Kremlin ally and chair of Russia's Federation Council's International Affairs Committee, Margelov claimed that the NIE showed that Russia was "correct in its unbiased approach toward Iran's nuclear issue" (Novostey, 2007:2). Although not commenting directly on the NIE's release, Russian President Vladimir Putin, in his meeting with the Secretary of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council, Sa'id Jalili in Moscow, expressed the "hope" that all of Iran's nuclear programs will be "open and transparent and will be carried out with monitoring by the IAEA (Prime-TASS, 2007:5). China's stance on the "Iran nuclear issue" is "consistent," and that Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi had "reiterated" China's "principled stance" to Secretary Rice (Foreign Ministry website).He added that China "hopes" Iran will "cooperate" with the IAEA, "clarify unresolved issues," and "create advantageous conditions" for "starting negotiations."

Accordingly, as shown above, despite divergence of attitudes, the said developments illustrate the overall nature of containment as a strategic policy object – which has so far failed to meet its objectives to stagnate Iran.

IV.II.II. Lack of Trust: Deterring Iran within a Changing Regional Balance of Power Context

As mentioned in chapter two, Realism as a school of thought, is based on lack of trust among states, especially in the absence of an overriding legal authority regulating interactions between states. Lack of trust among states drives them to protect themselves against each other, due to differences among their interests. When applying these themes within the Iranian-US context, it becomes vivid that unlike the then mutual trust between Iran and the United States during the reign of the Shah, today there are a continued growing of mistrust and distrust between the two nations sprang up in the 1979 Islamic revolution of Iran. Indeed, such lack of trust triggers different political understandings and security equations in the US-Iranian relations particularly after Iran declared to continue to pursue its nuclear 'ambitions'. In turn, two of the most heated outcomes reside over the conflicting views over redefining regional balance of power and deterrence within a changing regional order. Paradoxically, as shown below, although the clash over shaping these two conflictual understandings appear to be mainly between Iran and the US, other states with special reference to the state of Israel, are nonetheless deemed involved vigorously –though indirectly behind the scenes sometimes– in the making of regional political map (see figure two).

Figure 2.Dealing with Iran: Approaches and Instruments

For instance, as for the former, in an attempt to end Iran's nuclear aspirations, the US opts to achieve a regional balance of power in a chaotic region, where the United States main ally, Israel, exists. The situation in the region pushes the United States and the International community to neutralize the rising power of Iran. Many factors act as motives to the hostile position the United States, particularly, is adopting. Starting with the fact that Saddam Hussein's antagonistic position towards Iran is demolished now after the US war on Iraq in 2003. The absence of an antecedent counterbalance to Iran's power gives more space for Iran's hegemonic ambitions in the region. Iran's other enemy; the Taliban regime in Afghanistan has similarly been ousted. Today, the new leaders of Iraq and Afghanistan are much closer to their Iranian neighbors. A further change has occurred after the Israeli war against Lebanon. Israel was weakened, and the reputation of its huge power was falsified, especially after Hizbolla's successful resistance in Lebanon. It is also worth mentioning that Turkey as well has no major influence in the Middle East. Other than that, today, Shia figures in Iraq, Lebanon and Bahrain have won a significant share in political power. Thus,

Iran currently has something of an upper hand in the region. As a result, Iran has become a leader with influence throughout the region.

Such developments are enough to trigger concern in neighboring Arab states, and the international community as a whole, especially the US as it wishes to maintain Israel's hegemonic power, solely, in the region. The US also claims its fears further nuclear proliferation amongst Arab states in the region, trying to counterbalance Iran's nuclear capabilities, where a case of nuclear arms race can be created. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert called for firm efforts against Iran, stressing the need to "pursue efforts" to prevent Iran from developing a weapons capability (Ha'aretz, 4 December). Defense Minister Ehud Baraq expressed skepticism about the NIE's judgments suggesting that Iran has "probably since revived" its weapons efforts, and noting that Israel "cannot allow ourselves to rest because of an intelligence report from the other side of the earth, even if it is from our greatest friend (IDF Radio, 4 December).

The NIE was a wake-up call for all Israelis who believed that America and Israel saw the Iranian threat through the same lens. Isarel's policy makers see Iran as an existential threat, whereas it is perceived as a strategic threat by Washington. According to the report, by 2009 an Iranian nuclear device is a "very unlikely possibility." That risk of a possibility of a nuclear device is unacceptable by Israel. Israelis included, the NIE put to rest all the talk of a military strike against Iran. Without this threat of force, Israelis and some American officials believe, the probability of meaningful sanctions is severely reduced. This is liable to push Israel, which will feel isolated, to consider making "difficult decisions" in the case those diplomatic efforts to rein in Iran fail. (Rosner, 2007:2).

On the other hand, and as far as deterrence is concerned, this section also envisages that there is an overlapping between the general principles associated with deterrence - as illustrated in chapter one – with current US (and even Israel to lesser extent) policy alternative option towards Iran in that the threat to use force – based on the principle of retaliation - is becoming an increasingly alarming dominant instrument used by the US to deter Iran.

Generally speaking, during the forty-year Cold War, a strategy of deterrence protected the United States and its allies from the threat of nuclear-armed adversaries. Although the prospect of nuclear conflict was, at times during that period, much closer than it may seem in retrospect, the underlying logic of deterrence - that adversaries share a preeminent rational interest in survival - played a critical role in keeping the peace (Washington Institute, 2007). Containment as a policy has been seen as insufficient to deal with the Iranian issue, and thus the United States has adopted deterrence as a strategy, defending the argument that US leans more towards realistic rather than liberal approach. President Bush had said that plans for a US-led missile defense system in Europe are urgently needed to counter an emerging threat of attack by Iran. According to the United States the greatest threat facing their nation in the 21st century is the danger of terrorist networks or states armed with weapons of mass destruction. The Pentagon wants to install 10 interceptor rockets in Poland which, when linked to a proposed tracking radar in the Czech Republic and to other elements of the existing US missile defense system based in the United States, could defend all of Europe against a long-range missile fired from the Middle East (Feller,

2007:2). The United States have also planned to maintain a strong naval and air presence in the Persian Gulf to deter Iran and strengthen military cooperation with the Gulf States.

Indeed, Bush's aggressive language was obviously appreciated by the Israeli government, which has been sharply critical of last month's National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) by 16 US agencies that Iran had ended any nuclear weapons program in 2003. The assessment undercut the escalating propaganda campaign by the Bush administration and its Israeli allies for tough international action to force Iran to shut down its nuclear facilities. The incident in the Strait of Hormuz conveniently provided Bush with the opportunity to renew his warnings of the alleged danger posed by Iran.

> "Iran was a threat, Iran is a threat and Iran will be a threat to world peace if the international community does not come together and prevent that nation from the development of the knowledge to build a nuclear weapon," Bush declared. "A country that once had a secret program can easily restart a secret program. A country which can enrich [uranium] for civilian purposes can easily transfer that knowledge to a military program" (Benn and Ravid, 2008: 2).

Over the past year Israel has issued its own menacing warnings that it would not permit Iran to gain nuclear weapons. Reports in the British press have pointed to advanced Israeli preparations for air strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities. Following talks with Bush, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert indicated Iran had been a major topic of discussion and that he had been reassured. "I certainly am encouraged and reinforced, having heard the position of the United States under the leadership of George Bush, particularly on this subject," he said (Symonds, 2008:2).

Comments by Israel's ambassador to the US, Sallai Meridor, highlight the determination of Israel and the US to heighten the confrontation with Iran, despite the NIE findings. After

explaining that the two governments were "in sync and think similarly", he responded to a question about a military strike on Iran, by ominously declaring: "Both the US and Israel haven't removed any option from the table. All options are on the table, not only in the future" (ibid, 3).

In short, it can be understood from above that shifting regional balance in favor of Iran, would ultimately strengthen its deterrence strategy regional at the expense of Israel. From American point of view, along with other economic factors (e.g. oil), this scenario should subsequently backfire on their long term strategic interests in the region and through which its current rigid policy towards Iran is demonstrated.

On the following section, the chapter will try examine other actors involved – apart from the US– in dealing with Iranian nuclear question. In it, the section will show that although these actors meet US general objective in neutralizing 'nuclear' Iran, they nonetheless purse different approach to achieve such end. Accordingly, to some extent, the theoretical framework needed to explain such different approach (liberalism) will diverge from that in the earlier section (realism).

IV.II.III. The International Community- Iranian Paradigm

While the US main strategy in dealing with Iran has been based on realistic approaches of balancing power, deterring and threatening, with some bending towards approaches based on liberal thoughts such as negotiations, the international community (except for France lately) has been supporting diplomatic means and pushing towards negotiations. There has

been a diplomatic effort underway for the past years to dissuade Iran from trying to become a nuclear power. That effort began in 2003 when Britain, France, and Germany—the so-called EU-3—became sufficiently worried about Tehran's apparent objectives that they decided to address the problem through engagement and negotiations. They urged the United States to join that effort, but the Bush administration spurned the overtures of its allies and decided to remain on the sidelines. That posture did not prevent President Bush and other US officials from issuing periodic statements stressing that a nuclear-armed Iran was "intolerable." Indeed, from the earliest stages of the European diplomatic initiative, Washington urged that Iran be referred to the UN Security Council for possible sanctions (Beehner, 2005:5).

France position has been more firm urging the continuation of a strategy that combined pressure with dialogue, believing that Iran remains to be a danger, being one of the staunchest defenders of further sanctions, Whereas Russia and China continue to oppose US and European sanctions strategy, believing that there is no evidence that Iran ever had a secret nuclear weapons program in violation of international treaty obligations.

In addition, the liberal component further demonstrates itself within the Paris Summit as well as 'final settlement plan' – as thoroughly detailed in previous chapter - in 2004 and 2006 respectively. The plan for instance provided to assist Iran with peaceful uses of nuclear energy insufficient (medicine, agriculture, and other uses) and offered limited security guarantees in exchange for Iran's permanently ending uranium enrichment. Also, a spacious room of diplomacy was granted to Iran during "Paris Agreement", as it

conditioned a voluntary and temporary suspension of uranium enrichment activities (the in return for unspecified economic rewards from the EU.

IV.III. Assessing US strategic Thinking towards Containing and Neutralizing Nuclear Iran

The main objective of this main section is to try to answer the second main component of this chapter by attempting to assess the so far US Strategic Thinking towards containing and neutralizing nuclear Iran. As shown below, the following sub-sections reveal the overall assessment of the US countermeasure options towards Iran failed so far in containing Iranian nuclear aspirations based on the following grounds:

1. The Continuation of Iranian 'Nuclear Policy' (regardless whether it is meant to serve peaceful or military purposes)

The efforts of the United States and its allies to dissuade Iran from pursuing its long-sought goal of attaining a nuclear weapons capability have so far failed to yield satisfactory results. It has been viewed that the strategy for containing Iran is based on mistaken assumptions, beginning with the fallacy that Iran can be compared to the Soviet Union and that the early Cold War model is applicable to today's Middle East (Takeyh and Naser, 2007:7). Although Iran made temporary tactical concessions in October 2003 under strong international pressure to temporarily freeze its uranium enrichment operations and submit to increased inspections of its nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Tehran feared that referral to the United Nations Security Council could result in diplomatic isolation, economic sanctions, or possible military attack. It undoubtedly also was motivated by the rapid overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2001 and

Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq in early 2003 by US-led coalitions. Tehran made enough tactical concessions to stave off international sanctions and engage the European Union in diplomatic negotiations led by Britain, France, and Germany (the EU-3) to temporarily defuse the crisis. But Tehran later dropped the charade of negotiations after it apparently concluded that the international situation had shifted in its favor. It started to believe that it is in a much stronger position due to the continued need for US military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan; the rise in oil prices, which has given it greater bargaining leverage with oil importers; and its diplomatic cultivation of China and Russia, which can dilute or veto resolutions brought before the Security Council. The installation of a new hard-line government led by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in August 2005 also was a major factor that led Tehran to renege on its agreement with the EU-3. Iran's new president is firmly committed to Iran's nuclear program and vehemently criticized Iran's previous government for making too many concessions in past negotiations with the EU-3 (Phillips, 2006:76).

Economic sanctions in place for decades haven't stopped Iran from pursuing nuclear ambitions the Bush administration says are a cover for a nuclear bomb or, if administration allegations are true, from funding terrorism across the Middle East. The United States has had only mixed results using sanctions as a foreign policy tool in the past against countries like Iran, Cuba and North Korea. Undaunted by three decades of failed sanctions on Iran, the United States is taking new measures to punish the Islamic republic's nuclear ambitions and alleged sponsorship of terrorism. But analysts questioned the sanctions' effectiveness in the absence of concerted UN action against Iran, and opposition Democrats saw worrying parallels to the drumbeats of war that preceded the 2003 invasion of Iraq. "Every day now,

it seems that the confrontational rhetoric between the United States and Iran escalates," senior Democratic Senator Robert Byrd said. Through ever-stricter sanctions, Washington has tried and failed to exert pressure on Iran ever since the US embassy hostage crisis that erupted following the 1979 Islamic revolution. Bush suggested that a nuclear-armed Iran could trigger "World War III," while Vice President Dick Cheney spoke of "serious consequences" unless the Islamic republic comes to heel. Cheney's language matched the 2002 resolutions of the UN Security Council that warned Saddam Hussein of "serious consequences" unless he came clean on his alleged stockpiles of WMD. Although Unveiling the new sanctions, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice renewed an offer to meet her Iranian counterpart for talks "anytime, anywhere" and on any issue if Tehran agrees to suspend its enrichment of uranium, Rice also warned: "If they choose to continue down a path of confrontation, the US will act with the international community to resist these threats of the Iranian regime." (Joshi, 2007:6).

Iran still holds tight to its right of enrichment and refuses to sustain its nuclear program. Mohammad Ali Hosseini, Foreign Ministry spokesman said that the US efforts to isolate Iran have so far got nowhere. `Tehran`s stand is against suspension and is for continuation of peaceful activities under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),` he reiterated `If the objective of the US and certain European states, by issuing anti-Iran resolutions, is to deprive Iran of its rights, it will not be materialized,` Hosseini stated. (IRNA, 2008:1).

"The Iranian people will not back down an inch over their right to nuclear energy. They (the world powers) should not make another blunder by voting a new resolution against

Iran," (AFP, 2008:2) said Ahmadinejad. The West fears Iran could use sensitive nuclear technology to make atomic weapons but Tehran insists the drive is peaceful and has pressed on with its nuclear program. "You should know that the path of the Iranian nation is different from that of those who compromise. The Iranian nation will resist to the end," declared Ahmadinejad (ibid, 3). He had also said later ,"World powers can pass United Nations sanctions resolutions for 100 years without deterring Iran from its nuclear ambitions" (Reuters, 2008:1). Tehran insists it is seeking to master nuclear technology so it can make fuel for a planned network of nuclear power plants and save its huge oil and gas reserves for export.

2. Lack of Support: Reports and Studies – with special reference to US Intelligence Report – Shows that Iran is far from Entrenching Uranium for Military Purposes.

The strategy of incrementally tightening the UN sanctions has been derailed by the December National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), which ascertained that Iran currently does not have a nuclear weapons program. Consequently, the much anticipated third UN resolution seems nowhere in sight. Russia and China have signaled greater resistance to it in response to the NIE and the Iranian UN ambassador has taken a month's vacation, reflecting Tehran's lack of worry. And in a great blow to the effort of forcing Iran to face a united Security Council, Russia has begun delivering nuclear fuel to Iran's Bushehr reactor after years of procrastination. Thus, Iran has continued its nuclear program in spite of both U.N. sanctions and Washington's unilateral financial sanctions.

The NIE report triggered different reactions in the international community. As a start, Iran's most authoritative comment to date, Government Spokesman Gholam Hoseyn Elham

called the NIE a "US Government confession of its mistakes" and said the US should "pay for the disadvantages" it caused (ISNA, 2007:1). In the same vein, Foreign Ministry spokesman Seyyed Mohammad Ali Hoseyni, who described past US claims as "baseless" and called on the Europeans to "adopt fair approaches, make just judgments, and choose logical solutions" (ISNA,2007:2). Relatedly, Iran's Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki stated that "70%" of the NIE report is "correct", again emphasizing the positive side of it as far as Iran is concerned and urging Western governments to "correct their policies toward Iran"(Afrasiabi, 2007:5). Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad called the US report a "great victory" for Iran. (BBC news, 2007) As for the General Director of the IAEA he had stated that the report has relieved him because of its consistency with the agency's assessment.

Official statements from the EU-3 called for maintaining international pressure on Iran, pointing to the positive effects of the sanctions to date. The German Foreign Minister said that the report offered an "opportunity to give new dynamism to the nuclear talks with Iran," adding that "only a firm position by the international community can persuade Iran to follow path of confidence-building" (Foreign Ministry website, 4 December).

A month after the NIE report announcement, the Strait of Hormuz incident occurred. The Pentagon warned on the 6th of January, that five small Iranian speedboats "threatened" a powerful US fleet comprising one frigate, a destroyer and a cruiser in the Strait of Hormuz by coming within 500 meters of them. Bush accused Iran of "a provocative act", saying: "It is a dangerous situation, and they should not have done it, pure and simple." Speaking in Jerusalem the following day after meeting with Israeli leaders, he went one step further,

warning Tehran of "dangerous consequences" if US ships were attacked. "All options are on the table to protect our assets," he said, "My advice to them is, don't do it."(Symonds, 2008:1).

The Strait of Hormuz incident has been surrounded by doubts. It is claimed that the political manner in which the US has exploited the naval encounter in Strait of Hormuz to inflame tensions is out of all proportion to the incident itself. While the pentagon has come up with differing versions of the story, Iranian officials dismissed the incident as an ordinary occurrence and denied that any threat was made. Iran's low-key response tends to indicate that no one in Tehran is seeking to make political mileage out of the incident. In fact, the regime has more to lose than to gain by heightening tensions with the US. The Iranian government has been seeking to finalize arrangements for another round of talks in Baghdad involving the US and Iranian ambassadors over security in Iraq. Over the past months, Tehran has improved relations with neighboring Gulf States, making advances that would be upset by any new confrontation. The Bush administration on the other hand has been seeking at every turn to pressurize and provoke Iran.

For the Bush administration, the incident in the Strait of Hormuz could not have been better timed to stymie the development of diplomatic relations with Iran, to heighten tensions in the region and possibly to justify a further US military buildup against Tehran. But a war against Iran could not be an option for long; Moscow has begun hinting that Russia's S-300 missiles are being dispatched to Iran. There is much constructive ambiguity over the subject in both Moscow and Tehran, which leaves Washington nervous and guessing. The medium-range S-300 surface-to-air missiles, together with the short-range Tor-M1 systems supplied

by Moscow to Tehran earlier, would help counter any attempt by the Bush administration to bully Iran. To quote the Russian daily Izvestiya, "Iran will be Moscow's trump card in its drive against the third stage of US missile defenses in Poland and the Czech Republic."(Bhadrakumar, 2008:2).

The Bush administration is beginning to grasp that it has no option but to negotiate with Iran. But a new danger is that negotiations with Iran, too, may soon become a non-option. Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei had said that at the moment, relations with the US are of "no benefit to the Iranian nation. The day such relations are of benefit, I will be the first one to approve of that." He seems to be anticipating the post-Bush era.

3. The US Failed to Isolate Iran Diplomatic ties especially towards its Neighboring Regions despite Bush's Visit to the Area

The USA and its partners in Europe have constantly tried to contain Iran through growing forms of economic sanctions and hints that armed confrontations (limited military strikes) had not been ruled out. This was the situation till the end of the third quarter of last year. However, the use of such eager vocabulary has been slightly reduced in recent months. After a decade of making Iran's isolation a principal goal of Washington's Middle Eastern policy, the track record is somehow clear. Despite all the political capital invested in that approach, the isolation policy has neither prevented Iran's rise nor has it compelled Tehran to moderate its foreign policy. As a matter of fact, it is possibly viewed that the policy of containing Iran has actually failed so far. Instead, as shown below, Iran has strengthened its diplomatic ties with regional and international states, widening its circle of cordial relations.

A) Caspian Sea Summit

At a summit held in Kyrgyzstan in August 2007, leaders of the six Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) countries said they can ensure regional stability and energy security without outside assistance. The SCO comprises Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and has Iran, India, Pakistan and Mongolia as observers. The bloc, which primarily addresses security issues, is seen by many as a counterbalance to US influence in the region. Participants of the summit in the Central Asian nation's capital, Bishkek, signed eight documents, including a Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation, a Bishkek Declaration, a joint communique, and a plan of action to ensure international information security.

In parallel, two months later, Iran had participated in October 2007 in a Caspian Sea summit where leaders of Russia, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan came with a statement saying that no Caspian Sea state should let its soil be used to attack a fellow country in the summit. The statement was believed to refer to a possible US strike on Iran launched from Azerbaijan. "The parties underline that under no circumstances would they allow other nations to use their territory for waging aggression or other military action against any of the parties," the declaration said. Putin had said earlier: "We should not even think of making use of force in this region." Collectively, the summit participants also said all signatories to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty have a right to develop peaceful nuclear technology. The states had "expressed the idea that peaceful nuclear activities must be allowed," Putin said (Aljazeera news, 2007). Putin was the first Kremlin leader to travel to Iran since Josef Stalin, the former Soviet leader, attended a wartime summit with

Winston Churchill, former British prime minister, and Franklin Roosevelt, former US president, in 1943.

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose presence at the event added to its image as an anti-NATO event, told the summit that the deployment of US missile defense elements in Central Europe threatens not only Iran but also the whole of Eurasia. The US announced in January plans to place a radar and a host of interceptor missiles in Poland and the Czech Republic to fend off what Washington sees as an impending missile threat from "rogue states", including Iran. United States plans "to deploy elements of a missile defense system around the world are threatening not just one country, but also the entire Eurasian continent, Asia and members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization [SCO]," Ahmadinejad said (Fars news agency, 2007).

Russia has strongly opposed the US missile shield plans, saying Washington has no justification for deploying a missile defense system in Europe until there is conclusive evidence showing that Iran has the capability to launch long-range nuclear-armed missiles. Ahmadinejad called for closer cooperation between members of the so-called Shanghai Six on a variety of global challenges, including drug-trafficking, terrorism and organized crime. The Iranian leader arrived in Kyrgyzstan after visits to nearby Afghanistan and Turkmenistan, where he met with the countries' presidents, Hamid Karzai and Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov, who was also a guest at the summit. At his bilateral meeting with Hu Jintao the previous day, Ahmadinejad had thanked the Chinese leader for his country's support in the ongoing international dispute over Iran's nuclear program (BBC news, 2007).

B) Bush's Visit to the Region in January 2008

A couple of days after the Strait of Hormuz incident, and a month after the NIE report, The US president departed for a Middle East tour that includes Israel, Palestine, Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Bush had two objectives in his Middle East mission - weigh in on the faltering post-Annapolis Palestinian-Israeli peace process of last November and seek support for US concerns about Iran.

But where people misjudge is that the real purpose of Bush's visit to the region lies elsewhere. His principal aim is to keep the heat on Iran. Bush admitted that in his talks in the region, he would focus on containing the "hostile aspirations" of Iran. He told the Israeli newspaper Yediot Ahnronot, "Part of the reason I'm going to the Middle East is to make it abundantly clear to nations in that part of the world that we view Iran as a threat, and that the National Intelligence Estimate [NIE] in no way lessens that threat, but in fact clarifies that threat"(Bhdarakumar, 2008:2).

President George W Bush reaffirmed the strengthening of its longstanding security commitments in the Gulf but also realized that the Gulf States are determined to avoid further conflict in the region. The Gulf leadership has listened to Bush about the dangers of a resurgent Iran and agreed to further modernize their arsenal. At the same time, the Gulf States also indirectly indicated the need to establish better ties of understanding by themselves with Iran (Zamir, 2008:1).

Papers in the Middle East are sharply critical of Bush's current Middle East visit, saying the

United States is obsessed with Iran and that he is backpedaling on the positions he staked

out at Annapolis. The left-wing Pro-Iranian Lebanese daily As-Safir writes:

> "The explicit aim of the lame duck visit to the region is to foster hatred for Iran
> among Arab countries ... and to urge them to stand together with Israel against what
> the American president calls 'terrorism' -- as if there was anything more dangerous for
> the region than Israeli terrorism. A responsible Arab delivered the necessary response.
> Prince Saud al-Faisal of Saudi Arabia insisted that 'Iran will always remain a friend, a
> partner and a neighbor for the Arab region.'"

On the other hand, the pro-regime United Arab Emirates daily Khaleej Times writes:

> "Just as the Gulf countries have healthy relations with the West, including the US,
> they also have historical, cultural and economic ties with Iran. The UAE happens to
> be Iran's biggest trading partner. This is why the UAE and other Gulf countries
> wouldn't want any more confrontation and conflict between the US and Iran. The
> Middle East and Gulf region, already suffering from two conflicts, cannot afford any
> more tensions. Peace and only peace is the way forward."

In a polite and diplomatic rebuttal of the Bush instigation, Saudi Arabia's foreign minister,

Prince Saud Al-Faisal, reiterated his country's sober approach to the Iranian affair by

underlining the Kingdom's keenness on maintaining peaceful relations with its neighbors.

His carefully chosen words echoed the GCC's policy towards Iran especially when Tehran

has been showing close cooperation with the IAEA and its head. Also, Al-Hayat, the Saudi-

owned newspaper published from London, commented on Bush's rhetoric:

> "This language is rendering the US's regional allies confused about the real policies
> of Washington ... Washington is speaking in dual tone, with US military officials
> commending the Iranian role in minimizing the threat to the forces in Iraq, and the
> CIA at the same time highlighting the danger posed by Iran's alleged nuclear
> program."

The tour held by President Bush envisaged giving the impression that the United States

didn't desert its policy of containing Iran and isolating it. It mainly focused on that

cooperation and increased support from regional actors can succeed in containing Iran. Yet, he was met with great skepticism. Now more than ever, the United States is seen to have little choice but to make a shift on Iran. Other than the NIE report and the way the Iranian leaders have felt victorious, US commanders in Iraq have toned down accusations of Iranian meddling and indicated that Iran is pressuring its Shi'ite allies to cease hostilities. Further more, and perhaps more importantly, US domestic politics has turned against the current course on Iran. The top three Democratic Presidential candidates – Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton, and John Edwards – are all on the record favoring unconditional diplomacy with Tehran.

C) Strong Diplomatic Relations with Arab Countries

The Arab world has started to question the efficacy of Bush visit to the region and had started to work out their own accommodation with Iran. The Arab League Secretary General Amr Musa posed a tricky question to the Washington Post: "As long as they [Iran] have no nuclear program ... why should we isolate Iran? Why punish Iran now?" (Washington Post, 2008). He has openly questioned the validity of Iran being isolated and punished. Clearly, Washington's plan for creating an anti-Iran alliance of "pro-West" Arab states in the Persian Gulf region - raison d'etre of the Annapolis conference - has conclusively disintegrated.

Iran, on its part, has sustained the active momentum of its diplomacy with its Persian Gulf neighbors. Thus, Tehran has done a smart thing by scheduling for the visit of the chief of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohamed ElBaradei, precisely when Bush arrives in the Persian Gulf.

Again, Iran is swiftly building on the positive climate generated by the invitation to Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to attend the Gulf Cooperation Council Summit in Doha on December 2 and by the friendly gesture by Saudi King Abdullah to invite him to attend the *hajj* in Mecca. The Saudi King Abdallah invited the Iranian president to Hajj as his special guest. "It's the first time in the history of relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia that the king of this country invites a president of the Islamic Republic to make the pilgrimage to Mecca" Ali Akbar Javanfekr, Ahmadinejad's media adviser said (Abdallah, 2007:1). His pilgrimage has an added political significance because of the sometimes rocky relations between Shiite Iran and Sunni-dominated Saudi Arabia, both key players in the turbulent Middle East. Ahmadinejad described Tehran's relations with Riyadh as "friendly," adding: "The message of my presence here is boosting ties among Islamic nations."(AFP, 2007:4). As a result the invitation of Ahmadinejad is considered to be an important event in the relations between the two countries.

The US must have taken note of the invitation extended to the Iranian President to attend a summit of the GCC States in Doha, Qatar, in December 2007, a few weeks before Bush's visit to the area. Such an unprecedented gesture could not have been considered even five years ago. The Iranian participation in the summit indicates Iran's good will and intention to help bring regional states closer together, Hassan Hanizadeh, an expert on Arab affairs had said (Tehran Times, 2007). Earlier during Iran- Iraq war, the council has taken a hostile stance against Iran, financially and logistically supporting Iraq, with an estimation of $180 billion, he continued. Ahmadinejad attended the summit to assure that Iran's nuclear activities will not create problems for them. He said that PGCC members should assure Iran

that foreign troops wouldn't threaten security of Iran and Persian Gulf. Iran's relations with Persian Gulf littoral states are so profound that western countries cannot cut them off. Ahmadinejad was the first Iranian president to be invited to attend a GCC summit during which he had called for regional security cooperation pact with his country. Both invitations were unprecedented (ibid, 2007).

Furthermore, even outside the region, Tehran has reached out to Cairo in a major initiative to repair the ties with Egypt, which were disrupted during the Iranian revolution in 1979. In a path-breaking visit to Cairo, Khamenei's representative to the National Security Council, Ali Larijani, offered a resumption of diplomatic relations, as well as cooperation in the nuclear field. From Cairo, Larijani proceeded to Damascus, where he met Hamas chief Khaled Meshaal, the secretary general of the Islamic Jihad, Ramadhan Abdullah Shalah, and top officials of the Lebanese Amal and Hezbollah movements (Asia Times, 10 Jan 2008).

Indeed, this Arab outreach to Iran – which largely is a response to a perception of the likely failure of Washington's Iran policy – has made the US effort to contain Tehran all the more unfeasible. Against this backdrop, the idea of an US- Arab-Israeli alliance being formed to counter Iran's rise – a key impetus for President Bush's Mideast tour – seems more farfetched than ever.

These developments have contributed to the perception that the United States cannot sustain its containment and isolation policies it's following with Iran, and have so far failed in doing so. Consequently Arab states have initiated their own diplomatic overtures towards Tehran.

4. **The Option for Military Strike is Becoming very Limited and Expensive**

This part of the paper aims at examining the military strategic option which some policy advisors recommended by US policy cycles. The Bush's administration foreign policy advisors fall into two main groups concerning the Iran's issue. Some believe that to induce a regime change in Iran, lifting sanctions and ending the country's isolation, exposing its population to the global economy, which would foster a long-term regime change. That would require establishing direct communications with Iran and diplomatic ties. On the other hand, others believe that the Iranian clerical regime will eventually give in due to severe sanctions and constant pressure. They believe a regime change must be forced in Iran similar to that of Iraq, they envisage that the clerics quickly developing a nuclear weapon that could destabilize the region and become a potential deterrent for any initiative the US may attempt with Iran (Walker, 2006:1). Perhaps the most bizarre incarnation of the air strike thesis is the argument made by some American hawks that it would serve as the needed catalyst for regime change. According to that thesis, the Iranian people would be so enraged at the clerics for bringing destruction upon them that they would overthrow the regime. Bill Kristol, once again, is the most explicit with that rationale. Asserting that "the Iranian people dislike their regime," he predicts that "the right use of military force could cause them to reconsider whether they really want to have this regime in power."(Interview on fox news, July: 2006). Bombing Iran would almost certainly be counterproductive for the goal of regime change. Iranians, like most other people, could be expected to "rally around the flag" if their country comes under attack. Nobel laureate Shirin Ebadi, an Iranian liberal critic of the clerical regime, likely expressed the views of most of her fellow citizens when she warned Washington not to attack Iran: "We will defend our country till

the last drop of blood" (Ebadi, 2006:1). If that is the attitude of a pro-Western liberal Iranian, one can only imagine what the attitude would be of Iranians less hostile to the current government.

It is widely believed that the use of military threats in 2002 and 2003 together with diplomacy (positive incentives and sanctions) have made Iran accommodate at the time. Since it had froze its nuclear program and had agreed to talk secretly to Washington. But the war on Iraq and the fiasco it became for the US, the rise of oil prices, the anti-Americanism allover the world, the effect of the war in Lebanon on the military capability of Israel, all these factors pushed Iran to believe that a military option is almost impossible for the US to consider, and thus Iran started to play its cards stubbornly (Perkovich, 2006:20).

Proponents of preventive military action typically cite the successful Israeli strike on Iraq's Osirak reactor in 1981 as a model for derailing the Iranian nuclear program. Some suggest that the United States undertake that mission on its own; others suggest that Washington encourage Israel to do. The drumbeat among American hawks for air strikes against Iran has redoubled since war broke out in July between Israel and the Iranian-supported Hezbollah in Lebanon. The comments of Weekly Standard editor William Kristol epitomize those recommendations. He suggests "countering this act of Iranian aggression with a military strike against Iranian nuclear facilities." And he is in a hurry, asserting that it "would be easier to act sooner than later." Kristol is sanguine about the consequences. "Yes, there would be repercussions— and they would be healthy ones, showing a strong America that has rejected further appeasement" (Kristol, 2006:1). The principal aim of

military action against Iran would be to destroy or, at a minimum, substantially set back its alleged nuclear weapons program. It is likely that this would be attempted through air strikes; US commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, together with Israel's recent experience in southern Lebanon, mean that there is no serious public consideration of a ground offensive. Potential targets for US or Israeli air strikes include not only Iranian nuclear facilities and missile delivery systems but also more general defense infrastructure, especially air defense systems, in order to paralyze Iran's capacity to defend against attack and to mount counterattacks. Some have also suggested that military strikes could deliberately target scientific and technical personnel, who may take longer to 'replace' than physical infrastructure. Some of these individuals are based in cities – for example, at university research laboratories in Tehran – which means that the risk of civilian casualties would increase in the event of such attacks (Rogers, 206:7). While all or some of these targets could be attacked, it is more likely that initial strikes would concentrate on actual and suspected nuclear facilities involved in uranium production and enrichment and plutonium separation research. However, due to the amorphous nature of Iranian nuclear facilities, their dispersal across the country and their subterranean design, it is unlikely that the US or Israel could achieve the aim of significantly setting back Iran's nuclear program through one targeted strike. While an article by Seymour Hersh in The New Yorker suggested that nuclear 'bunker busters' might be used against underground targets, it is also possible that an attack would take the form of a sustained conventional bombing campaign over at least four to five days (ibid, 8).

A. **Problems Facing a Military Attack Option**

There are numerous problems with the strategy of preemptive air strikes whether they are conducted by Israel or the United States. Iraq's Osirak facility was one easily identified, above-ground site. There are numerous nuclear-related sites in Iran— many of which are in or near major population centers, maximizing the probable number of civilian casualties in an attack. Indeed, thousands of innocent Iranians would likely perish in a campaign of air strikes (Carpenter, 2006:8). Natanz, Bushehr, and Arak are much farther away from Israel than Osirak. Moreover, these facilities are located hundreds of miles from each other, which makes them more difficult to attack simultaneously. Yiftah Shapir, an Israeli analyst, explains: "Israel's options to counter the threat are limited. A preemptive strike against Iran's missile or nuclear assets is problematic because the targets are too far away, too numerous and dispersed, and too well protected - some of them in deep underground installations" (Shapir, 2003:1).

B. Consequences of a Military Option

1. **Strengthen Iranian Nuclear Ambitions**

Iranian planners have studied Israel's attack on Iraq's Osirak in 1981, and have dispersed nuclear sites around the country, and sited many in or near densely populated areas. Many sites are well hidden or buried underground; it is actually believed that Natanz plant has over 18 meters of concrete and soil above its roof (Brom, 2005:146). The US House of Representatives Subcommittee on Intelligence Policy criticized US intelligence agencies for having inadequate information on Iran's nuclear program and of lacking sufficient information regarding locations of nuclear sites. Senior military figures at the Pentagon

oppose military action and warned that bombs against Iran would not destroy Iran's nuclear program (International Crisis group, 2005:17). It would instead engender a greater determination within Iran to develop a nuclear "deterrent", undermining its intended purpose. Iran had warned earlier that it would withdraw from the NPT in the event of a US attack, and most analysts believe Iran's threat is a genuine one. This would remove the international community's ability to monitor Iran's nuclear program, which would weaken the treaty and lead to further proliferation (Rogers, 2006:7).

2. Instability in the Middle East

Longstanding Iranian links to Hamas in Gaza and the West Bank, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Shia groups in Iraq, along with the presence of significant minority Shia populations in Saudi Arabia and other countries, could lead to severe destabilization throughout the Middle East. From an economic perspective, Iran is a lynchpin for global energy security. An attack on Iran, a primary producer of oil with influence over the Straits of Hormuz, could lead to a further global increase in oil prices. In the same vein, potential US military confrontation with Iran may exacerbate the already fragile regional stability and endanger its national security interests at different fronts:

A-Impact on Iraq:

A military attack on Iran by the US or Israel is likely to provoke a strong Iranian response in Iraq, threatening US, UK and other coalition forces and further jeopardizing hopes of stability. Iran has a keen interest in the outcome of the Iraq conflict, due to both its own history of war with its neighbor during the 1980s and its cultural links and sympathies with the majority Shia living there. Many Iraqis and Americans believe Iran's links to Iraqi Shia

pose a grave threat to stability in Iraq. Iran is already thought to have several thousand intelligence agents operating in the Shia region of Iraq, and despite initially refraining from overtly manipulating the Iraqi Shia, Iran has widely and increasingly been accused of arming and inciting Shia insurgents (Muholland, 2006:2). A decision to activate insurgent units could lead to an escalation in ethnic violence and push Iraq further down the road to bloody civil war (Rogers, 2006:10). Both the US and Iranian governments share an interest in stability in Iraq, but each sees the other as a fundamental obstacle to improved security.

B-Impact on Israel:

Iran has threatened direct attacks on Israel in the event of a military attack on Iranian territory (Iran Focus, 2006:1) which it could effect using ballistic missiles, conventional weapons and asymmetric capabilities (Chossudovsky, 2006:2). It is possible that Iran could exert influence over Hamas to catalyse conflict in the West Bank and Gaza, undermining attempts, for example by the UK government, to reinvigorate the Middle East peace process.

C-Impact on Afghanistan:

Iran has links with the Northern Alliance and Shia groups in Afghanistan, and Iranian officials have threatened retaliation against US forces in Afghanistan should the US attack Iran (Speigel, 2005:1). Not only could NATO forces (including British troops) become targets, but NATO's overall mission in Afghanistan could lose important allies and become bogged down by increased resistance.

D-Impact on Lebanon:

In the event of a military attack on Iran, it is expected that Hezbollah could open a second front, mounting sustained attacks on Israel. Though the recent war in Lebanon may have temporarily weakened Hezbollah's offensive capacity, Hezbollah's stature and confidence appear to have increased dramatically.

3. Inflammation of the "War on Terror"

The West often accuses Iran of being a state sponsor of terrorism. Prominent figures such as former US Defense Secretary William Perry have warned that military action in Iran could lead to a backlash of 'Tehran-sponsored terror attacks.' In June 2006, UK intelligence agencies also warned that Iran could launch attacks on British targets if there was an escalation of tensions between the two countries (The Guardian, 2006:2). Although Iran has an uneasy relationship with the al-Qaida movement, there is no doubt that another Western attack on an Islamic nation would intensify anti-Western and anti- American feeling, and groups like al-Qaida could capitalize on this sentiment (Rogers, 2006:11). The recent conflict in Lebanon generated support for Hezbollah from both Shia and Sunni communities. Similarly, some might perceive any military attack against Iran as an attack on the Islamic world. Though it is impossible to predict where terrorist attacks may occur, involvement in – or support for – military action against Iran might push a country higher up the list of potential targets. It could certainly have a huge impact on inter-community relations throughout the West.

4. Economic Consequences of Military Actions

Military action in Iran could lead to an increase in the price of oil Iran is the world's fourth largest oil exporter and holds 10% of the world's proven oil reserves (Doggett, 2006:1). Whilst it is unlikely that Iran would completely close exports of oil, since 80–90% of its export earnings come from oil, threats to production could have a dramatic impact on the sensitive oil market (Ambrogi, 2006:9). Over the summer months of 2006 the price of oil rose to an unprecedented $77 a barrel, largely as a result of tensions caused by the Iranian diplomatic crisis. In the event of a military attack on Iran, tensions could spill into the oil market, and some analysts predict that the price could rise to over $100 a barrel (Rogers, 2006:10). Analysts agree that Iran could incite paramilitaries in Gulf States such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates to sabotage oil export facilities, creating instability and impacting oil prices (ibid,12). Also Iran could threaten shipping passing through the straits of Hormuz, through effective mining operations or the use of missiles which could impact drastically the world's economy. Noting that Forty percent of the world's shipments of oil – over 21 million barrels a day – pass through this 30-mile-wide strait (AlJazeera Magazine, 2006:1). The impact of this rise in oil price could be felt most by developing countries, especially those in sub-Saharan Africa. Increases in the price of oil cause increases in interest rates, thus globally increasing debt repayments, which is particularly problematic for heavily indebted countries. The International Energy Agency (IEA) has shown that non-oil-producing developing countries are particularly hard hit by high oil prices because they are more reliant on imported oil and use oil less efficiently (International Energy Agency Economic Analysis Division, 2004:1). EU economies would undoubtedly also suffer from increased oil prices and might even be pushed into economic recession.

5. Iranian Reaction to a Military Strike

A military action is generally opposed because it has many risks involved. In a case of military attack Iran would retaliate and probably with some success. Any military action would prompt denunciations from close allies. Even if an attack was successful, the United States would not know how much damage it had done to Iran's nuclear program. The US probably would be able to deter Iran from a direct nuclear attack on American or Israeli targets by threatening massive retaliation and the assured destruction of the Iranian regime. But there is a lingering doubt that a leader such as President Ahmadinejad, who reportedly harbors apocalyptic religious beliefs, would have the same cost-benefit calculus about a nuclear war as other leaders. The west believing he is a bellicose leader, who boldly called for Israel to be "wiped off the map" before he acquired a nuclear weapon, might be sorely tempted to follow through on his threat after he acquired one. Moreover, his regime might risk passing nuclear weapons off to terrorist surrogates in hopes of escaping retaliation for a nuclear surprise attack launched by an unknown attacker (Phillips, 2006:8). Preventive air strikes against Iranian nuclear installations, as discussed mainly in the US, would only slow down the Iranian nuclear program, but not end it. Furthermore, such attacks would probably cause further deep rifts among the international community, trigger regional solidarity with Tehran, and foster domestic consolidation within Iran.

Finally, although there are still advocates of forced regime change in Iran, this option is unlikely to win the support of a majority in the US, given the experience in Iraq. Indeed, such plans appear little promising, not least because Iran has three times the population and four times the territory of its western neighbor, and because Iranian armed forces today are significantly more powerful than those of Saddam Hussein, which were subjected to

international control after the 1991 Gulf War. It should also be taken into consideration that serious coercive measures could provoke a dangerous escalation of the nuclear crisis. Iran might withdraw from the NPT and expel all inspectors, stoke the smoldering civil war in Iraq, or increase its support for terrorist groups. Furthermore, experts believe that by blocking the Straits of Hormuz, Tehran could make the price of oil shoot up to over US$100 per barrel.

6. The Failure of Sanctions against Iran

The U.N. Security Council has to date passed three resolutions concerning the Iranian nuclear program: first, it adopted resolution 1696 in July 2006 demanding that Iran suspend nuclear enrichment under Article 41 of the U.N. Charter, allowing for sanctions. Second, Resolution 1737 was adopted on December 2006, embargoed trade or cooperation that might contribute to Iran's nuclear or ballistic missile program, targeting Iran's Atomic Energy Organization and Defense Industries Organization and companies and individuals involved with them. And finally (third), in March 2007, resolution 1747 embargoed arms exports by Iran (not imports); restricted travel by individuals associated with the nuclear program, and extended the list of sanctioned institutions and persons to include Bank Sepah and senior commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)(Oxford Analytica, 2007:3).

So far it appears that neither U.N. Security Council sanctions nor US unilateral measures have yet succeeded in pressuring Iran to suspend nuclear enrichment. Nevertheless, sanctions remain the best of a poor range of options for Washington and Europe in confronting Tehran over its nuclear activities. Sanctions against Iran are not likely to cause

but international tension. The US sanctions continue to fail because Iran still has many friends. Europeans still have extensive trade with Iran. Russian President Vladimir Putin recently warned the United States not to think of attacking Iran. On Oct. 16 2007, the nations bordering the Caspian Sea, including Iran, issued a declaration in which the countries agreed that none would allow their territories to be used as a base for military strikes against any of the others. India has renewed talks with Iran to establish a pipeline between the two nations. Iran has a positive balance of trade with China, as well as India. China's leadership has repeatedly declared that Iran's nuclear energy program is not an international threat. Japan continues to be an important Iranian trade and diplomatic partner.

It's not surprising that the new sanctions are being greeted with skepticism by the international community of nations. Iran's considerable oil and gas reserves have made it a valuable international trading partner for all but the US. Any move by Washington against Iran that could hurt Russia and China economically would be viewed in Moscow and Beijing with concern. Russia's disapproval of the latest sanctions was evident in a comment by Russian leader Vladimir Putin that President Bush was like a man "running around with a razor blade in his hand"(Walker, 2007:2).

The Bush administration strategy appears to be predicated on several assertions that may not necessarily hold true. First, it believes that damage to Iran's economy could generate protests on the streets and would eventually force Ahmadinejad out of the office. History demonstrates, however, that sanctions rarely have the kind of political impact they are intended to have (ibid, 3).

There is also the fact these new sanctions lack global backing and cannot therefore be effective. Iran will still have business partners in China and Russia and will be able to exploit the international black market economy. Some nonpermanent members of the Security Council such as Libya and South Africa have balked at more sanctions, and Russia and China would like to see more "carrots" than "sticks" offered to Tehran (Pleming, 2008:1). But having been asked whether the United States would consider offering more inducements, US Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns said, "We like the current package" (ibid,2).

Iran, the world's fourth largest oil exporter, says its uranium enrichment is for generating electricity so that it can ship more oil and gas. It denies charges by the West that it seeks to build a nuclear bomb. "New sanctions will not harm Iran's economy ... High oil prices will help Iran to compensate," Economy and Finance Minister Davoud Danesh-Jafari was quoted by the students' news agency ISNA as saying (Hafezi, 2008:2).

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose country denies wanting nuclear weapons, had said world powers could pass sanctions resolutions for 100 years without deterring Tehran from its nuclear work (ibid,3). Iran has also warned Western powers they would be the ones to suffer if new sanctions were imposed on Tehran.

Iran has also taken steps to limit its exposure to the impact of unilateral US sanctions. Tehran says it now receives 70 percent of its oil revenues in currencies other than the dollar and that Iranian banks have stopped issuing letters of credit in dollars, while the central bank is reducing the share of its foreign exchange holding in dollars, though the exact figure remains confidential (Oxford Analytica, 2007:4).

The US continues to impose unilateral sanctions against Iran. The Bush administration has sought to isolate Iran from the global financial system. In September 2006, the US Treasury banned any transactions between the US financial system and Iran's Bank Saderat, and Bank Sepah was also blacklisted. Washington designated the IRGC as an entity of proliferation concern, and its Qods Force as a supporter of terrorism, thus banning transactions between any 'US person' and these entities, as well as freezing their US assets (ibid, 5).

As for US allies, the EU has not imposed any sanctions other than those included in U.N. Security Council resolutions. While Germany has scaled back export credits, both it and Italy remain hesitant to impose additional EU sanctions given the large volume of their trade with Iran. Diplomats from nonpermanent council member states like South Africa, Indonesia and Libya have said they want any resolution voted on by the 15-nation Security Council to reflect a report on Iran from the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna expected to be released. Vienna-based diplomats say IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei is expected to say in the report that he has made significant progress in resolving outstanding questions related to Iran's past nuclear activities (Reuters,Feb 21, 2008).

Indeed it is premature to asses the implications of these sanctions, but so far it seems that efforts are deemed impotent. Few options remain open for Europe and the United States in confronting Iran, other than more sanctions against Tehran. However, there is little prospect that sanctions will have any significant economic effect while oil prices remain high.

Conclusion

The relations between Iran and the US dated back to the early decades of the twentieth century and continued to develop throughout the early years of the twenty first century. Generally speaking, the relations had have witnessed different forms and gone through major turning points within which regional geopolitical changes and power transformations have taken place accordingly. At bilateral level, the era of the US- Iranian relations constituted amalgam -though distinctive- phases of affairs each of which triggered the relations to take a distinct form of policy attitude towards each other.

Indeed, one of the most contested and heated phases that occupied the US-Iranian relations was emerged with the onset of Ayatollah Khomeini ascendancy in Iran in the late years of 1970s and the establishment of the Islamic Republic. Since then, the relations has been severely deteriorated and entered into a vicious circle culminated with the growing sense of distrust, hostility, and animosity between the two states.

In recent years, there has been mounting fertile grounds conducive for intensifying and escalating the already edgy relations demonstrated mainly by: the arrival of President George Bush to power coupled with the arrival of the Iranian conservative leader Ahmadinejad to presidency and his dedication to continue to further develop the Iranian controversial nuclear 'program'.

Without doubts, the growing deepening of the existing political as well ideological divergence between the US and Iran dictated an exacerbations of the already political,

security, as well as economic conflict of interests between the two powers in the region. Hence, according to the Americans, such 'provocative' action accrued by the Iranians to continue to adopt its nuclear aspirations, reveals that the various US interests in the region will accordingly be challenged and in turn entailed a stressing need to take 'effective' countermeasures capable to halt Iran from pursuing its nuclear 'ambitions'.

Given this, the main objective as well as the prime question of this research revolves around assessing those countermeasures strategic options undertaken by the US against Iran. Clearly, in order to understand the complete political as well as strategic dynamics interplay in the assessing process, the research included other relevant key state and non state actors who are directly involved in the issue (such as the EU and IAEA).

As shown above, the research concludes that the US various attempts to 'neutralize Iranian nuclear ambitions' have failed so far to achieve its ends due to the following reasons:

1. The lack of an effective containment policy to isolate Iran's diplomatic and non diplomatic relations and ties especially towards its neighboring states in the Gulf region.

2. The military option is far from mature to take place in that it may backfire on US own strategic and various vital interests in the region.

3. The UN sanctions failed to some extent to deter Iran from altering its position towards advancing its nuclear program.

Theoretically speaking, part one of the research presented all relevant key ideologies and concepts related to the nature of the research. In it, chapter one focused on two main schools of thoughts: realism and liberalism. The objective revolved around laying the foundations for the empirical part of the research to conduct the extent to which theoretical principles coincided with the experimental certainty.

In addition, given the nature of the research, the above-chapters took into consideration on the one hand, those strategic concepts and instruments related to the theoretical foundations of the topic. For instance, some strategic related issues and concepts such as containment policy, balance of power, and deterrence which were thoroughly discussed in the theoretical as well empirical analysis of the research. In fact, the research found out that such strategic concepts coincided and explained to high extent the current relations between the US and Iran - with special reference to the various US countermeasures policies.

Finally, it is worth noting here that the assessment outcomes are concluded within the specified time-framework (2000-2006) and thus it is not meant to serve futuristic-oriented purposes. In other words, what appears to be inactive and irrelevant today may become relevant and effective tomorrow.

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Appendix 1

<div align="center">

TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

</div>

Signed at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968
Ratification advised by US Senate March 13, 1969
Ratified by US President November 24, 1969
US ratification deposited at Washington, London, and Moscow March 5, 1970
Proclaimed by US President March 5, 1970
Entered into force March 5, 1970

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty",

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to cooperate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties of the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear weapon States,

Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in cooperation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament,

Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the worlds human and economic resources,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

Article II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Article III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency

and the Agencys safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this article shall be applied to all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article.

3. The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

Article IV

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

Article V

Each party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a nondiscriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.

Article VI

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Article VII

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

Article VIII

1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.

Article IX

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article X

1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.

Article XI

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

DONE in triplicate, at the cities of Washington, London and Moscow, this first day of July one thousand nine hundred sixty-eight.

Appendix 2

TEXT OF U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1696 (2006): SECURITY COUNCIL DEMANDS IRAN SUSPENDS URANIUM ENRICHMENT BY 31 AUGUST OR FACE POSSIBLE ECONOMIC, DIPLOMATIC SANCTIONS

U.N. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION - NEWS MEDIA DIVISION

July 31, 2006

The Security Council met this morning to consider the item entitled "Non-proliferation."

The Council had before it a draft resolution (document S/2006/589) sponsored by France, Germany and the United Kingdom. The Council adopted the text as resolution 1696 (2006), by a vote of 14 in favour to 1 against (Qatar).

The text of the resolution reads as follows:

"*The Security Council*,

"*Recalling* the Statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15, of 29 March 2006,

"*Reaffirming* its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and recalling the right of States Party, in conformity with Articles I and II of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination,

"*Noting* with serious concern the many reports of the IAEA Director General and resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors related to Iran's nuclear programme, reported to it by the IAEA Director General, including IAEA Board Resolution GOV/2006/14,

"*Noting* with serious concern that the IAEA Director General's report of 27 February 2006 (GOV/2006/15) lists a number of outstanding issues and concerns on Iran's nuclear programme, including topics which could have a military nuclear dimension, and that the IAEA is unable to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran,

"*Noting* with serious concern the IAEA Director General's report of 28 April 2006 (GOV/2006/27) and its findings, including that, after more than three years of Agency efforts to seek clarity about all aspects of Iran's nuclear programme, the existing gaps in knowledge continue to be a matter of concern, and that the IAEA is unable to make

progress in its efforts to provide assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran,

"*Noting* with serious concern that, as confirmed by the IAEA Director General's report of 8 June 2006 (GOV/2006/38) Iran has not taken the steps required of it by the IAEA Board of Governors, reiterated by the Council in its statement of 29 March and which are essential to build confidence, and in particular Iran's decision to resume enrichment-related activities, including research and development, its recent expansion of and announcements about such activities, and its continued suspension of co-operation with the IAEA under the Additional Protocol,

"*Emphasizing* the importance of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution guaranteeing that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes, and *noting* that such a solution would benefit nuclear non-proliferation elsewhere,

"*Welcoming* the statement by the Foreign Minister of France, Philippe Douste-Blazy, on behalf of the Foreign Ministers of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States and the High Representative of the European Union, in Paris on 12 July 2006 (S/2006/573),

"*Concerned* by the proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear programme, *mindful* of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security, and *being determined* to prevent an aggravation of the situation,

"*Acting* under Article 40 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations in order to make mandatory the suspension required by the IAEA,

"1. *Calls upon* Iran without further delay to take the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors in its resolution GOV/2006/14, which are essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and to resolve outstanding questions,

"2. *Demands*, in this context, that Iran shall suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the IAEA,

"3. *Expresses* the conviction that such suspension as well as full, verified Iranian compliance with the requirements set out by the IAEA Board of Governors, would contribute to a diplomatic, negotiated solution that guarantees Iran's nuclear programme is for exclusively peaceful purposes, *underlines* the willingness of the international community to work positively for such a solution, *encourages* Iran, in conforming to the above provisions, to re-engage with the international community and with the IAEA, and *stresses* that such engagement will be beneficial to Iran,

"4. *Endorses*, in this regard, the proposals of China, France, Germany, theRussian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the support of the European Union's High Representative, for a long-term comprehensive arrangement which would

allow for the development of relations and cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect and the establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme (S/2006/521),

"5. *Calls upon* all States, in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, to exercise vigilance and prevent the transfer of any items, materials, goods and technology that could contribute to Iran's enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and ballistic missile programmes,

"6. *Expresses* its determination to reinforce the authority of the IAEA process, strongly supports the role of the IAEA Board of Governors, *commends and encourages* the Director General of the IAEA and its Secretariat for their ongoing professional and impartial efforts to resolve all remaining outstanding issues in Iran within the framework of the Agency, *underlines* the necessity of the IAEA continuing its work to clarify all outstanding issues relating to Iran's nuclear programme, and *calls upon* Iran to act in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol and to implement without delay all transparency measures as the IAEA may request in support of its ongoing investigations,

"7. *Requests* by 31 August a report from the Director General of the IAEA primarily on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in this resolution, as well as on the process of Iranian compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board and with the above provisions of this resolution, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration,

"8. *Expresses* its intention, in the event that Iran has not by that date complied with this resolution, then to adopt appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to persuade Iran to comply with this resolution and the requirements of the IAEA, and *underlines* that further decisions will be required should such additional measures be necessary,

"9. *Confirms* that such additional measures will not be necessary in the event that Iran complies with this resolution,

"10. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter."

**TEXT OF U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1737 (2006):
SECURITY COUNCIL IMPOSES SANCTIONS ON IRAN FOR FAILURE TO
HALT URANIUM ENRICHMENT, UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTED**

U.N. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION - NEWS MEDIA DIVISION

December 23, 2006

The Security Council met today to act on a draft resolution (document S/2006/1010) sponsored by France, Germany and the United Kingdom, which reads as follows:

"*The Security Council*,

"*Recalling* the Statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15, of 29 March 2006, and its resolution 1696 (2006) of 31 July 2006,

"*Reaffirming* its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and recalling the right of States Party, in conformity with Articles I and II of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination,

"*Reiterating* its serious concern over the many reports of the IAEA Director General and resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors related to Iran's nuclear programme, reported to it by the IAEA Director General, including IAEA Board resolution GOV/2006/14,

"*Reiterating* its serious concern that the IAEA Director General's report of 27 February 2006 (GOV/2006/15) lists a number of outstanding issues and concerns on Iran's nuclear programme, including topics which could have a military nuclear dimension, and that the IAEA is unable to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran,

"*Reiterating* its serious concern over the IAEA Director General's report of 28 April 2006 (GOV/2006/27) and its findings, including that, after more than three years of Agency efforts to seek clarity about all aspects of Iran's nuclear programme, the existing gaps in knowledge continue to be a matter of concern, and that the IAEA is unable to make progress in its efforts to provide assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran,

"*Noting* with serious concern that, as confirmed by the IAEA Director General's reports of 8 June 2006 (GOV/2006/38), 31 August 2006 (GOV/2006/53) and 14 November 2006 (GOV/2006/64), Iran has not established full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities as set out in resolution 1696 (2006), nor resumed its cooperation with the IAEA under the Additional Protocol, nor taken the other steps required of it by the IAEA Board of Governors, nor complied with the provisions of Security Council resolution 1696 (2006) and which are essential to build confidence, and *deploring* Iran's refusal to take these steps,

"*Emphasizing* the importance of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution guaranteeing that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes, and *noting* that such a solution would benefit nuclear non-proliferation elsewhere, and *welcoming* the continuing commitment of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation,

the United Kingdom and the United States, with the support of the European Union's High Representative to seek a negotiated solution,

"*Determined* to give effect to its decisions by adopting appropriate measures to persuade Iran to comply with resolution 1696 (2006) and with the requirements of the IAEA, and also to constrain Iran's development of sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear and missile programmes, until such time as the Security Council determines that the objectives of this resolution have been met,

"*Concerned* by the proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear programme and, in this context, by Iran's continuing failure to meet the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors and to comply with the provisions of Security Council resolution 1696 (2006), *mindful* of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,

"*Acting* under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

"1. *Affirms* that Iran shall without further delay take the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors in its resolution GOV/2006/14, which are essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and to resolve outstanding questions;

"2. *Decides*, in this context, that Iran shall without further delay suspend the following proliferation sensitive nuclear activities:

(a) all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the IAEA; and

(b) work on all heavy water-related projects, including the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water, also to be verified by the IAEA;

"3. *Decides* that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for the use in or benefit of, Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology which could contribute to Iran's enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, namely:

(a) those set out in sections B.2, B.3, B.4, B.5, B.6 and B.7 of INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 1 in document S/2006/814;

(b) those set out in sections A.1 and B.1 of INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 1 in document S/2006/814, except the supply, sale or transfer of:

(i) equipment covered by B.1 when such equipment is for light water reactors;

(ii) low-enriched uranium covered by A.1.2 when it is incorporated in assembled nuclear fuel elements for such reactors;

(c) those set out in document S/2006/815, except the supply, sale or transfer of items covered by 19.A.3 of Category II;

(d) any additional items, materials, equipment, goods and technology, determined as necessary by the Security Council or the Committee established by paragraph 18 below (herein "the Committee"), which could contribute to enrichment-related, or reprocessing, or heavy water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;

"4. *Decides* that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for the use in or benefit of, Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of the following items, materials, equipment, goods and technology:

(a) those set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part2 of document S/2006/814 if the State determines that they would contribute to enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities;

(b) any other items not listed in documents S/2006/814 or S/2006/815 if the State determines that they would contribute to enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;

(c) any further items if the State determines that they would contribute to the pursuit of activities related to other topics about which the IAEA has expressed concerns or identified as outstanding;

"5. *Decides* that, for the supply, sale or transfer of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology covered by documents S/2006/814 and S/2006/815 the export of which to Iran is not prohibited by subparagraphs 3 (b), 3 (c) or 4 (a) above, States shall ensure that:

(a) the requirements, as appropriate, of the Guidelines as set out in documents S/2006/814 and S/2006/985 have been met; and

(b) they have obtained and are in a position to exercise effectively a right to verify the end-use and end-use location of any supplied item; and

(c) they notify the Committee within ten days of the supply, sale or transfer; and

(d) in the case of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology contained in document S/2006/814, they also notify the IAEA within ten days of the supply, sale or transfer;

"6. *Decides* that all States shall also take the necessary measures to prevent the provision to Iran of any technical assistance or training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services, and the transfer of financial resources or services, related to the supply, sale,

transfer, manufacture or use of the prohibited items, materials, equipment, goods and technology specified in paragraphs 3 and 4 above;

"7. *Decides* that Iran shall not export any of the items in documents S/2006/814 and S/2006/815 and that all Member States shall prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of Iran;

"8. *Decides* that Iran shall provide such access and cooperation as the IAEA requests to be able to verify the suspension outlined in paragraph 2 and to resolve all outstanding issues, as identified in IAEA reports, and *calls upon* Iran to ratify promptly the Additional Protocol;

"9. *Decides* that the measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 above shall not apply where the Committee determines in advance and on a case-by-case basis that such supply, sale, transfer or provision of such items or assistance would clearly not contribute to the development of Iran's technologies in support of its proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and of development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including where such items or assistance are for food, agricultural, medical or other humanitarian purposes, provided that:

(a) contracts for delivery of such items or assistance include appropriate end-user guarantees; and

(b) Iran has committed not to use such items in proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;

"10. *Calls upon* all States to exercise vigilance regarding the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals who are engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, and decides in this regard that all States shall notify the Committee of the entry into or transit through their territories of the persons designated in the Annex to this resolution (herein "the Annex"), as well as of additional persons designated by the Security Council or the Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including through the involvement in procurement of the prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology specified by and under the measures in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, except where such travel is for activities directly related to the items in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) above;

"11. *Underlines* that nothing in the above paragraph requires a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory, and that all States shall, in the implementation of the above paragraph, take into account humanitarian considerations as well as the necessity to meet the objectives of this resolution, including where Article XV of the IAEA Statute is engaged;

"12. D*ecides* that all States shall freeze the funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are on their territories at the date of adoption of this resolution or at any time thereafter, that are owned or controlled by the persons or entities designated in the Annex, as well as those of additional persons or entities designated by the Security Council or by the Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, or by persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, and that the measures in this paragraph shall cease to apply in respect of such persons or entities if, and at such time as, the Security Council or the Committee removes them from the Annex, and *decides further* that all States shall ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any persons or entities within their territories, to or for the benefit of these persons and entities;

"13. *Decides* that the measures imposed by paragraph 12 above do not apply to funds, other financial assets or economic resources that have been determined by relevant States:

(a) to be necessary for basic expenses, including payment for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges or exclusively for payment of reasonable professional fees and reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services, or fees or service charges, in accordance with national laws, for routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds, other financial assets and economic resources, after notification by the relevant States to the Committee of the intention to authorize, where appropriate, access to such funds, other financial assets or economic resources and in the absence of a negative decision by the Committee within five working days of such notification;

(b) to be necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that such determination has been notified by the relevant States to the Committee and has been approved by the Committee;

(c) to be the subject of a judicial, administrative or arbitral lien or judgement, in which case the funds, other financial assets and economic resources may be used to satisfy that lien or judgement provided that the lien or judgement was entered into prior to the date of the present resolution, is not for the benefit of a person or entity designated pursuant to paragraphs 10 and 12 above, and has been notified by the relevant States to the Committee;

(d) to be necessary for activities directly related to the items specified in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) and have been notified by the relevant States to the Committee;

"14. *Decides* that States may permit the addition to the accounts frozen pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 12 above of interests or other earnings due on those accounts or payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that arose prior to the date on which those accounts became subject to the provisions of this resolution, provided that any such interest, other earnings and payments continue to be subject to these provisions and are frozen;

"15. *Decides* that the measures in paragraph 12 above shall not prevent a designated person or entity from making payment due under a contract entered into prior to the listing of such a person or entity, provided that the relevant States have determined that:

(a) the contract is not related to any of the prohibited items, materials, equipment, goods, technologies, assistance, training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or services referred to in paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 above;

(b) the payment is not directly or indirectly received by a person or entity designated pursuant to paragraph 12 above;

and after notification by the relevant States to the Committee of the intention to make or receive such payments or to authorize, where appropriate, the unfreezing of funds, other financial assets or economic resources for this purpose, 10 working days prior to such authorization;

"16. *Decides* that technical cooperation provided to Iran by the IAEA or under its auspices shall only be for food, agricultural, medical, safety or other humanitarian purposes, or where it is necessary for projects directly related to the items specified in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) above, but that no such technical cooperation shall be provided that relates to the proliferation sensitive nuclear activities set out in paragraph 2 above;

"17. *Calls upon* all States to exercise vigilance and prevent specialized teaching or training of Iranian nationals, within their territories or by their nationals, of disciplines which would contribute to Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;

"18. *Decides* to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the Council, to undertake the following tasks:

(a) to seek from all States, in particular those in the region and those producing the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, information regarding the actions taken by them to implement effectively the measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 12 of this resolution and whatever further information it may consider useful in this regard;

(b) to seek from the secretariat of the IAEA information regarding the actions taken by the IAEA to implement effectively the measures imposed by paragraph 17 of this resolution and whatever further information it may consider useful in this regard;

(c) to examine and take appropriate action on information regarding alleged violations of measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 12 of this resolution;

(d) to consider and decide upon requests for exemptions set out in paragraphs 9, 13 and 15 above;

(e) to determine as may be necessary additional items, materials, equipment, goods and technology to be specified for the purpose of paragraph 3 above;

(f) to designate as may be necessary additional individuals and entities subject to the measures imposed by paragraphs 10 and 12 above;

(g) to promulgate guidelines as may be necessary to facilitate the implementation of the measures imposed by this resolution and include in such guidelines a requirement on States to provide information where possible as to why any individuals and/or entities meet the criteria set out in paragraphs 10 and 12 and any relevant identifying information;

(h) to report at least every 90 days to the Security Council on its work and on the implementation of this resolution, with its observations and recommendations, in particular on ways to strengthen the effectiveness of the measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 12 above;

"19. *Decides* that all States shall report to the Committee within 60 days of the adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing effectively paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12 and 17 above;

"20. *Expresses* the conviction that the suspension set out in paragraph 2 above as well as full, verified Iranian compliance with the requirements set out by the IAEA Board of Governors, would contribute to a diplomatic, negotiated solution that guarantees Iran's nuclear programme is for exclusively peaceful purposes, *underlines* the willingness of the international community to work positively for such a solution, *encourages* Iran, in conforming to the above provisions, to re-engage with the international community and with the IAEA, and *stresses* that such engagement will be beneficial to Iran;

"21. *Welcomes* the commitment of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the support of the European Union's High Representative, to a negotiated solution to this issue and encourages Iran to engage with their June 2006 proposals (S/2006/521), which were endorsed by the Security Council in resolution 1696 (2006), for a long-term comprehensive agreement which would allow for the development of relations and cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect and the establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme;

"22. *Reiterates* its determination to reinforce the authority of the IAEA, strongly supports the role of the IAEA Board of Governors, *commends* and *encourages* the Director General of the IAEA and its secretariat for their ongoing professional and impartial efforts to resolve all remaining outstanding issues in Iran within the framework of the IAEA, *underlines* the necessity of the IAEA continuing its work to clarify all outstanding issues relating to Iran's nuclear programme;

"23. *Requests* within 60 days a report from the Director General of the IAEA on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in this resolution, as well as on the process of Iranian compliance with all the steps required by the

IAEA Board and with the other provisions of this resolution, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration;

"24. *Affirms* that it shall review Iran's actions in the light of the report referred to in paragraph 23 above, to be submitted within 60 days, and:

(a) that it shall suspend the implementation of measures if and for so long as Iran suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, as verified by the IAEA, to allow for negotiations;

(b) that it shall terminate the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10 and 12 of this resolution as soon as it determines that Iran has fully complied with its obligations under the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and met the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors, as confirmed by the IAEA Board;

(c) that it shall, in the event that the report in paragraph 23 above shows that Iran has not complied with this resolution, adopt further appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to persuade Iran to comply with this resolution and the requirements of the IAEA, and underlines that further decisions will be required should such additional measures be necessary;

"25. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter."

Resolution Annex

A. Entities involved in the nuclear programme

1. Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran

2. Mesbah Energy Company (provider for A40 research reactor — Arak)

3. Kala-Electric (aka Kalaye Electric) (provider for PFEP — Natanz)

4. Pars Trash Company (involved in centrifuge programme, identified in IAEA reports)

5. Farayand Technique (involved in centrifuge programme, identified in IAEA reports)

6. Defence Industries Organisation (overarching MODAFL-controlled entity, some of whose subordinates have been involved in the centrifuge programme making components, and in the missile programme)

7. 7th of Tir (subordinate of DIO, widely recognized as being directly involved in the nuclear programme)

B. Entities involved in the ballistic missile programme

1. Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) (subordinate entity of AIO)

2. Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG) (subordinate entity of AIO)

3. Fajr Industrial Group (formerly Instrumentation Factory Plant, subordinate entity of AIO)

C. Persons involved in the nuclear programme

1. Mohammad Qannadi, AEOI Vice President for Research & Development

2. Behman Asgarpour, Operational Manager (Arak)

3. Dawood Agha-Jani, Head of the PFEP (Natanz)

4. Ehsan Monajemi, Construction Project Manager, Natanz

5. Jafar Mohammadi, Technical Adviser to the AEOI (in charge of managing the production of valves for centrifuges)

6. Ali Hajinia Leilabadi, Director General of Mesbah Energy Company

7. Lt Gen Mohammad Mehdi Nejad Nouri, Rector of Malek Ashtar University of Defence Technology (chemistry dept, affiliated to MODALF, has conducted experiments on beryllium)

D. Persons involved in the ballistic missile programme

1. Gen Hosein Salimi, Commander of the Air Force, IRGC (Pasdaran)

2. Ahmad Vahid Dastjerdi, Head of the AIO

3. Reza-Gholi Esmaeli, Head of Trade & International Affairs Dept, AIO

4. Bahmanyar Morteza Bahmanyar, Head of Finance & Budget Dept, AIO

E. Persons involved in both the nuclear and ballistic missile programmes

1. Maj Gen Yahya Rahim Safavi, Commander, IRGC (Pasdaran)

TEXT OF U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1747 (2007):
SECURITY COUNCIL UNANIMOUSLY VOTES TO TOUGHEN SANCTIONS
AGAINST IRAN

U.N. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION - NEWS MEDIA DIVISION

March 24, 2007

The Security Council met today to take action on the draft resolution contained in document S/2007/170, sponsored by France, Germany and the United Kingdom. The text reads as follows:

"*The Security Council*,

"*Recalling* the Statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15, of 29 March 2006, and its resolution 1696 (2006) of 31 July 2006, and its resolution 1737 (2006) of 23 December 2006, and *reaffirming* their provisions,

"*Reaffirming* its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the need for all States party to that Treaty to comply fully with all their obligations, and recalling the right of States parties, in conformity with articles I and II of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination,

"*Recalling* its serious concern over the reports of the IAEA Director General as set out in its resolutions 1696 (2006) and 1737 (2006),

"*Recalling* the latest report by the IAEA Director General (GOV/2007/8) of 22 February 2007 and *deploring* that, as indicated therein, Iran has failed to comply with resolution 1696 (2006) and resolution 1737 (2006),

"*Emphasizing* the importance of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution guaranteeing that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes, and *noting* that such a solution would benefit nuclear non-proliferation elsewhere, and *welcoming* the continuing commitment of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the support of the European Union's High Representative, to seek a negotiated solution,

"*Recalling* the resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors (GOV/2006/14), which states that a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue would contribute to global non-proliferation efforts and to realizing the objective of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery,

"*Determined* to give effect to its decisions by adopting appropriate measures to persuade Iran to comply with resolution 1696 (2006) and resolution 1737 (2006) and with the requirements of the IAEA, and also to constrain Iran's development of sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear and missile programmes, until such time as the Security Council determines that the objectives of these resolutions have been met,

"*Recalling* the requirement on States to join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council,

"*Concerned* by the proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear programme and, in this context, by Iran's continuing failure to meet the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors and to comply with the provisions of Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006) and 1737 (2006), *mindful* of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,

"*Acting* under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

"1. *Reaffirms* that Iran shall without further delay take the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors in its resolution GOV/2006/14, which are essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and to resolve outstanding questions and, in this context, *affirms* its decision that Iran shall without further delay take the steps required in paragraph 2 of resolution 1737 (2006);

"2. *Calls upon* all States also to exercise vigilance and restraint regarding the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals who are engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, and *decides* in this regard that all States shall notify the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 18 of resolution 1737 (2006) (herein "the Committee") of the entry into or transit through their territories of the persons designated in the Annex to resolution 1737 (2006) or Annex I to this resolution, as well as of additional persons designated by the Security Council or the Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including through the involvement in procurement of the prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology specified by and under the measures in paragraphs 3 and 4 of

resolution 1737 (2006), except where such travel is for activities directly related to the items in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) of that resolution;

"3. *Underlines* that nothing in the above paragraph requires a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory, and that all States shall, in the implementation of the above paragraph, take into account humanitarian considerations, including religious obligations, as well as the necessity to meet the objectives of this resolution and resolution 1737 (2006), including where article XV of the IAEA Statute is engaged;

"4. *Decides* that the measures specified in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of resolution 1737 (2006) shall apply also to the persons and entities listed in Annex I to this resolution;

"5. *Decides* that Iran shall not supply, sell or transfer directly or indirectly from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft any arms or related materiel, and that all States shall prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of Iran;

"6. *Calls upon* all States to exercise vigilance and restraint in the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft of any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register on Conventional Arms to Iran, and in the provision to Iran of any technical assistance or training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services, and the transfer of financial resources or services, related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture or use of such items in order to prevent a destabilising accumulation of arms;

"7. *Calls upon* all States and international financial institutions not to enter into new commitments for grants, financial assistance, and concessional loans, to the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, except for humanitarian and developmental purposes;

"8. *Calls upon* all States to report to the Committee within 60 days of the adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing effectively paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 above;

"9. *Expresses* the conviction that the suspension set out in paragraph 2 of resolution 1737 (2006), as well as full, verified Iranian compliance with the requirements set out by the IAEA Board of Governors would contribute to a diplomatic, negotiated solution that guarantees Iran's nuclear programme is for exclusively peaceful purposes, *underlines* the willingness of the international community to work positively for such a solution, *encourages* Iran, in conforming to the above provisions, to re-engage with the international community and with the IAEA, and *stresses* that such engagement will be beneficial to Iran;

"10. *Welcomes* the continuous affirmation of the commitment of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the support of the European Union's High Representative, to a negotiated solution to this issue and

encourages Iran to engage with their June 2006 proposals (S/2006/521), attached in Annex II to this resolution, which were endorsed by the Security Council in resolution 1696 (2006), and *acknowledges* with appreciation that this offer to Iran remains on the table, for a long-term comprehensive agreement which would allow for the development of relations and cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect and the establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme;

"11. *Reiterates* its determination to reinforce the authority of the IAEA, strongly supports the role of the IAEA Board of Governors, *commends* and *encourages* the Director General of the IAEA and its secretariat for their ongoing professional and impartial efforts to resolve all outstanding issues in Iran within the framework of the IAEA, *underlines* the necessity of the IAEA, which is internationally recognized as having authority for verifying compliance with safeguards agreements, including the non-diversion of nuclear material for non-peaceful purposes, in accordance with its Statute, to continue its work to clarify all outstanding issues relating to Iran's nuclear programme;

"12. *Requests* within 60 days a further report from the Director General of the IAEA on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in resolution 1737 (2006), as well as on the process of Iranian compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board and with the other provisions of resolution 1737 (2006) and of this resolution, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration;

"13. *Affirms* that it shall review Iran's actions in light of the report referred to in paragraph 12 above, to be submitted within 60 days, and:

(a) that it shall suspend the implementation of measures if and for so long as Iran suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, as verified by the IAEA, to allow for negotiations in good faith in order to reach an early and mutually acceptable outcome;

(b) that it shall terminate the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 12 of resolution 1737 (2006) as well as in paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 above as soon as it determines, following receipt of the report referred to in paragraph 12 above, that Iran has fully complied with its obligations under the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and met the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors, as confirmed by the IAEA Board;

(c) that it shall, in the event that the report in paragraph 12 above shows that Iran has not complied with resolution 1737 (2006) and this resolution, adopt further appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to persuade Iran to comply with these resolutions and the requirements of the IAEA, and underlines that further decisions will be required should such additional measures be necessary;

"14. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter."

Resolution Annex I

Entities involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities

1. Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG) (aka Ammunition Industries Group) (AMIG controls 7th of Tir, which is designated under resolution 1737 (2006) for its role in Iran's centrifuge programme. AMIG is in turn owned and controlled by the Defence Industries Organisation (DIO), which is designated under resolution 1737 (2006))

2. Esfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Centre (NFRPC) and Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre (ENTC) (Parts of the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran's (AEOI) Nuclear Fuel Production and Procurement Company, which is involved in enrichment-related activities. AEOI is designated under resolution 1737 (2006))

3. Kavoshyar Company (Subsidiary company of AEOI, which has sought glass fibres, vacuum chamber furnaces and laboratory equipment for Iran's nuclear programme)

4. Parchin Chemical Industries (Branch of DIO, which produces ammunition, explosives, as well as solid propellants for rockets and missiles)

5. Karaj Nuclear Research Centre(Part of AEOI's research division)

6. Novin Energy Company (aka Pars Novin) (Operates within AEOI and has transferred funds on behalf of AEOI to entities associated with Iran's nuclear programme)

7. Cruise Missile Industry Group (aka Naval Defence Missile Industry Group) (Production and development of cruise missiles. Responsible for naval missiles including cruise missiles)

8. Bank Sepah and Bank Sepah International (Bank Sepah provides support for the Aerospace Industries Organisation (AIO) and subordinates, including Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) and Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG), both of which were designated under resolution 1737 (2006)

9. Sanam Industrial Group (subordinate to AIO, which has purchased equipment on AIO's behalf for the missile programme)

10. Ya Mahdi Industries Group (subordinate to AIO, which is involved in international purchases of missile equipment)

Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps entities

1. Qods Aeronautics Industries (Produces unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), parachutes, paragliders, paramotors, etc. Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has boasted of using these products as part of its asymmetric warfare doctrine)

2. Pars Aviation Services Company (Maintains various aircraft including MI-171, used by IRGC Air Force)

3. Sho'a' Aviation (Produces micro-lights which IRGC has claimed it is using as part of its asymmetric warfare doctrine)

Persons involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities

1. Fereidoun Abbasi-Davani (Senior Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) scientist with links to the Institute of Applied Physics, working closely with Mohsen Fakhrizadeh-Mahabadi, designated below)

2. Mohsen Fakhrizadeh-Mahabadi (Senior MODAFL scientist and former head of the Physics Research Centre (PHRC). The IAEA have asked to interview him about the activities of the PHRC over the period he was head but Iran has refused)

3. Seyed Jaber Safdari (Manager of the Natanz Enrichment Facilities)

4. Amir Rahimi (Head of Esfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Centre, which is part of the AEOI's Nuclear Fuel Production and Procurement Company, which is involved in enrichment-related activities)

5. Mohsen Hojati (Head of Fajr Industrial Group, which is designated under resolution 1737 (2006) for its role in the ballistic missile programme)

6. Mehrdada Akhlaghi Ketabachi (Head of SBIG, which is designated under resolution 1737 (2006) for its role in the ballistic missile programme)

7. Naser Maleki (Head of SHIG, which is designated under resolution 1737 (2006) for its role in Iran's ballistic missile programme. Naser Maleki is also a MODAFL official overseeing work on the Shahab-3 ballistic missile programme. The Shahab-3 is Iran's long range ballistic missile currently in service)

8. Ahmad Derakhshandeh (Chairman and Managing Director of Bank Sepah, which provides support for the AIO and subordinates, including SHIG and SBIG, both of which were designated under resolution 1737 (2006))

Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps key persons

1. Brigadier General Morteza Rezaie (Deputy Commander of IRGC)

2. Vice Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian (Chief of IRGC Joint Staff.)

3. Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Zahedi (Commander of IRGC Ground Forces)

4. Rear Admiral Morteza Safari (Commander of IRGC Navy)

5. Brigadier General Mohammad Hejazi (Commander of Bassij resistance force)

6. Brigadier General Qasem Soleimani (Commander of Qods force)

7. General Zolqadr (IRGC officer, Deputy Interior Minister for Security Affairs)

Resolution Annex II

Elements of a long-term agreement

Our goal is to develop relations and cooperation with Iran, based on mutual respect and the establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran. We propose a fresh start in the negotiation of a comprehensive agreement with Iran. Such an agreement would be deposited with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and endorsed in a Security Council resolution.

To create the right conditions for negotiations,

We will:

- Reaffirm Iran's right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (hereinafter, NPT), and in this context reaffirm our support for the development by Iran of a civil nuclear energy programme.
- Commit to support actively the building of new light water reactors in Iran through international joint projects, in accordance with the IAEA statute and NPT.
- Agree to suspend discussion of Iran's nuclear programme in the Security Council upon the resumption of negotiations.

Iran will:

- Commit to addressing all of the outstanding concerns of IAEA through full cooperation with IAEA.
- Suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities to be verified by IAEA, as requested by the IAEA Board of Governors and the Security Council, and commit to continue this during these negotiations.
- Resume the implementation of the Additional Protocol.

Areas of future cooperation to be covered in negotiations on a long-term agreement

1. Nuclear

We will take the following steps:

Iran's rights to nuclear energy

- Reaffirm Iran's inalienable right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of NPT, and cooperate with Iran in the development by Iran of a civil nuclear power programme.
- Negotiate and implement a Euratom/Iran nuclear cooperation agreement.

Light water reactors

- Actively support the building of new light water power reactors in Iran through international joint projects, in accordance with the IAEA statute and NPT, using state-of-the-art technology, including by authorizing the transfer of necessary goods and the provision of advanced technology to make its power reactors safe against earthquakes.
- Provide cooperation with the management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste through appropriate arrangements.

Research and development in nuclear energy

- Provide a substantive package of research and development cooperation, including possible provision of light water research reactors, notably in the fields of radioisotope production, basic research and nuclear applications in medicine and agriculture.

Fuel guarantees

- Give legally binding, multilayered fuel assurances to Iran, based on:
  - Participation as a partner in an international facility in Russia to provide enrichment services for a reliable supply of fuel to Iran's nuclear reactors. Subject to negotiations, such a facility could enrich all uranium hexaflouride (UF6) produced in Iran.
  - Establishment on commercial terms of a buffer stock to hold a reserve of up to five years' supply of nuclear fuel dedicated to Iran, with the participation and under supervision of IAEA.
  - Development with IAEA of a standing multilateral mechanism for reliable access to nuclear fuel, based on ideas to be considered at the next meeting of the Board of Governors.

Review of moratorium

The long-term agreement would, with regard to common efforts to build international confidence, contain a clause for review of the agreement in all its aspects, to follow:

- Confirmation by IAEA that all outstanding issues and concerns reported by it, including those activities which could have a military nuclear dimension, have been resolved;
- Confirmation that there are no undeclared nuclear activities or materials in Iran and that international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's civil nuclear programme has been restored.

2. Political and economic

Regional security cooperation

Support for a new conference to promote dialogue and cooperation on regional security issues.

International trade and investment

Improving Iran's access to the international economy, markets and capital, through practical support for full integration into international structures, including the World Trade Organization and to create the framework for increased direct investment in Iran and trade with Iran (including a trade and economic cooperation agreement with the European Union). Steps would be taken to improve access to key goods and technology.

Civil aviation

Civil aviation cooperation, including the possible removal of restrictions on United States and European manufacturers in regard to the export of civil aircraft to Iran, thereby widening the prospect of Iran renewing its fleet of civil airliners.

Energy partnership

Establishment of a long-term energy partnership between Iran and the European Union and other willing partners, with concrete and practical applications.

Telecommunications infrastructure

Support for the modernization of Iran's telecommunication infrastructure and advanced Internet provision, including by possible removal of relevant United States and other export restrictions.

High technology cooperation

Cooperation in fields of high technology and other areas to be agreed upon.

Agriculture

Support for agricultural development in Iran, including possible access to United States and European agricultural products, technology and farm equipment.

تقييم التغيرات في الخيارات الأمريكية الإستراتيجية في ضوء تعاظم طموحات إيران النووية
(2000-2006)

إعداد
رنا نائل شبانه

المشرف
الدكتور وليد أبو دلبوح

ملخص

استقطبت قضية إيران النووية في السنوات القليلة الماضية أهمية بالغة، سواء كان ذلك على الصعيد السياسي، الأمني، أو الإستراتيجي. حيث دخلت العلاقات الأمريكية الإيرانية مؤخرا في دوامة مستديمة خاصة بعد أن استلم كل من الرئيس الأمريكي جورج بوش و الرئيس الإيراني الحكم في عامي 2002 و2005 على التوالي. إن إصرار إيران على برنامجها النووي ولّد المزيد من التعقيدات حول العلاقات الأمريكية الإيرانية. وفقا لذلك، تعمل الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية بجدية على الحيلولة دون وصول إيران إلى تحقيق طموحاتها النووية . فقامت الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية، حتى الآن، بتطبيق عدد من الخيارات الإستراتيجية المتوفرة في محاولة منها لاخضاع ايران على التخلي عن برنامجها النووي.

و بناء على ما سبق، تهدف هذه الرسالة الى تقييم هذه الخيارات الاستراتيجية المتبعة من قبل الولايات المتحدة الامريكية المتعلقة بموضوع ايران النووي. من خلال المناقشات التحليلية التي تدور حولها فصول هذه الرسالة ، تم التوصل الى ان الولايات المتحدة الامريكية قد فشلت نوعا ما في الحد من طموحات ايران النووية على الأقل في الوقت الراهن، كما أن سياسة الاحتواء لم تثبت فعاليتها في تغيير مسار ايران النووي. في المقابل يتوصل الباحث الى ان الخيار العسكري الامريكي لا يبدو خيارا منطقيا في الوقت الراهن، حيث يمكن ان يرتد سلبيا على المصالح الامريكية في المنطقة.